| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ | |
| /* | |
| * This is <linux/capability.h> | |
| * | |
| * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> | |
| * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no> | |
| * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main. | |
| * | |
| * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance): | |
| * | |
| * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/ | |
| */ | |
| #ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H | |
| #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H | |
| #include <uapi/linux/capability.h> | |
| #include <linux/uidgid.h> | |
| #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 | |
| #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 | |
| extern int file_caps_enabled; | |
| typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { | |
| __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; | |
| } kernel_cap_t; | |
| /* same as vfs_ns_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */ | |
| struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { | |
| __u32 magic_etc; | |
| kernel_cap_t permitted; | |
| kernel_cap_t inheritable; | |
| kuid_t rootid; | |
| }; | |
| #define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct)) | |
| #define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t)) | |
| struct file; | |
| struct inode; | |
| struct dentry; | |
| struct task_struct; | |
| struct user_namespace; | |
| extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set; | |
| extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; | |
| /* | |
| * Internal kernel functions only | |
| */ | |
| #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \ | |
| for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) | |
| /* | |
| * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS: | |
| * | |
| * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant. | |
| * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. | |
| * | |
| * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs. | |
| * | |
| * We could also define fsmask as follows: | |
| * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions | |
| * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions | |
| */ | |
| # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ | |
| | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \ | |
| | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ | |
| | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ | |
| | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ | |
| | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID)) | |
| # define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) | |
| #if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 | |
| # error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers | |
| #else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ | |
| #define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1) | |
| #define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1) | |
| # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) | |
| # define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }}) | |
| # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | |
| | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ | |
| CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) | |
| # define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | |
| | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \ | |
| CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) | |
| #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ | |
| # define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0) | |
| #define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) | |
| #define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) | |
| #define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) | |
| #define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \ | |
| do { \ | |
| unsigned __capi; \ | |
| CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ | |
| c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \ | |
| } \ | |
| } while (0) | |
| #define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \ | |
| do { \ | |
| unsigned __capi; \ | |
| CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ | |
| c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \ | |
| } \ | |
| } while (0) | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a, | |
| const kernel_cap_t b) | |
| { | |
| kernel_cap_t dest; | |
| CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |); | |
| return dest; | |
| } | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a, | |
| const kernel_cap_t b) | |
| { | |
| kernel_cap_t dest; | |
| CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &); | |
| return dest; | |
| } | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a, | |
| const kernel_cap_t drop) | |
| { | |
| kernel_cap_t dest; | |
| CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~); | |
| return dest; | |
| } | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c) | |
| { | |
| kernel_cap_t dest; | |
| CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~); | |
| return dest; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a) | |
| { | |
| unsigned __capi; | |
| CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { | |
| if (a.cap[__capi] != 0) | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Check if "a" is a subset of "set". | |
| * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set" | |
| * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true | |
| * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set" | |
| * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false | |
| */ | |
| static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set) | |
| { | |
| kernel_cap_t dest; | |
| dest = cap_drop(a, set); | |
| return cap_isclear(dest); | |
| } | |
| /* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */ | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a) | |
| { | |
| const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; | |
| return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); | |
| } | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a, | |
| const kernel_cap_t permitted) | |
| { | |
| const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; | |
| return cap_combine(a, | |
| cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set)); | |
| } | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a) | |
| { | |
| const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; | |
| return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); | |
| } | |
| static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a, | |
| const kernel_cap_t permitted) | |
| { | |
| const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; | |
| return cap_combine(a, | |
| cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set)); | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER | |
| extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap); | |
| extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, | |
| struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); | |
| extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); | |
| extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, | |
| struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); | |
| extern bool capable(int cap); | |
| extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); | |
| extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); | |
| extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); | |
| #else | |
| static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, | |
| struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, | |
| struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool capable(int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | |
| { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ | |
| bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, | |
| struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, | |
| const struct inode *inode); | |
| bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, | |
| const struct inode *inode, int cap); | |
| extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); | |
| extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); | |
| static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) | |
| { | |
| return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); | |
| } | |
| static inline bool bpf_capable(void) | |
| { | |
| return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); | |
| } | |
| static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns) | |
| { | |
| return ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || | |
| ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); | |
| } | |
| /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ | |
| int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, | |
| const struct dentry *dentry, | |
| struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); | |
| int cap_convert_nscap(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, | |
| const void **ivalue, size_t size); | |
| #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */ |