blob: 7fff2933995a63363ce56bf7eebc6ca92ed40b60 [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* Copyright 2021 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
* found in the LICENSE file.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "fmap.h"
#include "futility.h"
#include "gsc_ro.h"
#include "host_key21.h"
#include "host_keyblock.h"
#include "host_signature.h"
/*
* for testing purposes let's use
* - tests/devkeys/arv_root.vbprivk as the root private key
* - tests/devkeys/arv_root.vbpubk as the root public key
* used for signing of the platform public key
* - tests/devkeys/arv_platform.vbprivk signing platform key
* - tests/devkeys/arv_platform.vbpubk - public key used for signature
* verification
*------------
* Command to create the signed public key block in ~/tmp/packed:
*
./build/futility/futility vbutil_keyblock --pack ~/tmp/packed \
--datapubkey tests/devkeys/arv_platform.vbpubk \
--signprivate tests/devkeys/arv_root.vbprivk
*------------
* Command to fill RO_GSCVD FMAP area in an AP firmware file. The input AP
* firmware file is ~/tmp/image-guybrush.serial.bin, the output signed
* AP firmware file is ~/tmp/guybrush-signed:
*
./build/futility/futility gscvd --outfile ~/tmp/guybrush-signed \
-R 818100:10000,f00000:100,f80000:2000,f8c000:1000,0x00804000:0x00000800 \
-k ~/tmp/packed -p tests/devkeys/arv_platform.vbprivk -b 5a5a4352 \
-r tests/devkeys/arv_root.vbpubk ~/tmp/image-guybrush.serial.bin
*------------
* Command to validate a previously signed AP firmware file. The hash is the
* sha256sum of tests/devkeys/kernel_subkey.vbpubk:
*
build/futility/futility gscvd ~/tmp/guybrush-signed \
3d74429f35be8d34bcb425d4397e2218e6961afed456a78ce30047f5b54ed158
*/
/* Command line options processing support. */
enum no_short_opts {
OPT_OUTFILE = 1000,
};
static const struct option long_opts[] = {
/* name hasarg *flag val */
{"outfile", 1, NULL, OPT_OUTFILE},
{"ranges", 1, NULL, 'R'},
{"board_id", 1, NULL, 'b'},
{"root_pub_key", 1, NULL, 'r'},
{"keyblock", 1, NULL, 'k'},
{"platform_priv", 1, NULL, 'p'},
{"help", 0, NULL, 'h'},
{}
};
static const char *short_opts = "R:b:hk:p:r:";
static const char usage[] =
"\n"
"This utility creates an RO verification space in the Chrome OS AP\n"
"firmware image or allows to validate a previously prepared image\n"
"containing the RO verification space.\n\n"
"Usage: " MYNAME " gscvd PARAMS <AP FIRMWARE FILE> [<root key hash>]\n"
"\n\nCreation of RO Verification space:\n\n"
"Required PARAMS:\n"
" -R|--ranges STRING Comma separated colon delimited\n"
" hex tuples <offset>:<size>, the\n"
" areas of the RO covered by the\n"
" signature\n"
" -b|--board_id <hex value> The Board ID of the board for which\n"
" the image is being signed\n"
" -r|--root_pub_key <file> The main public key, in .vbpubk\n"
" format, used to verify platform\n"
" key\n"
" -k|--keyblock <file> Signed platform public key in\n"
" .keyblock format, used for run\n"
" time RO verifcation\n"
" -p|--platform_priv <file> Private platform key in .vbprivk\n"
" format, used for signing RO\n"
" verification data\n"
"Optional PARAMS:\n"
" [--outfile] OUTFILE Output firmware image containing\n"
" RO verification information\n"
"\n\n"
"Validation of RO Verification space:\n\n"
" The only required parameter is <AP FIRMWARE FILE>, if optional\n"
" <root key hash> is given, it is compared to the hash\n"
" of the root key found in <AP_FIRMWARE_FILE>.\n"
"\n\n"
" -h|--help Print this message\n\n";
/* Structure helping to keep track of the file mapped into memory. */
struct file_buf {
uint32_t len;
uint8_t *data;
int fd;
FmapAreaHeader *ro_gscvd;
};
/*
* Max number of RO ranges to cover. 32 is more than enough, this must be kept
* in sync with APRO_MAX_NUM_RANGES declaration in
* common/ap_ro_integrity_check.c in the Cr50 tree.
*/
#define MAX_RANGES 32
/*
* Container keeping track of the set of ranges to include in hash
* calculation.
*/
struct gscvd_ro_ranges {
size_t range_count;
struct gscvd_ro_range ranges[MAX_RANGES];
};
/**
* Load the AP firmware file into memory.
*
* Map the requested file into memory, find RO_GSCVD area in the file, and
* cache the information in the passed in file_buf structure.
*
* @param file_name name of the AP firmware file
* @param file_buf pointer to the helper structure keeping information about
* the file
*
* @return 0 on success 1 on failure.
*/
static int load_ap_firmware(const char *file_name, struct file_buf *file)
{
int fd;
int rv;
fd = open(file_name, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
ERROR("Can't open %s: %s\n", file_name,
strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
file->fd = fd;
do {
rv = 1;
if (futil_map_file(fd, MAP_RW, &file->data, &file->len)) {
file->data = NULL;
break;
}
if (!fmap_find_by_name(file->data, file->len, NULL, "RO_GSCVD",
&file->ro_gscvd)) {
ERROR("Could not find RO_GSCVD in the FMAP\n");
break;
}
rv = 0;
} while (false);
return rv;
}
/**
* Check if the passed in offset falls into the passed in FMAP area.
*/
static bool in_range(uint32_t offset, const FmapAreaHeader *ah)
{
return (offset >= ah->area_offset) &&
(offset <= (ah->area_offset + ah->area_size));
}
/**
* Check if the passed in range fits into the passed in FMAP area.
*/
static bool range_fits(const struct gscvd_ro_range *range,
const FmapAreaHeader *ah)
{
if (in_range(range->offset, ah) &&
in_range(range->offset + range->size, ah))
return true;
ERROR("Range %#x..+%#x does not fit in %s\n", range->offset,
range->size, ah->area_name);
return false;
}
/**
* Check if the passed in range overlaps with the area.
*
* @param range pointer to the range to check
* @param offset offset of the area to check against
* @param size size of the area to check against
*
* @return true if range overlaps with the area, false otherwise.
*/
static bool range_overlaps(const struct gscvd_ro_range *range, uint32_t offset,
size_t size)
{
if (((range->offset + range->size) <= offset) ||
(offset + size) <= range->offset)
return false;
ERROR("Range %x..+%x overlaps with %x..+%zx\n", range->offset,
range->size, offset, size);
return true;
}
/*
* Check validity of the passed in ranges.
*
* All ranges must
* - fit into the WP_RO FMAP area
* - not overlap with the RO_GSCVD FMAP area
* - not overlap with each other
*
* @param ranges - pointer to the container of ranges to check
* @param file - pointer to the file layout descriptor
*
* @return zero on success, -1 on failures
*/
static int verify_ranges(const struct gscvd_ro_ranges *ranges,
const struct file_buf *file)
{
size_t i;
FmapAreaHeader *wp_ro;
int errorcount;
if (!fmap_find_by_name(file->data, file->len, NULL, "WP_RO", &wp_ro)) {
ERROR("Could not find WP_RO in the FMAP\n");
return 1;
}
errorcount = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ranges->range_count; i++) {
size_t j;
/* Must fit into WP_RO. */
if (!range_fits(ranges->ranges + i, wp_ro))
errorcount++;
/* Must not overlap with RO_GSCVD. */
if (range_overlaps(ranges->ranges + i,
file->ro_gscvd->area_offset,
file->ro_gscvd->area_size))
errorcount++;
/* The last range is nothing to compare against. */
if (i == ranges->range_count - 1)
break;
/* Must not overlap with all following ranges. */
for (j = i + 1; j < ranges->range_count; j++)
if (range_overlaps(ranges->ranges + i,
ranges->ranges[j].offset,
ranges->ranges[j].size))
errorcount++;
}
return errorcount ? -1 : 0;
}
/**
* Parse range specification supplied by the user.
*
* The input is a string of the following format:
* <hex base>:<hex size>[,<hex base>:<hex size>[,...]]
*
* @param input user input, part of the command line
* @param output pointer to the ranges container
*
* @return zero on success, -1 on failure
*/
static int parse_ranges(const char *input, struct gscvd_ro_ranges *output)
{
char *cursor;
char *delim;
char *str = strdup(input);
int rv = 0;
if (!str) {
ERROR("Failed to allocate memory for ranges string copy!\n");
return -1;
}
output->range_count = 0;
cursor = str;
do {
char *colon;
char *e;
if (output->range_count >= ARRAY_SIZE(output->ranges)) {
ERROR("Too many ranges!\n");
rv = -1;
break;
}
delim = strchr(cursor, ',');
if (delim)
*delim = '\0';
colon = strchr(cursor, ':');
if (!colon) {
rv = -1;
break;
}
*colon = '\0';
errno = 0;
output->ranges[output->range_count].offset =
strtol(cursor, &e, 16);
if (errno || *e) {
rv = -1;
break;
}
output->ranges[output->range_count].size =
strtol(colon + 1, &e, 16);
if (errno || *e) {
rv = -1;
break;
}
output->range_count++;
cursor = delim + 1;
/* Iterate until there is no more commas. */
} while (delim);
free(str);
if (rv)
ERROR("Misformatted ranges string\n");
return rv;
}
/**
* Calculate hash of the RO ranges.
*
* @param ap_firmware_file pointer to the AP firmware file layout descriptor
* @param ranges pointer to the container of ranges to include in hash
* calculation
* @param hash_alg algorithm to use for hashing
* @param digest memory to copy the calculated hash to
* @param digest_ size requested size of the digest, padded with zeros if the
* SHA digest size is smaller than digest_size
*
* @return zero on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static int calculate_ranges_digest(const struct file_buf *ap_firmware_file,
const struct gscvd_ro_ranges *ranges,
enum vb2_hash_algorithm hash_alg,
void *digest, size_t digest_size)
{
struct vb2_digest_context dc;
size_t i;
/* Calculate the ranges digest. */
if (vb2_digest_init(&dc, hash_alg) != VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Failed to init digest!\n");
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < ranges->range_count; i++) {
if (vb2_digest_extend(&dc,
ap_firmware_file->data +
ranges->ranges[i].offset,
ranges->ranges[i].size) != VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Failed to extend digest!\n");
return -1;
}
}
memset(digest, 0, digest_size);
if (vb2_digest_finalize(&dc, digest, digest_size) != VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Failed to finalize digest!\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* Build GSC verification data.
*
* Calculate size of the structure including the signature and the root key,
* allocate memory, fill up the structure, calculate AP RO ranges digest and
* then the GVD signature.
*
* @param ap_firmware_file pointer to the AP firmware file layout descriptor
* @param ranges pointer to the container of ranges to include in verification
* @param root_pubk pointer to the root pubk container
* @param privk pointer to the private key to use for signing
* @param board_id Board ID value to use.
*
* @return pointer to the created GVD (to be freed by the caller) on success,
* NULL on failure.
*/
static
struct gsc_verification_data *create_gvd(struct file_buf *ap_firmware_file,
struct gscvd_ro_ranges *ranges,
const struct vb2_packed_key *root_pubk,
const struct vb2_private_key *privk,
uint32_t board_id)
{
struct gsc_verification_data *gvd;
size_t total_size;
size_t sig_size;
size_t ranges_size;
struct vb2_signature *sig;
const FmapHeader *fmh;
sig_size = vb2_rsa_sig_size(privk->sig_alg);
ranges_size = ranges->range_count * sizeof(struct gscvd_ro_range);
total_size = sizeof(struct gsc_verification_data) +
root_pubk->key_size + sig_size + ranges_size;
gvd = calloc(total_size, 1);
if (!gvd) {
ERROR("Failed to allocate %zd bytes for gvd\n", total_size);
return NULL;
}
gvd->gv_magic = GSC_VD_MAGIC;
gvd->size = total_size;
gvd->gsc_board_id = board_id;
gvd->rollback_counter = GSC_VD_ROLLBACK_COUNTER;
/* Guaranteed to succeed. */
fmh = fmap_find(ap_firmware_file->data, ap_firmware_file->len);
gvd->fmap_location = (uintptr_t)fmh - (uintptr_t)ap_firmware_file->data;
gvd->hash_alg = VB2_HASH_SHA256;
if (calculate_ranges_digest(ap_firmware_file, ranges, gvd->hash_alg,
gvd->ranges_digest,
sizeof(gvd->ranges_digest))) {
free(gvd);
return NULL;
}
/* Prepare signature header. */
vb2_init_signature(&gvd->sig_header,
(uint8_t *)(gvd + 1) + ranges_size,
sig_size,
sizeof(struct gsc_verification_data) + ranges_size);
/* Copy root key into the structure. */
vb2_init_packed_key(&gvd->root_key_header,
(uint8_t *)(gvd + 1) + ranges_size + sig_size,
root_pubk->key_size);
vb2_copy_packed_key(&gvd->root_key_header, root_pubk);
/* Copy ranges into the ranges section. */
gvd->range_count = ranges->range_count;
memcpy(gvd->ranges, ranges->ranges, ranges_size);
sig = vb2_calculate_signature((uint8_t *)gvd,
sizeof(struct gsc_verification_data) +
ranges_size, privk);
if (!sig) {
ERROR("Failed to calculate signature\n");
free(gvd);
return NULL;
}
/* Copy signature body into GVD after some basic checks. */
if ((sig_size == sig->sig_size) &&
(gvd->sig_header.data_size == sig->data_size)) {
vb2_copy_signature(&gvd->sig_header, sig);
} else {
ERROR("Inconsistent signature headers\n");
free(sig);
free(gvd);
return NULL;
}
free(sig);
return gvd;
}
/**
* Fill RO_GSCVD FMAP area.
*
* All trust chain components have been verified, AP RO sections digest
* calculated, and GVD signature created; put it all together in the dedicated
* FMAP area.
*
* @param ap_firmware_file pointer to the AP firmware file layout descriptor
* @param gvd pointer to the GVD header
* @param keyblock pointer to the keyblock container
*
* @return zero on success, -1 on failure
*/
static int fill_gvd_area(struct file_buf *ap_firmware_file,
struct gsc_verification_data *gvd,
struct vb2_keyblock *keyblock)
{
size_t total;
uint8_t *cursor;
/* How much room is needed for the whole thing? */
total = gvd->size + keyblock->keyblock_size;
if (total > ap_firmware_file->ro_gscvd->area_size) {
ERROR("GVD section does not fit, %zd > %d\n",
total, ap_firmware_file->ro_gscvd->area_size);
return -1;
}
cursor = ap_firmware_file->data +
ap_firmware_file->ro_gscvd->area_offset;
/* Copy GSC verification data */
memcpy(cursor, gvd, gvd->size);
cursor += gvd->size;
/* Keyblock, size includes everything. */
memcpy(cursor, keyblock, keyblock->keyblock_size);
return 0;
}
/**
* Initialize a work buffer structure.
*
* Embedded vboot reference code does not use malloc/free, it uses the so
* called work buffer structure to provide a poor man's memory management
* tool. This program uses some of the embedded library functions, let's
* implement work buffer support to keep the embedded code happy.
*
* @param wb pointer to the workubffer structure to initialize
* @param size size of the buffer to allocate
*
* @return pointer to the allocated buffer on success, NULL on failure.
*/
static void *init_wb(struct vb2_workbuf *wb, size_t size)
{
void *buf = malloc(size);
if (!buf)
ERROR("Failed to allocate workblock of %zd\n", size);
else
vb2_workbuf_init(wb, buf, size);
return buf;
}
/**
* Validate that platform key keyblock was signed by the root key.
*
* This function performs the same step the GSC is supposed to perform:
* validate the platform key keyblock signature using the root public key.
*
* @param root_pubk pointer to the root public key container
* @param kblock pointer to the platform public key keyblock
*
* @return 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
static int validate_pubk_signature(const struct vb2_packed_key *root_pubk,
struct vb2_keyblock *kblock)
{
struct vb2_public_key pubk;
struct vb2_workbuf wb;
uint32_t kbsize;
int rv;
void *buf;
if (vb2_unpack_key(&pubk, root_pubk) != VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Failed to unpack public key\n");
return -1;
}
/* Let's create an ample sized work buffer. */
buf = init_wb(&wb, 8192);
if (!buf)
return -1;
rv = -1;
do {
void *work;
kbsize = kblock->keyblock_size;
work = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, kbsize);
if (!work) {
ERROR("Failed to allocate workblock space %d\n",
kbsize);
break;
}
memcpy(work, kblock, kbsize);
if (vb2_verify_keyblock(work, kbsize, &pubk, &wb) !=
VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Root and keyblock mismatch\n");
break;
}
rv = 0;
} while (false);
free(buf);
return rv;
}
/**
* Validate that private and public parts of the platform key match.
*
* This is a fairly routine validation, the N components of the private and
* public RSA keys are compared.
*
* @param keyblock pointer to the keyblock containing the public key
* @param plat_privk pointer to the matching private key
*
* @return 0 on success, nonzero on failure
*/
static int validate_privk(struct vb2_keyblock *kblock,
struct vb2_private_key *plat_privk)
{
const BIGNUM *privn;
BIGNUM *pubn;
struct vb2_public_key pubk;
int rv;
privn = pubn = NULL;
RSA_get0_key(plat_privk->rsa_private_key, &privn, NULL, NULL);
if (vb2_unpack_key(&pubk, &kblock->data_key) != VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Failed to unpack public key\n");
return -1;
}
pubn = BN_new();
pubn = BN_lebin2bn((uint8_t *)pubk.n, vb2_rsa_sig_size(pubk.sig_alg),
pubn);
rv = BN_cmp(pubn, privn);
if (rv)
ERROR("Public/private key N mismatch!\n");
BN_free(pubn);
return rv;
}
/**
* Copy ranges from AP firmware file into gscvd_ro_ranges container
*
* While copying the ranges verify that they do not overlap.
*
* @param ap_firmware_file pointer to the AP firmware file layout descriptor
* @param gvd pointer to the GVD header followed by the ranges
* @param ranges pointer to the ranges container to copy ranges to
*
* @return 0 on successful copy nonzero on errors.
*/
static int copy_ranges(const struct file_buf *ap_firmware_file,
const struct gsc_verification_data *gvd,
struct gscvd_ro_ranges *ranges)
{
ranges->range_count = gvd->range_count;
memcpy(ranges->ranges, gvd->ranges,
sizeof(ranges->ranges[0]) * ranges->range_count);
return verify_ranges(ranges, ap_firmware_file);
}
/**
* Basic validation of GVD included in a AP firmware file.
*
* This is not a cryptographic verification, just a check that the structure
* makes sense and the expected values are found in certain fields.
*
* @param gvd pointer to the GVD header followed by the ranges
* @param ap_firmware_file pointer to the AP firmware file layout descriptor
*
* @return zero on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static int validate_gvd(const struct gsc_verification_data *gvd,
const struct file_buf *ap_firmware_file)
{
const FmapHeader *fmh;
if (gvd->gv_magic != GSC_VD_MAGIC) {
ERROR("Incorrect gscvd magic %x\n", gvd->gv_magic);
return -1;
}
if (!gvd->range_count || (gvd->range_count > MAX_RANGES)) {
ERROR("Incorrect gscvd range count %d\n", gvd->range_count);
return -1;
}
/* Guaranteed to succeed. */
fmh = fmap_find(ap_firmware_file->data, ap_firmware_file->len);
if (gvd->fmap_location !=
((uintptr_t)fmh - (uintptr_t)ap_firmware_file->data)) {
ERROR("Incorrect gscvd fmap offset %x\n", gvd->fmap_location);
return -1;
}
/* Make sure signature and root key fit. */
if (vb2_verify_signature_inside(gvd, gvd->size, &gvd->sig_header) !=
VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Corrupted signature header in GVD\n");
return -1;
}
if (vb2_verify_packed_key_inside(gvd, gvd->size,
&gvd->root_key_header) !=
VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Corrupted root key header in GVD\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* Validate GVD signature.
*
* Given the entire GVD space (header plus ranges array), the signature and
* the public key, verify that the signature matches.
*
* @param gvd pointer to gsc_verification_data followed by the ranges array
* @param gvd_signature pointer to the vb2 signature container
* @param packedk pointer to the keyblock containing the public key
*
* @return zero on success, non-zero on failure
*/
static int validate_gvd_signature(struct gsc_verification_data *gvd,
const struct vb2_packed_key *packedk)
{
struct vb2_workbuf wb;
void *buf;
int rv;
struct vb2_public_key pubk;
size_t signed_size;
/* Extract public key from the public key keyblock. */
if (vb2_unpack_key(&pubk, packedk) != VB2_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("Failed to unpack public key\n");
return -1;
}
/* Let's create an ample sized work buffer. */
buf = init_wb(&wb, 8192);
if (!buf)
return -1;
signed_size = sizeof(struct gsc_verification_data) +
gvd->range_count * sizeof(gvd->ranges[0]);
rv = vb2_verify_data((const uint8_t *)gvd, signed_size,
&gvd->sig_header,
&pubk, &wb);
free(buf);
return rv;
}
/*
* Validate GVD of the passed in AP firmware file and possibly the root key hash
*
* The input parameters are the subset of the command line, the first argv
* string is the AP firmware file name, the second string, if present, is the
* hash of the root public key included in the RO_GSCVD area of the AP
* firmware file.
*
* @return zero on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static int validate_gscvd(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct file_buf ap_firmware_file;
int rv;
struct gscvd_ro_ranges ranges;
struct gsc_verification_data *gvd;
const char *file_name;
uint8_t digest[sizeof(gvd->ranges_digest)];
struct vb2_hash root_key_digest = { .algo = VB2_HASH_SHA256 };
/* Guaranteed to be available. */
file_name = argv[0];
if (argc > 1)
parse_digest_or_die(root_key_digest.sha256,
sizeof(root_key_digest.sha256),
argv[1]);
do {
struct vb2_keyblock *kblock;
rv = -1; /* Speculative, will be cleared on success. */
if (load_ap_firmware(file_name, &ap_firmware_file))
break;
/* Copy ranges from gscvd to local structure. */
gvd = (struct gsc_verification_data
*)(ap_firmware_file.data +
ap_firmware_file.ro_gscvd->area_offset);
if (validate_gvd(gvd, &ap_firmware_file))
break;
if (copy_ranges(&ap_firmware_file, gvd, &ranges))
break;
if (calculate_ranges_digest(&ap_firmware_file, &ranges,
gvd->hash_alg, digest,
sizeof(digest)))
break;
if (memcmp(digest, gvd->ranges_digest, sizeof(digest))) {
ERROR("Ranges digest mismatch\n");
break;
}
/* Find the keyblock. */
kblock = (struct vb2_keyblock *)((uintptr_t)gvd + gvd->size);
if ((argc > 1) && (vb2_hash_verify
(vb2_packed_key_data(&gvd->root_key_header),
gvd->root_key_header.key_size,
&root_key_digest) != VB2_SUCCESS)) {
ERROR("Sha256 mismatch\n");
break;
}
if (validate_pubk_signature(&gvd->root_key_header,
kblock))
break;
if (validate_gvd_signature(gvd, &kblock->data_key))
break;
rv = 0;
} while (false);
return rv;
}
/**
* Calculate and report sha256 hash of the public key body.
*
* The hash will be incorporated into GVC firmware to allow it to validate the
* root key.
*
* @param pubk pointer to the public key to process.
*/
static void dump_pubk_hash(const struct vb2_packed_key *pubk)
{
struct vb2_hash hash;
size_t i;
vb2_hash_calculate(vb2_packed_key_data(pubk), pubk->key_size,
VB2_HASH_SHA256, &hash);
printf("Root key body sha256 hash:\n");
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hash.sha256); i++)
printf("%02x", hash.sha256[i]);
printf("\n");
}
/**
* The main function of this futilty option.
*
* See the usage string for input details.
*
* @return zero on success, nonzero on failure.
*/
static int do_gscvd(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i;
int longindex;
char *infile = NULL;
char *outfile = NULL;
char *work_file = NULL;
struct gscvd_ro_ranges ranges;
int errorcount = 0;
struct vb2_packed_key *root_pubk = NULL;
struct vb2_keyblock *kblock = NULL;
struct vb2_private_key *plat_privk = NULL;
struct gsc_verification_data *gvd = NULL;
struct file_buf ap_firmware_file = { .fd = -1 };
uint32_t board_id = UINT32_MAX;
int rv = 0;
ranges.range_count = 0;
while ((i = getopt_long(argc, argv, short_opts, long_opts,
&longindex)) != -1) {
switch (i) {
case OPT_OUTFILE:
outfile = optarg;
break;
case 'R':
if (parse_ranges(optarg, &ranges)) {
ERROR("Could not parse ranges\n");
/* Error message has been already printed. */
errorcount++;
}
break;
case 'b': {
char *e;
long long bid;
bid = strtoull(optarg, &e, 16);
if (*e || (bid >= UINT32_MAX)) {
ERROR("Board ID value '%s' is invalid\n",
optarg);
errorcount++;
} else {
board_id = (uint32_t)bid;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
root_pubk = vb2_read_packed_key(optarg);
if (!root_pubk) {
ERROR("Could not read %s\n", optarg);
errorcount++;
}
break;
case 'k':
kblock = vb2_read_keyblock(optarg);
if (!kblock) {
ERROR("Could not read %s\n", optarg);
errorcount++;
}
break;
case 'p':
plat_privk = vb2_read_private_key(optarg);
if (!plat_privk) {
ERROR("Could not read %s\n", optarg);
errorcount++;
}
break;
case 'h':
printf("%s", usage);
return 0;
case '?':
if (optopt)
ERROR("Unrecognized option: -%c\n", optopt);
else
ERROR("Unrecognized option: %s\n",
argv[optind - 1]);
errorcount++;
break;
case ':':
ERROR("Missing argument to -%c\n", optopt);
errorcount++;
break;
case 0: /* handled option */
break;
default:
FATAL("Unrecognized getopt output: %d\n", i);
}
}
if ((optind == 1) && (argc > 1))
/* This must be a validation request. */
return validate_gscvd(argc - 1, argv + 1);
if (optind != (argc - 1)) {
ERROR("Misformatted command line\n%s\n", usage);
return 1;
}
if (errorcount || !ranges.range_count || !root_pubk || !kblock ||
!plat_privk || (board_id == UINT32_MAX)) {
/* Error message(s) should have been printed by now. */
ERROR("%s\n", usage);
return 1;
}
infile = argv[optind];
if (outfile) {
futil_copy_file_or_die(infile, outfile);
work_file = outfile;
} else {
work_file = infile;
}
do {
rv = 1; /* Speculative, will be cleared on success. */
if (validate_pubk_signature(root_pubk, kblock))
break;
if (validate_privk(kblock, plat_privk))
break;
if (load_ap_firmware(work_file, &ap_firmware_file))
break;
if (verify_ranges(&ranges, &ap_firmware_file))
break;
gvd = create_gvd(&ap_firmware_file, &ranges,
root_pubk, plat_privk, board_id);
if (!gvd)
break;
if (fill_gvd_area(&ap_firmware_file, gvd, kblock))
break;
dump_pubk_hash(root_pubk);
rv = 0;
} while (false);
free(gvd);
free(root_pubk);
free(kblock);
vb2_private_key_free(plat_privk);
/* Now flush the file. */
if (ap_firmware_file.data) {
rv |= futil_unmap_file(ap_firmware_file.fd, true,
ap_firmware_file.data,
ap_firmware_file.len);
}
if (ap_firmware_file.fd != -1)
close(ap_firmware_file.fd);
return rv;
}
DECLARE_FUTIL_COMMAND(gscvd, do_gscvd, VBOOT_VERSION_2_1,
"Create RO verification structure");