perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
BUG=b/149273109
TEST=tryjob
RELEASE_NOTE=Backport "perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux
checks"
SOURCE=UPSTREAM(da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e)
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Change-Id: Ifa962e82df9e7fbb167199793da0deaa46e6a1e5
Reviewed-on: https://cos-review.googlesource.com/c/third_party/kernel/+/2502
Reviewed-by: Vaibhav Rustagi <vaibhavrustagi@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 32f7dedff547c8e35d3a0fa912f1be6639f16cc3)
Reviewed-on: https://cos-review.googlesource.com/c/third_party/kernel/+/2682
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
index ca92e01..4860462 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { }
+static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { }
static inline u32 perf_get_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 0;
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_enable(struct perf_event *event) {}
static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_disable(struct perf_event *event) {}
static void power_pmu_sched_task(struct perf_event_context *ctx, bool sched_in) {}
-static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) {}
+static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct perf_event *event, struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) {}
static void pmao_restore_workaround(bool ebb) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC32 */
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
* pointed to by SIAR; this is indicated by the [POWER6_]MMCRA_SDSYNC, the
* [POWER7P_]MMCRA_SDAR_VALID bit in MMCRA, or the SDAR_VALID bit in SIER.
*/
-static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
+static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
{
unsigned long mmcra = regs->dsisr;
bool sdar_valid;
@@ -204,8 +204,7 @@
if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid)
*addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR);
- if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)))
+ if (is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)) && perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr) != 0)
*addrp = 0;
}
@@ -444,7 +443,7 @@
}
/* Processing BHRB entries */
-static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw)
+static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct perf_event *event, struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw)
{
u64 val;
u64 addr;
@@ -472,8 +471,7 @@
* exporting it to userspace (avoid exposure of regions
* where we could have speculative execution)
*/
- if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- is_kernel_addr(addr))
+ if (is_kernel_addr(addr) && perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr) != 0)
continue;
/* Branches are read most recent first (ie. mfbhrb 0 is
@@ -2087,12 +2085,12 @@
if (event->attr.sample_type &
(PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR | PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR))
- perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr);
+ perf_get_data_addr(event, regs, &data.addr);
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw;
cpuhw = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events);
- power_pmu_bhrb_read(cpuhw);
+ power_pmu_bhrb_read(event, cpuhw);
data.br_stack = &cpuhw->bhrb_stack;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 741540d..6a3b599 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -555,9 +555,11 @@
* Note that the default paranoia setting permits unprivileged
* users to profile the kernel.
*/
- if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (event->attr.exclude_kernel) {
+ ret = perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
return -EBUSY;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 0461ab257..711abf0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -3315,8 +3315,9 @@
if (x86_pmu.version < 3)
return -EINVAL;
- if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ ret = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ANY;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
index dee579e..a4cc660 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
@@ -776,8 +776,9 @@
* the user needs special permissions to be able to use it
*/
if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) {
- if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ v = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ if (v)
+ return v;
}
/* ESCR EventMask bits may be invalid */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 0bdcfdb..1299786 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1832,6 +1832,14 @@
void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ int (*perf_event_open)(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type);
+ int (*perf_event_alloc)(struct perf_event *event);
+ void (*perf_event_free)(struct perf_event *event);
+ int (*perf_event_read)(struct perf_event *event);
+ int (*perf_event_write)(struct perf_event *event);
+
+#endif
};
struct security_hook_heads {
@@ -2077,6 +2085,13 @@
struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
struct hlist_head locked_down;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_open;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_alloc;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_free;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_read;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_write;
+#endif
} __randomize_layout;
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 68ccc5b..4f77b22 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <linux/perf_regs.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/local.h>
struct perf_callchain_entry {
@@ -721,6 +722,9 @@
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp; /* cgroup event is attach to */
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ void *security;
+#endif
struct list_head sb_list;
#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
};
@@ -1241,19 +1245,41 @@
int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
-static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void)
+/* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
+#define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN 0
+
+/* Finer grained perf_event_open(2) access control. */
+#define PERF_SECURITY_CPU 1
+#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL 2
+#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT 3
+
+static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
{
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
}
-static inline bool perf_paranoid_cpu(void)
+static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0;
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
}
-static inline bool perf_paranoid_kernel(void)
+static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1;
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
+}
+
+static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+{
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
}
extern void perf_event_init(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 404b421..2c48c45 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1909,4 +1909,41 @@
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+struct perf_event_attr;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+extern int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type);
+extern int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event);
+extern void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event);
+extern int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event);
+extern int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event);
+#else
+static inline int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr,
+ int type)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index aaaf50b..8740d39 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4234,8 +4234,9 @@
if (!task) {
/* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
- if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+ err = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ if (err)
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
ctx = &cpuctx->ctx;
@@ -4544,6 +4545,8 @@
unaccount_event(event);
+ security_perf_event_free(event);
+
if (event->rb) {
/*
* Can happen when we close an event with re-directed output.
@@ -4997,6 +5000,10 @@
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
int ret;
+ ret = security_perf_event_read(event);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
ret = __perf_read(event, buf, count);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
@@ -5261,6 +5268,11 @@
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
long ret;
+ /* Treat ioctl like writes as it is likely a mutating operation. */
+ ret = security_perf_event_write(event);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
ret = _perf_ioctl(event, cmd, arg);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
@@ -5724,6 +5736,10 @@
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
+ ret = security_perf_event_read(event);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
vma_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
if (vma->vm_pgoff == 0) {
@@ -5857,7 +5873,7 @@
lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
locked = atomic64_read(&vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm) + extra;
- if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() &&
+ if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_is_paranoid() &&
!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto unlock;
@@ -10610,11 +10626,20 @@
}
}
+ err = security_perf_event_alloc(event);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_callchain_buffer;
+
/* symmetric to unaccount_event() in _free_event() */
account_event(event);
return event;
+err_callchain_buffer:
+ if (!event->parent) {
+ if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN)
+ put_callchain_buffers();
+ }
err_addr_filters:
kfree(event->addr_filter_ranges);
@@ -10703,9 +10728,11 @@
attr->branch_sample_type = mask;
}
/* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
- if ((mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM)
- && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) {
+ ret = perf_allow_kernel(attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
}
if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
@@ -10918,13 +10945,19 @@
if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
+ err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
if (err)
return err;
if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
- if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (attr.namespaces) {
@@ -10941,9 +10974,11 @@
}
/* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
- if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
- perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR)) {
+ err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PERF);
if (err && (attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR))
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
index a9dfa04..643e0b1 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "trace.h"
#include "trace_probe.h"
@@ -26,8 +27,10 @@
static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
+ int ret;
+
if (tp_event->perf_perm) {
- int ret = tp_event->perf_perm(tp_event, p_event);
+ ret = tp_event->perf_perm(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
@@ -46,8 +49,9 @@
/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) {
- if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (!is_sampling_event(p_event))
return 0;
@@ -82,8 +86,9 @@
* ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
* only allow root to have these.
*/
- if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 36196eb..a21fae9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2419,3 +2419,30 @@
return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
+}
+
+void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 552e73d..61f3560 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6827,6 +6827,67 @@
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
+
+ if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
+ requested, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
+
+ perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!perfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ perfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ event->security = perfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+
+ event->security = NULL;
+ kfree(perfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -7064,6 +7125,14 @@
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 32e9b03..7db2485 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@
{"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} },
{ "xdp_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "perf_event",
+ {"open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write"} },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 586b7ab..a4a86cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -141,7 +141,11 @@
};
struct bpf_security_struct {
- u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
+ u32 sid; /* SID of bpf obj creator */
+};
+
+struct perf_event_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of perf_event obj creator */
};
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
