bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields

commit e09299225d5ba3916c91ef70565f7d2187e4cca0 upstream.

The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a
kernel warning:

    r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169);
    exit;

With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is
detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it
doesn't match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed
and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the
"is_narrower_load" case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn->off
is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However,
the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning:

    verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1)

This patch fixes that to return a proper "invalid bpf_context access
off=X size=Y" error on the load instruction.

The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that
allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg,
sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for
consistency.

Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the "Closes" link below, which
used to be about a different bug, fixed in
commit fce7bd8e385a ("bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions
in insn_def_regno()"). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs,
the new crash and repro didn't get reported to the mailing list.

BUG=b/440033177
TEST=presubmit
RELEASE_NOTE=Fixed CVE-2025-38591 in the Linux kernel.

cos-patch: security-moderate
Fixes: f96da09473b52 ("bpf: simplify narrower ctx access")
Fixes: 0df1a55afa832 ("bpf: Warn on internal verifier errors")
Reported-by: syzbot+0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec
Change-Id: Ib157d742569173b07f12826f7c32b5927fc4f86b
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3b8dcee67ff4296903351a974ddd9c4dca768b64.1753194596.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kernel CVE Triage Automation <cloud-image-kernel-cve-triage-automation@prod.google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://cos-review.googlesource.com/c/third_party/kernel/+/128181
Tested-by: Cusky Presubmit Bot <presubmit@cos-infra-prod.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Chenglong Tang <chenglongtang@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Berry <kpberry@google.com>
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
index c0d606c..1ebf40b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -2418,22 +2418,22 @@ static bool cg_sockopt_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 	}
 
 	switch (off) {
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, sk):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, sk):
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
 		break;
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval):
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET;
 		break;
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end):
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
 		break;
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, retval):
+	case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sockopt, retval):
 		if (size != size_default)
 			return false;
 		return prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT;
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index b6636b8..53c7526 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -8654,7 +8654,7 @@ static bool bpf_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		break;
-	case offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct __sk_buff, sk):
 		if (type == BPF_WRITE || size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL;
@@ -9231,7 +9231,7 @@ static bool sock_addr_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 				return false;
 		}
 		break;
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_addr, sk):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_addr, sk):
 		if (type != BPF_READ)
 			return false;
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
@@ -9285,17 +9285,17 @@ static bool sock_ops_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 			if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 				return false;
 			break;
-		case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, sk):
+		case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, sk):
 			if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 				return false;
 			info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL;
 			break;
-		case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data):
+		case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data):
 			if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 				return false;
 			info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET;
 			break;
-		case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data_end):
+		case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data_end):
 			if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 				return false;
 			info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
@@ -9304,7 +9304,7 @@ static bool sock_ops_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 			bpf_ctx_record_field_size(info, size_default);
 			return bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok(off, size,
 							size_default);
-		case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp):
+		case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp):
 			if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 				return false;
 			break;
@@ -9374,17 +9374,17 @@ static bool sk_msg_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 		return false;
 
 	switch (off) {
-	case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, data):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, data):
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET;
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		break;
-	case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, data_end):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, data_end):
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		break;
-	case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, sk):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, sk):
 		if (size != sizeof(__u64))
 			return false;
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
@@ -11597,7 +11597,7 @@ static bool sk_lookup_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 		return false;
 
 	switch (off) {
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_sk_lookup, sk):
+	case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sk_lookup, sk):
 		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL;
 		return size == sizeof(__u64);