blob: 7bf8d6c293f0d1ce56b59012f33afd7ad3e7226f [file] [log] [blame]
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
#include <console/console.h>
#include <security/tpm/tspi/crtm.h>
#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <security/vboot/misc.h>
#include <vb2_api.h>
#include <vb2_sha.h>
#if CONFIG(TPM1)
static uint32_t tpm1_invoke_state_machine(void)
{
uint8_t disabled;
uint8_t deactivated;
uint32_t result = TPM_SUCCESS;
/* Check that the TPM is enabled and activated. */
result = tlcl_get_flags(&disabled, &deactivated, NULL);
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't read capabilities.\n");
return result;
}
if (disabled) {
printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: is disabled. Enabling...\n");
result = tlcl_set_enable();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n");
return result;
}
}
if (!!deactivated != CONFIG(TPM_DEACTIVATE)) {
printk(BIOS_INFO,
"TPM: Unexpected TPM deactivated state. Toggling...\n");
result = tlcl_set_deactivated(!deactivated);
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR,
"TPM: Can't toggle deactivated state.\n");
return result;
}
deactivated = !deactivated;
result = TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
}
return result;
}
#endif
static uint32_t tpm_setup_s3_helper(void)
{
uint32_t result;
result = tlcl_resume();
switch (result) {
case TPM_SUCCESS:
break;
case TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT:
/*
* We're on a platform where the TPM maintains power
* in S3, so it's already initialized.
*/
printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Already initialized.\n");
result = TPM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Resume failed (%#x).\n", result);
break;
}
return result;
}
static uint32_t tpm_setup_epilogue(uint32_t result)
{
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
post_code(POST_TPM_FAILURE);
else
printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: setup succeeded\n");
return result;
}
static int tpm_is_setup;
static inline int tspi_tpm_is_setup(void)
{
/*
* vboot_logic_executed() only starts returning true at the end of
* verstage, but the vboot logic itself already wants to extend PCRs
* before that. So in the stage where verification actually runs, we
* need to check tpm_is_setup. Skip that check in all other stages so
* this whole function can be evaluated at compile time.
*/
if (CONFIG(VBOOT)) {
if (verification_should_run())
return tpm_is_setup;
return vboot_logic_executed();
}
if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT_INIT_BOOTBLOCK))
return ENV_BOOTBLOCK ? tpm_is_setup : 1;
if (ENV_RAMSTAGE)
return tpm_is_setup;
return 0;
}
/*
* tpm_setup starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the
* anti-rollback mechanism. tpm_setup can fail for three reasons. 1 A bug.
* 2 a TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack. In
* general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is
* to reboot in recovery mode in all cases. The recovery mode calls tpm_setup
* again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations. There is a
* good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the
* failure will repeat itself. (In general this is impossible to guarantee
* because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the
* previous boot.) In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus
* giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set
* bGlobalLock). The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a
* bricked device.
*
* As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using
* the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces. We do this to avoid writing
* to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about
* the durability of the NVRAM.
*/
uint32_t tpm_setup(int s3flag)
{
uint32_t result;
result = tlcl_lib_init();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initialize.\n");
return tpm_setup_epilogue(result);
}
/* Handle special init for S3 resume path */
if (s3flag) {
printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Handle S3 resume.\n");
return tpm_setup_epilogue(tpm_setup_s3_helper());
}
result = tlcl_startup();
if (CONFIG(TPM_STARTUP_IGNORE_POSTINIT)
&& result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: ignoring invalid POSTINIT\n");
result = TPM_SUCCESS;
}
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't run startup command.\n");
return tpm_setup_epilogue(result);
}
result = tlcl_assert_physical_presence();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
/*
* It is possible that the TPM was delivered with the physical
* presence command disabled. This tries enabling it, then
* tries asserting PP again.
*/
result = tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't enable physical presence command.\n");
return tpm_setup_epilogue(result);
}
result = tlcl_assert_physical_presence();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't assert physical presence.\n");
return tpm_setup_epilogue(result);
}
}
#if CONFIG(TPM1)
result = tpm1_invoke_state_machine();
#endif
if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT))
result = tspi_measure_cache_to_pcr();
tpm_is_setup = 1;
return tpm_setup_epilogue(result);
}
uint32_t tpm_clear_and_reenable(void)
{
uint32_t result;
printk(BIOS_INFO, "TPM: Clear and re-enable\n");
result = tlcl_force_clear();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initiate a force clear.\n");
return result;
}
#if CONFIG(TPM1)
result = tlcl_set_enable();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set enabled state.\n");
return result;
}
result = tlcl_set_deactivated(0);
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't set deactivated state.\n");
return result;
}
#endif
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tpm_extend_pcr(int pcr, enum vb2_hash_algorithm digest_algo,
const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const char *name)
{
uint32_t result;
if (!digest)
return TPM_E_IOERROR;
if (tspi_tpm_is_setup()) {
result = tlcl_lib_init();
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Can't initialize library.\n");
return result;
}
printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: Extending digest for `%s` into PCR %d\n", name, pcr);
result = tlcl_extend(pcr, digest, NULL);
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Extending hash for `%s` into PCR %d failed.\n",
name, pcr);
return result;
}
}
if (CONFIG(TPM_MEASURED_BOOT))
tcpa_log_add_table_entry(name, pcr, digest_algo,
digest, digest_len);
printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "TPM: Digest of `%s` to PCR %d %s\n",
name, pcr, tspi_tpm_is_setup() ? "measured" : "logged");
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
#if CONFIG(VBOOT_LIB)
uint32_t tpm_measure_region(const struct region_device *rdev, uint8_t pcr,
const char *rname)
{
uint8_t digest[TPM_PCR_MAX_LEN], digest_len;
uint8_t buf[HASH_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE];
uint32_t offset;
size_t len;
struct vb2_digest_context ctx;
if (!rdev || !rname)
return TPM_E_INVALID_ARG;
digest_len = vb2_digest_size(TPM_MEASURE_ALGO);
assert(digest_len <= sizeof(digest));
if (vb2_digest_init(&ctx, vboot_hwcrypto_allowed(), TPM_MEASURE_ALGO,
region_device_sz(rdev))) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error initializing hash.\n");
return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR;
}
/*
* Though one can mmap the full needed region on x86 this is not the
* case for e.g. ARM. In order to make this code as universal as
* possible across different platforms read the data to hash in chunks.
*/
for (offset = 0; offset < region_device_sz(rdev); offset += len) {
len = MIN(sizeof(buf), region_device_sz(rdev) - offset);
if (rdev_readat(rdev, buf, offset, len) < 0) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Not able to read region %s.\n",
rname);
return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE;
}
if (vb2_digest_extend(&ctx, buf, len)) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error extending hash.\n");
return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR;
}
}
if (vb2_digest_finalize(&ctx, digest, digest_len)) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "TPM: Error finalizing hash.\n");
return TPM_E_HASH_ERROR;
}
return tpm_extend_pcr(pcr, TPM_MEASURE_ALGO, digest, digest_len, rname);
}
#endif /* VBOOT_LIB */