|  | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc. | 
|  | * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> | 
|  | * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <linux/netdevice.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/types.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/skbuff.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/compiler.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/ieee80211.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/gfp.h> | 
|  | #include <asm/unaligned.h> | 
|  | #include <net/mac80211.h> | 
|  | #include <crypto/aes.h> | 
|  | #include <crypto/algapi.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include "ieee80211_i.h" | 
|  | #include "michael.h" | 
|  | #include "tkip.h" | 
|  | #include "aes_ccm.h" | 
|  | #include "aes_cmac.h" | 
|  | #include "aes_gmac.h" | 
|  | #include "aes_gcm.h" | 
|  | #include "wpa.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | u8 *data, *key, *mic; | 
|  | size_t data_len; | 
|  | unsigned int hdrlen; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  | int tail; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  | if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || | 
|  | skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | if (skb->len < hdrlen) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | data = skb->data + hdrlen; | 
|  | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) { | 
|  | /* Need to use software crypto for the test */ | 
|  | info->control.hw_key = NULL; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG || | 
|  | ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) && | 
|  | !(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | | 
|  | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) { | 
|  | /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */ | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; | 
|  | if (!info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || | 
|  | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, | 
|  | "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n", | 
|  | skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, | 
|  | skb_tailroom(skb), tail)) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) { | 
|  | /* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */ | 
|  | memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY]; | 
|  | michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); | 
|  | if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) | 
|  | mic[0]++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | u8 *data, *key = NULL; | 
|  | size_t data_len; | 
|  | unsigned int hdrlen; | 
|  | u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN]; | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other | 
|  | * than data frames. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or | 
|  | * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely | 
|  | * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a | 
|  | * MIC failure report. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) { | 
|  | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) | 
|  | goto mic_fail_no_key; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key && | 
|  | rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) | 
|  | goto update_iv; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even | 
|  | * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no | 
|  | * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || | 
|  | !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) { | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC | 
|  | * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for | 
|  | * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast | 
|  | * frames in the BSS. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) | 
|  | goto mic_fail; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | hdr = (void *)skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | data = skb->data + hdrlen; | 
|  | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; | 
|  | key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY]; | 
|  | michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); | 
|  | if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)) | 
|  | goto mic_fail; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* remove Michael MIC from payload */ | 
|  | skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | update_iv: | 
|  | /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ | 
|  | rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32; | 
|  | rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mic_fail: | 
|  | rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mic_fail_no_key: | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in | 
|  | * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if | 
|  | * the key is set. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2, | 
|  | is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ? | 
|  | NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP : | 
|  | NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE, | 
|  | rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1, | 
|  | NULL, GFP_ATOMIC); | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  | unsigned int hdrlen; | 
|  | int len, tail; | 
|  | u64 pn; | 
|  | u8 *pos; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && | 
|  | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { | 
|  | /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */ | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | len = skb->len - hdrlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | tail = 0; | 
|  | else | 
|  | tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || | 
|  | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN)) | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); | 
|  | memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen); | 
|  | pos += hdrlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Increase IV for the frame */ | 
|  | pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); | 
|  | pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* hwaccel - with software IV */ | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Add room for ICV */ | 
|  | skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(&tx->local->wep_tx_ctx, | 
|  | key, skb, pos, len); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { | 
|  | if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; | 
|  | int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */ | 
|  | if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | hdr = (void *)skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption. | 
|  | * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well, | 
|  | * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt() | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) | 
|  | hwaccel = 1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(&rx->local->wep_rx_ctx, | 
|  | key, skb->data + hdrlen, | 
|  | skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, | 
|  | hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx, | 
|  | &rx->tkip_iv32, | 
|  | &rx->tkip_iv16); | 
|  | if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Trim ICV */ | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED)) | 
|  | skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Remove IV */ | 
|  | memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); | 
|  | skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad) | 
|  | { | 
|  | __le16 mask_fc; | 
|  | int a4_included, mgmt; | 
|  | u8 qos_tid; | 
|  | u16 len_a; | 
|  | unsigned int hdrlen; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) | 
|  | * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected | 
|  | */ | 
|  | mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; | 
|  | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | | 
|  | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); | 
|  | if (!mgmt) | 
|  | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); | 
|  | mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | len_a = hdrlen - 2; | 
|  | a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); | 
|  | else | 
|  | qos_tid = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC | 
|  | * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived | 
|  | * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the | 
|  | * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take | 
|  | * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting | 
|  | * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | b_0[0] = 0x1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN | 
|  | * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) | 
|  | */ | 
|  | b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); | 
|  | memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); | 
|  | memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header | 
|  | * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ | 
|  | put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]); | 
|  | put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); | 
|  | memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ | 
|  | aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; | 
|  | aad[23] = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (a4_included) { | 
|  | memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); | 
|  | aad[30] = qos_tid; | 
|  | aad[31] = 0; | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); | 
|  | aad[24] = qos_tid; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id) | 
|  | { | 
|  | hdr[0] = pn[5]; | 
|  | hdr[1] = pn[4]; | 
|  | hdr[2] = 0; | 
|  | hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); | 
|  | hdr[4] = pn[3]; | 
|  | hdr[5] = pn[2]; | 
|  | hdr[6] = pn[1]; | 
|  | hdr[7] = pn[0]; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) | 
|  | { | 
|  | pn[0] = hdr[7]; | 
|  | pn[1] = hdr[6]; | 
|  | pn[2] = hdr[5]; | 
|  | pn[3] = hdr[4]; | 
|  | pn[4] = hdr[1]; | 
|  | pn[5] = hdr[0]; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, | 
|  | unsigned int mic_len) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  | int hdrlen, len, tail; | 
|  | u8 *pos; | 
|  | u8 pn[6]; | 
|  | u64 pn64; | 
|  | u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN]; | 
|  | u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && | 
|  | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && | 
|  | !((info->control.hw_key->flags & | 
|  | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && | 
|  | ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP | 
|  | * header or MIC fields | 
|  | */ | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | len = skb->len - hdrlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | tail = 0; | 
|  | else | 
|  | tail = mic_len; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || | 
|  | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); | 
|  | memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos; | 
|  | pos += hdrlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); | 
|  |  | 
|  | pn[5] = pn64; | 
|  | pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; | 
|  | pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; | 
|  | pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; | 
|  | pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; | 
|  | pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */ | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; | 
|  | ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); | 
|  | return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, | 
|  | skb_put(skb, mic_len)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, | 
|  | unsigned int mic_len) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { | 
|  | if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, | 
|  | unsigned int mic_len) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; | 
|  | int hdrlen; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); | 
|  | u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; | 
|  | int data_len; | 
|  | int queue; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && | 
|  | !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { | 
|  | if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) | 
|  | mic_len = 0; | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; | 
|  | if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { | 
|  | int res; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | queue = rx->security_idx; | 
|  |  | 
|  | res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], | 
|  | IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); | 
|  | if (res < 0 || | 
|  | (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { | 
|  | key->u.ccmp.replays++; | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { | 
|  | u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; | 
|  | u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; | 
|  | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ | 
|  | ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( | 
|  | key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, | 
|  | skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, | 
|  | data_len, | 
|  | skb->data + skb->len - mic_len)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ | 
|  | if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); | 
|  | skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad) | 
|  | { | 
|  | __le16 mask_fc; | 
|  | u8 qos_tid; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); | 
|  | memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); | 
|  | j_0[13] = 0; | 
|  | j_0[14] = 0; | 
|  | j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header | 
|  | * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] | 
|  | */ | 
|  | put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]); | 
|  | /* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) | 
|  | * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected | 
|  | */ | 
|  | mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; | 
|  | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | | 
|  | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); | 
|  | mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); | 
|  |  | 
|  | put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); | 
|  | memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ | 
|  | aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; | 
|  | aad[23] = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); | 
|  | else | 
|  | qos_tid = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) { | 
|  | memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); | 
|  | aad[30] = qos_tid; | 
|  | aad[31] = 0; | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); | 
|  | aad[24] = qos_tid; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id) | 
|  | { | 
|  | hdr[0] = pn[5]; | 
|  | hdr[1] = pn[4]; | 
|  | hdr[2] = 0; | 
|  | hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); | 
|  | hdr[4] = pn[3]; | 
|  | hdr[5] = pn[2]; | 
|  | hdr[6] = pn[1]; | 
|  | hdr[7] = pn[0]; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr) | 
|  | { | 
|  | pn[0] = hdr[7]; | 
|  | pn[1] = hdr[6]; | 
|  | pn[2] = hdr[5]; | 
|  | pn[3] = hdr[4]; | 
|  | pn[4] = hdr[1]; | 
|  | pn[5] = hdr[0]; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  | int hdrlen, len, tail; | 
|  | u8 *pos; | 
|  | u8 pn[6]; | 
|  | u64 pn64; | 
|  | u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN]; | 
|  | u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && | 
|  | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && | 
|  | !((info->control.hw_key->flags & | 
|  | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && | 
|  | ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { | 
|  | /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP | 
|  | * header or MIC fields | 
|  | */ | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | len = skb->len - hdrlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | tail = 0; | 
|  | else | 
|  | tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || | 
|  | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); | 
|  | memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); | 
|  | skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + | 
|  | IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos; | 
|  | pos += hdrlen; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); | 
|  |  | 
|  | pn[5] = pn64; | 
|  | pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; | 
|  | pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; | 
|  | pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; | 
|  | pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; | 
|  | pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; | 
|  |  | 
|  | gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */ | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; | 
|  | gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); | 
|  | return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len, | 
|  | skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { | 
|  | if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; | 
|  | int hdrlen; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); | 
|  | u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN]; | 
|  | int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && | 
|  | !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { | 
|  | if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) | 
|  | mic_len = 0; | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; | 
|  | if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { | 
|  | int res; | 
|  |  | 
|  | gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | queue = rx->security_idx; | 
|  |  | 
|  | res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], | 
|  | IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); | 
|  | if (res < 0 || | 
|  | (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { | 
|  | key->u.gcmp.replays++; | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { | 
|  | u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; | 
|  | u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; | 
|  | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ | 
|  | gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt( | 
|  | key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, | 
|  | skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, | 
|  | data_len, | 
|  | skb->data + skb->len - | 
|  | IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */ | 
|  | if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); | 
|  | skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  | int hdrlen; | 
|  | u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { | 
|  | /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */ | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len && | 
|  | pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  |  | 
|  | pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len); | 
|  | memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* pn is little endian */ | 
|  | for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | 
|  | if (pn1[i] < pn2[i]) | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  | else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i]) | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; | 
|  | const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL; | 
|  | int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); | 
|  | int data_len; | 
|  | u8 *rx_pn; | 
|  | u8 *skb_pn; | 
|  | u8 qos_tid; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme || | 
|  | !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme; | 
|  |  | 
|  | data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (data_len < 0) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); | 
|  | else | 
|  | qos_tid = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid]; | 
|  | skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* remove security header and MIC */ | 
|  | if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen); | 
|  | skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad) | 
|  | { | 
|  | __le16 mask_fc; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* FC type/subtype */ | 
|  | /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */ | 
|  | mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; | 
|  | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | | 
|  | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); | 
|  | put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]); | 
|  | /* A1 || A2 || A3 */ | 
|  | memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn) | 
|  | { | 
|  | *d++ = pn; | 
|  | *d++ = pn >> 8; | 
|  | *d++ = pn >> 16; | 
|  | *d++ = pn >> 24; | 
|  | *d++ = pn >> 32; | 
|  | *d = pn >> 40; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s) | 
|  | { | 
|  | *d++ = s[5]; | 
|  | *d++ = s[4]; | 
|  | *d++ = s[3]; | 
|  | *d++ = s[2]; | 
|  | *d++ = s[1]; | 
|  | *d = s[0]; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; | 
|  | u8 aad[20]; | 
|  | u64 pn64; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); | 
|  |  | 
|  | info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key && | 
|  | !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE)) | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  | mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; | 
|  | mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; | 
|  | mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* PN = PN + 1 */ | 
|  | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_aad(skb, aad); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64) | 
|  | */ | 
|  | ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, | 
|  | skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; | 
|  | u8 aad[20]; | 
|  | u64 pn64; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); | 
|  |  | 
|  | info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  | mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; | 
|  | mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; | 
|  | mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* PN = PN + 1 */ | 
|  | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_aad(skb, aad); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) | 
|  | */ | 
|  | ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, | 
|  | skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; | 
|  | u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6]; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* management frames are already linear */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) | 
|  | (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  | if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || | 
|  | mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { | 
|  | key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { | 
|  | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ | 
|  | bip_aad(skb, aad); | 
|  | ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, | 
|  | skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); | 
|  | if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { | 
|  | key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Remove MMIE */ | 
|  | skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; | 
|  | u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6]; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* management frames are already linear */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) | 
|  | (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  | if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || | 
|  | mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { | 
|  | key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { | 
|  | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ | 
|  | bip_aad(skb, aad); | 
|  | ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, | 
|  | skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); | 
|  | if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { | 
|  | key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Remove MMIE */ | 
|  | skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; | 
|  | u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN]; | 
|  | u64 pn64; | 
|  | u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); | 
|  |  | 
|  | info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  | mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; | 
|  | mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; | 
|  | mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* PN = PN + 1 */ | 
|  | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_aad(skb, aad); | 
|  |  | 
|  | hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  | memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); | 
|  | bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */ | 
|  | if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, | 
|  | skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); | 
|  | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; | 
|  | u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* management frames are already linear */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) | 
|  | (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  | if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || | 
|  | mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { | 
|  | key->u.aes_gmac.replays++; | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { | 
|  | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ | 
|  | bip_aad(skb, aad); | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); | 
|  | memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6); | 
|  |  | 
|  | mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); | 
|  | if (!mic) | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, | 
|  | skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, | 
|  | mic) < 0 || | 
|  | crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { | 
|  | key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; | 
|  | kfree(mic); | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } | 
|  | kfree(mic); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Remove MMIE */ | 
|  | skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct sk_buff *skb; | 
|  | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL; | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_result res; | 
|  |  | 
|  | skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { | 
|  | info  = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* handle hw-only algorithm */ | 
|  | if (!info->control.hw_key) | 
|  | return TX_DROP; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) { | 
|  | res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb); | 
|  | if (res != TX_CONTINUE) | 
|  | return res; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return TX_CONTINUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ieee80211_rx_result | 
|  | ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) | 
|  | { | 
|  | if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme) | 
|  | return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; | 
|  | } |