init/tpm_encryption/encryption_key_test.cc

// Copyright 2018 The ChromiumOS Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "init/tpm_encryption/encryption_key.h"

#include <memory>

#include <base/files/file_util.h>
#include <base/files/scoped_file.h>
#include <base/functional/bind.h>
#include <base/logging.h>
#include <base/strings/stringprintf.h>
#include <brillo/secure_blob.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <libhwsec-foundation/tlcl_wrapper/fake_tlcl_wrapper.h>
#include <libstorage/platform/mock_platform.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>

#include "init/tpm_encryption/tpm.h"

namespace encryption {
namespace {

// Size of the encryption key (256 bit AES) in bytes.
const size_t kEncryptionKeySize = 32;

#if !USE_TPM_DYNAMIC

// A random encryption key used in tests that exercise the situation where NVRAM
// space is missing and we fall back to writing the encryption key to disk.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncryptionKeyNeedsFinalization = {
    0xa4, 0x46, 0x75, 0x14, 0x38, 0x66, 0x83, 0x14, 0x2f, 0x88, 0x03,
    0x31, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x47, 0x6a, 0x52, 0x78, 0xcd, 0xff, 0xb9, 0x9c,
    0x99, 0x9e, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x79, 0xf7, 0xad, 0x34, 0x2f, 0xb0,
};

// This is kEncryptionKeyNeedsFinalization, obfuscated by encrypting it with a
// well-known hard-coded system key (the SHA-256 hash of "needs finalization").
brillo::SecureBlob kWrappedKeyNeedsFinalization = {
    0x38, 0x38, 0x9e, 0x59, 0x39, 0x88, 0xae, 0xb8, 0x74, 0xe8, 0x14, 0x58,
    0x78, 0x12, 0x1b, 0xb1, 0xf4, 0x70, 0xb9, 0x0f, 0x76, 0x22, 0x97, 0xe6,
    0x43, 0x21, 0x59, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x86, 0x90, 0x74, 0x23, 0x7f, 0x14, 0xd1,
    0x3d, 0xef, 0x01, 0x92, 0x9c, 0x89, 0x15, 0x85, 0xc5, 0xe5, 0x78, 0x10,
};

#endif  // !USE_TPM_DYNAMIC

#if USE_TPM2

#if !USE_TPM_DYNAMIC

const uint32_t kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2 =
    TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE | TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD | TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE |
    TPMA_NV_READ_STCLEAR | TPMA_NV_WRITTEN;

#endif  // USE_TPM_DYNAMIC

const uint8_t kPCRBootModeValue[] = {
    0x89, 0xea, 0xf3, 0x51, 0x34, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x4c,
    0x0c, 0x76, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xae, 0xab, 0x8b, 0xb3, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x3c,
    0xc7, 0xa6, 0x83, 0xc4, 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x15, 0x81, 0xc8, 0xc7,
};

// NVRAM space contents used in tests that exercise behavior with existing
// valid NVRAM space contents. Contains a random system key.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncStatefulTpm2Contents = {
    0x32, 0x4D, 0x50, 0x54, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xa3, 0xea,
    0xd7, 0x78, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xd7, 0x8f, 0xa1, 0x9a, 0xbd,
    0x04, 0x6a, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x21, 0xc7, 0x60, 0x1c, 0x45, 0xe3,
    0x06, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x68, 0x94, 0x96, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0xf3, 0x67,
};

// A random encryption key used in tests that exercise existing keys.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm2 = {
    0x7c, 0xdd, 0x2f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0x6d, 0x28, 0x5b, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0xa5,
    0x84, 0x82, 0x41, 0x02, 0x36, 0x7a, 0x17, 0xc6, 0xe4, 0x78, 0x0e,
    0x86, 0x50, 0x6c, 0x09, 0x50, 0x5c, 0x33, 0x57, 0x19, 0xae,
};

// This is kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm2, encrypted with the system key from
// kEncStatefulTpm2Contents.
brillo::SecureBlob kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm2 = {
    0xf4, 0xb0, 0x45, 0xc6, 0x24, 0xf8, 0xcd, 0x92, 0xb4, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x2f,
    0x45, 0x5e, 0x23, 0x8b, 0xba, 0xde, 0x67, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x3f, 0x74, 0xf1,
    0x60, 0x64, 0xa2, 0xca, 0x79, 0xce, 0xed, 0xa7, 0x04, 0xd1, 0xa5, 0x06,
    0x80, 0xc5, 0x84, 0xed, 0x34, 0x93, 0xb1, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x0a, 0x4a, 0x3e,
};

#else  // USE_TPM2

const uint32_t kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1 =
    TPM_NV_PER_WRITE_STCLEAR | TPM_NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR;
const uint32_t kLockboxAttributesTpm1 = TPM_NV_PER_WRITEDEFINE;

const uint8_t kPCRBootModeValue[] = {
    0x06, 0x4a, 0xec, 0x9b, 0xbd, 0x94, 0xde, 0xa1, 0x23, 0x1a,
    0xe7, 0x57, 0x67, 0x64, 0x7f, 0x09, 0x8c, 0x39, 0x8e, 0x79,
};

// NVRAM space contents used in tests that exercise behavior with existing
// valid NVRAM space contents. This contains a random "lockbox salt", which
// doubles as the system key for TPM 1.2 devices.
brillo::SecureBlob kLockboxV2Contents = {
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0xfa, 0x33, 0x18, 0x5b, 0x57, 0x64, 0x83,
    0x57, 0x9a, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0xb9, 0x94, 0xc5,
    0xc9, 0xa8, 0xd9, 0x32, 0xb4, 0xfb, 0x65, 0xb2, 0x5f, 0xb8, 0x60, 0xb8,
    0xfb, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x77, 0xad, 0x53, 0x46, 0x2e, 0xec, 0x13, 0x4a, 0x95,
    0x4a, 0xb8, 0x12, 0x2a, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0xb0, 0xc9, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x0c, 0x06,
    0x51, 0x12, 0xcc, 0x72, 0x4d, 0x7c, 0x59, 0xb5, 0xe6,
};

// A random encryption key used in tests that exercise existing keys.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2 = {
    0xfa, 0x33, 0x18, 0x5b, 0x57, 0x64, 0x83, 0x57, 0x9a, 0xaa, 0xab,
    0xef, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0xb9, 0x94, 0xc5, 0xc9, 0xa8, 0xd9,
    0x32, 0xb4, 0xfb, 0x65, 0xb2, 0x5f, 0xb8, 0x60, 0xb8, 0xfb,
};

// This is kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2, encrypted with the system key from
// kLockboxV2Contents.
brillo::SecureBlob kWrappedKeyLockboxV2 = {
    0x2e, 0x62, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x32, 0x2f, 0xb4, 0xa6, 0xba, 0x72, 0xb5, 0xf4,
    0x19, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0xd6, 0xdf, 0x56, 0xf7, 0x64, 0xa0, 0xd6, 0x51, 0xe0,
    0xc1, 0x46, 0x85, 0x80, 0x41, 0xbd, 0x41, 0xab, 0xbf, 0x56, 0x32, 0xaa,
    0xe8, 0x04, 0x5b, 0x69, 0xd4, 0x23, 0x8d, 0x99, 0x84, 0xff, 0x20, 0xc3,
};

// Contents of the encstateful TPM NVRAM space used in tests that set up
// existing valid NVRAM space contents. Contains random system key material.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncStatefulTpm1Contents = {
    0x31, 0x4D, 0x50, 0x54, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xa3, 0xea, 0xd7, 0x78,
    0xa6, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xd7, 0x8f, 0xa1, 0x9a, 0xbd, 0x04, 0x6a, 0xc5, 0x6c,
    0x21, 0xc7, 0x60, 0x1c, 0x45, 0xe3, 0x06, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x68, 0x94, 0x96,
    0x8b, 0x1a, 0xf3, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x4c, 0x52, 0xf9, 0x34, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xeb,
    0xcb, 0xce, 0x2f, 0xb3, 0xb3, 0x63, 0xb3, 0x67, 0x75, 0x75, 0xdc, 0x5d,
    0x0e, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0x4b, 0x44, 0xf9, 0x20, 0x49, 0x42, 0x4d, 0x22, 0x96,
};

// Contents of the encstateful TPM NVRAM space used in tests that set up
// existing writable NVRAM space contents.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncStatefulTpm1ContentsAllZeros = {
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
};

// Contents of the encstateful TPM NVRAM space used in tests that set up
// existing writable NVRAM space contents.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncStatefulTpm1ContentsAllOnes = {
    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
};

// A random encryption key used in tests that exercise the situation where the
// encstateful NVRAM space already exists.
brillo::SecureBlob kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm1 = {
    0x7c, 0xdd, 0x2f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0x6d, 0x28, 0x5b, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0xa5,
    0x84, 0x82, 0x41, 0x02, 0x36, 0x7a, 0x17, 0xc6, 0xe4, 0x78, 0x0e,
    0x86, 0x50, 0x6c, 0x09, 0x50, 0x5c, 0x33, 0x57, 0x19, 0xae,
};

// This is kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm1, encrypted with the system key from
// kEncStatefulTpm1Contents.
brillo::SecureBlob kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm1 = {
    0x7d, 0x10, 0x2a, 0x73, 0x20, 0xd2, 0x29, 0xe8, 0x27, 0xeb, 0xfd, 0xc0,
    0x57, 0xd8, 0x03, 0x16, 0x3c, 0xb7, 0x00, 0x80, 0x56, 0xf9, 0x93, 0x84,
    0xb6, 0xb7, 0xcb, 0xfb, 0x42, 0x59, 0x2b, 0x07, 0xd5, 0x00, 0xa4, 0x8d,
    0x9c, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x80, 0xe3, 0x75, 0xea, 0x7b, 0x72, 0x9c, 0xe8,
};

#endif  // !USE_TPM2

}  // namespace

using SystemKeyStatus = EncryptionKey::SystemKeyStatus;
using EncryptionKeyStatus = EncryptionKey::EncryptionKeyStatus;

class EncryptionKeyTest : public testing::Test {
 public:
  void SetUp() override {
    platform_ = std::make_unique<libstorage::MockPlatform>();
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->CreateDirectory(rootdir_));
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->CreateDirectory(
        stateful_mount_.Append(paths::cryptohome::kTpmOwned).DirName()));

    ClearTPM();
    ResetLoader();
  }

  void TearDown() override { ASSERT_EQ(tlcl_.GetDictionaryAttackCounter(), 0); }

  void ResetLoader() {
    tpm_ = std::make_unique<Tpm>(&tlcl_);
    loader_ = SystemKeyLoader::Create(platform_.get(), tpm_.get(), rootdir_,
                                      stateful_mount_);
    key_ = std::make_unique<EncryptionKey>(platform_.get(), loader_.get(),
                                           rootdir_, stateful_mount_);
  }

  void ResetTPM() {
    tlcl_.Reset();
    tlcl_.SetPCRValue(kPCRBootMode, kPCRBootModeValue);
  }

  void ClearTPM() {
    tlcl_.Clear();
    ResetTPM();
  }

  void SetOwned() {
    tlcl_.SetOwned({0x5e, 0xc2, 0xe7});
    if (!USE_TPM2) {
      ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->WriteStringToFile(
          stateful_mount_.Append(paths::cryptohome::kTpmOwned), ""));
    }
  }

  void SetupSpace(uint32_t index,
                  uint32_t attributes,
                  bool bind_to_pcr0,
                  const uint8_t* data,
                  size_t size) {
    hwsec_foundation::FakeTlclWrapper::NvramSpaceData* space =
        tlcl_.GetSpace(index);
    space->contents.assign(data, data + size);
    space->attributes = attributes;

    if (bind_to_pcr0) {
      uint32_t policy_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
      space->policy.resize(policy_size);
      uint8_t pcr_values[1][TPM_PCR_DIGEST] = {};
      memcpy(pcr_values[0], kPCRBootModeValue, TPM_PCR_DIGEST);
      ASSERT_EQ(TPM_SUCCESS,
                tlcl_.InitNvAuthPolicy((1 << kPCRBootMode), pcr_values,
                                       space->policy.data(), &policy_size));
    }
  }

  void SetupSpace(uint32_t index,
                  uint32_t attributes,
                  bool bind_to_pcr0,
                  const brillo::SecureBlob& nvram) {
    SetupSpace(index, attributes, bind_to_pcr0, nvram.data(), nvram.size());
  }

  void WriteWrappedKey(const base::FilePath& path,
                       const brillo::SecureBlob& key) {
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->CreateDirectory(path.DirName()));
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->WriteSecureBlobToFile(path, key));
  }

  void RequestPreservation() {
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->TouchFileDurable(key_->preservation_request_path()));
  }

  void SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(bool available, bool exit_status) {
    // Put the firmware update request into place.
    base::FilePath update_request_path(
        stateful_mount_.Append(paths::kFirmwareUpdateRequest));
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->TouchFileDurable(update_request_path));

    // Create a placeholder firmware updater.
    base::FilePath firmware_update_locator_path =
        rootdir_.Append(paths::kFirmwareUpdateLocator);
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->WriteStringToFile(firmware_update_locator_path, ""));

    // Mock the (current/updater) process to return the firmware image file.
    brillo::ProcessMock* process = platform_->mock_process();
    EXPECT_CALL(*process, RedirectUsingPipe(STDOUT_FILENO, false /*is_input*/));
    EXPECT_CALL(*process, Start()).WillOnce(Return(exit_status));
    if (!exit_status) {
      return;
    }

    // Setup a pipe to echo the firmware name:
    int pipe[2];
    base::ScopedFD read_end, write_end;
    ASSERT_TRUE(base::CreateLocalNonBlockingPipe(pipe));
    read_end.reset(pipe[0]);
    write_end.reset(pipe[1]);

    if (available) {
      // Create a placeholder firmware update image file.
      base::FilePath firmware_update_image_path =
          rootdir_.Append(paths::kFirmwareDir).Append("placeholder_fw.bin");
      ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->TouchFileDurable(firmware_update_image_path));
      // Feed the pipe with the firmware image path.
      ASSERT_TRUE(base::WriteFileDescriptor(
          write_end.get(), firmware_update_image_path.value() + "\n"));
      EXPECT_CALL(*process, Wait()).WillOnce(Return(0));
    } else {
      ASSERT_TRUE(base::WriteFileDescriptor(write_end.get(), ""));
    }
    EXPECT_CALL(*process, GetPipe(STDOUT_FILENO))
        .WillOnce(Return(read_end.get()));
    // read_end is now used by |tpm_firmware_update_locator|, it will be
    // closed when the test complete.
    std::ignore = read_end.release();
  }

  void ExpectNeedsFinalization(bool pre_existing_needs_finalization) {
    EXPECT_FALSE(key_->did_finalize());
    EXPECT_EQ(WRITE_ON_DISK_FINALIZATION || pre_existing_needs_finalization,
              platform_->FileExists(key_->needs_finalization_path()));
    EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->key_path()));
  }

  void ExpectFinalized(bool did_finalize_expectation) {
    EXPECT_EQ(did_finalize_expectation, key_->did_finalize());
    EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->needs_finalization_path()));
    EXPECT_TRUE(platform_->FileExists(key_->key_path()));
  }

  void ExpectFreshKey() {
    EXPECT_TRUE(key_->LoadChromeOSSystemKey(base::FilePath()));
    EXPECT_TRUE(key_->LoadEncryptionKey());
    EXPECT_EQ(key_->encryption_key().size(), kEncryptionKeySize);
    EXPECT_TRUE(key_->is_fresh());
  }

  void ExpectExistingKey(const brillo::SecureBlob& expected_key) {
    EXPECT_TRUE(key_->LoadChromeOSSystemKey(base::FilePath()));
    EXPECT_TRUE(key_->LoadEncryptionKey());
    EXPECT_EQ(expected_key, key_->encryption_key());
    EXPECT_FALSE(key_->is_fresh());
  }

  void ExpectLockboxValid(bool valid_expected) {
    bool valid_actual = !valid_expected;
    EXPECT_TRUE(loader_->CheckLockbox(&valid_actual));
    EXPECT_EQ(valid_expected, valid_actual);
  }

  void CheckSpace(uint32_t index, uint32_t attributes, uint32_t size) {
    hwsec_foundation::FakeTlclWrapper::NvramSpaceData* space =
        tlcl_.GetSpace(index);
    EXPECT_EQ(attributes, space->attributes);
    EXPECT_EQ(size, space->contents.size());
    EXPECT_TRUE(space->read_locked);
    EXPECT_TRUE(space->write_locked);
  }

#if !USE_TPM2
  void CheckLockboxTampering() {
    ResetTPM();

    // Set up invalid lockbox space contents and perform another load. Verify
    // that the lockbox space is flagged invalid afterwards.
    SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true,
               kLockboxV2Contents.data(), kLockboxV2Contents.size() - 1);

    ResetLoader();
    key_->LoadChromeOSSystemKey(base::FilePath());
    key_->LoadEncryptionKey();
    ExpectLockboxValid(false);
  }

  void SetStaleOwnershipFlag() {
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_->WriteStringToFile(
        stateful_mount_.Append(paths::cryptohome::kTpmOwned), ""));
  }

#endif

  base::FilePath rootdir_{"/test1"};
  base::FilePath stateful_mount_{"/test2"};
  hwsec_foundation::FakeTlclWrapper tlcl_;

  std::unique_ptr<libstorage::MockPlatform> platform_;
  std::unique_ptr<Tpm> tpm_;
  std::unique_ptr<SystemKeyLoader> loader_;
  std::unique_ptr<EncryptionKey> key_;
};

#if USE_TPM2

#if !USE_TPM_DYNAMIC
TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmClearNoSpaces) {
  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, kEncStatefulSize);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmOwnedNoSpaces) {
  SetOwned();

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectNeedsFinalization(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kFinalizationPending, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmExistingSpaceNoKeyFile) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, false,
             kEncStatefulTpm2Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, kEncStatefulSize);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmExistingSpaceBadKey) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, false,
             kEncStatefulTpm2Contents);
  brillo::SecureBlob wrapped_key(kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm2.size(), 0xa5);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), wrapped_key);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, kEncStatefulSize);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmExistingSpaceBadAttributes) {
  uint32_t attributes = kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2 | TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE;
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, attributes, false, kEncStatefulTpm2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm2);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectNeedsFinalization(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kFinalizationPending, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmExistingSpaceNotYetWritten) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2 & ~TPMA_NV_WRITTEN,
             false, kEncStatefulTpm2Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, kEncStatefulSize);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmExistingSpaceBadContents) {
  brillo::SecureBlob bad_contents(kEncStatefulTpm2Contents.size(), 0xa5);
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, false,
             bad_contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, kEncStatefulSize);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmExistingSpaceValid) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, false,
             kEncStatefulTpm2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm2);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm2, kEncStatefulSize);
}

#endif  // USE_TPM_DYNAMIC

#else  // USE_TPM2

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmClearNoSpaces) {
  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmOwnedNoSpaces) {
  SetOwned();

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectNeedsFinalization(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kFinalizationPending, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmClearExistingLockboxV2Unowned) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmOwnedExistingLockboxV2Finalize) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  SetOwned();

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMLockbox, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmOwnedExistingLockboxV2Finalized) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  SetOwned();
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMLockbox, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmOwnedExistingLockboxV2BadDecrypt) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  SetOwned();
  brillo::SecureBlob wrapped_key(kWrappedKeyLockboxV2.size(), 0xa5);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), wrapped_key);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMLockbox, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearExisting) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  bool initialized = false;
  EXPECT_TRUE(tpm_->HasSystemKeyInitializedFlag(&initialized));
  EXPECT_TRUE(initialized);
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(false);

  hwsec_foundation::FakeTlclWrapper::NvramSpaceData* space =
      tlcl_.GetSpace(kEncStatefulIndex);
  EXPECT_NE(space->contents, kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmClearExistingLockboxV2UnownedStaleOwnershipFlag) {
  SetStaleOwnershipFlag();
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  bool initialized = false;
  EXPECT_TRUE(tpm_->HasSystemKeyInitializedFlag(&initialized));
  EXPECT_TRUE(initialized);
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(false);

  hwsec_foundation::FakeTlclWrapper::NvramSpaceData* space =
      tlcl_.GetSpace(kEncStatefulIndex);
  EXPECT_NE(space->contents, kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearWritableAllZeros) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1ContentsAllZeros);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  bool initialized = false;
  EXPECT_TRUE(tpm_->HasSystemKeyInitializedFlag(&initialized));
  EXPECT_TRUE(initialized);
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(false);

  hwsec_foundation::FakeTlclWrapper::NvramSpaceData* space =
      tlcl_.GetSpace(kEncStatefulIndex);
  EXPECT_NE(space->contents, kEncStatefulTpm1ContentsAllZeros);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearWritableAllOnes) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1ContentsAllOnes);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  bool initialized = false;
  EXPECT_TRUE(tpm_->HasSystemKeyInitializedFlag(&initialized));
  EXPECT_TRUE(initialized);
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(false);

  hwsec_foundation::FakeTlclWrapper::NvramSpaceData* space =
      tlcl_.GetSpace(kEncStatefulIndex);
  EXPECT_NE(space->contents, kEncStatefulTpm1ContentsAllOnes);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearInitialized) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
  tpm_->SetSystemKeyInitializedFlag();
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm1);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm1);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmOwnedExisting) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  SetOwned();
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm1);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm1);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(kLockboxV2Contents, tpm_->GetLockboxSpace()->contents());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearBadPCRBinding) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, false,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearBadSize) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents.data(),
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents.size() - 1);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearBadAttributes) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, 0, true, kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmClearBadContents) {
  brillo::SecureBlob bad_contents(kEncStatefulTpm1Contents.size(), 0xa5);
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true, bad_contents);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulTpmOwnedBadSpaceLockboxFallback) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, false,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  SetOwned();
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMLockbox, key_->system_key_status());
  ExpectLockboxValid(true);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, EncStatefulLockboxMACFailure) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true,
             kLockboxV2Contents.data(), kLockboxV2Contents.size() - 1);
  SetOwned();
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm1);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm1);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(false);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationSuccessLockbox) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);
  RequestPreservation();
  SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(true, true);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  EXPECT_TRUE(tlcl_.IsOwned());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(true);

  // Perform another TPM clear and verify that a second preservation succeeds.
  ClearTPM();
  ResetLoader();
  RequestPreservation();

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(true);

  CheckLockboxTampering();
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationSuccessEncstateful) {
  SetupSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, true,
             kEncStatefulTpm1Contents);
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm1);
  RequestPreservation();
  SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(true, true);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyEncStatefulTpm1);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  ExpectLockboxValid(true);

  CheckLockboxTampering();
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationErrorNotEligible) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);
  RequestPreservation();
  SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(false, true);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->preservation_request_path()));
  ExpectLockboxValid(false);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationErrorUpdateLocatorFailure) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);
  RequestPreservation();
  SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(true, false);

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->preservation_request_path()));
  ExpectLockboxValid(false);
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationNoPreviousKey) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  RequestPreservation();

  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->preservation_request_path()));
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationRetryKeyfileMove) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->preserved_previous_key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);
  RequestPreservation();
  SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(true, true);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  EXPECT_TRUE(tlcl_.IsOwned());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->preservation_request_path()));
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationRetryEncryptionKeyWrapping) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->preserved_previous_key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm1);
  SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(true, true);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  EXPECT_TRUE(tlcl_.IsOwned());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->preservation_request_path()));
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, StatefulPreservationRetryTpmOwnership) {
  SetupSpace(kLockboxIndex, kLockboxAttributesTpm1, true, kLockboxV2Contents);
  tlcl_.SetOwned({kOwnerSecret, kOwnerSecret + kOwnerSecretSize});
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->preserved_previous_key_path(), kWrappedKeyLockboxV2);
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->key_path(), kWrappedKeyEncStatefulTpm1);
  SetupPendingFirmwareUpdate(true, true);

  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyLockboxV2);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kKeyFile, key_->encryption_key_status());
  ExpectFinalized(false);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
  EXPECT_TRUE(tlcl_.IsOwned());
  CheckSpace(kEncStatefulIndex, kEncStatefulAttributesTpm1, kEncStatefulSize);
  EXPECT_FALSE(platform_->FileExists(key_->preservation_request_path()));
}

#endif  // !USE_TPM2

#if !USE_TPM_DYNAMIC

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmClearNeedsFinalization) {
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->needs_finalization_path(),
                  kWrappedKeyNeedsFinalization);

#if READ_ON_DISK_FINALIZATION
  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyNeedsFinalization);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kNeedsFinalization,
            key_->encryption_key_status());
#else   // READ_ON_DISK_FINALIZATION
  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
#endif  // READ_ON_DISK_FINALIZATION
  ExpectFinalized(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kNVRAMEncstateful, key_->system_key_status());
}

TEST_F(EncryptionKeyTest, TpmOwnedNeedsFinalization) {
  SetOwned();
  WriteWrappedKey(key_->needs_finalization_path(),
                  kWrappedKeyNeedsFinalization);

#if READ_ON_DISK_FINALIZATION
  ExpectExistingKey(kEncryptionKeyNeedsFinalization);
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kNeedsFinalization,
            key_->encryption_key_status());
#else   // READ_ON_DISK_FINALIZATION
  ExpectFreshKey();
  EXPECT_EQ(EncryptionKeyStatus::kFresh, key_->encryption_key_status());
#endif  // READ_ON_DISK_FINALIZATION
  ExpectNeedsFinalization(true);
  EXPECT_EQ(SystemKeyStatus::kFinalizationPending, key_->system_key_status());
}

#endif  // !USE_TPM_DYNAMIC

}  // namespace encryption