| # Copyright 2018 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. |
| # Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| # found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| TIME="SHORT" |
| AUTHOR = "The Chromium OS Authors" |
| DOC = """ |
| Verified boot ensures only verified code runs after reboot. Malicious data from |
| the stateful partition can still influence verified code to perform unintended |
| actions that may lead to device compromise. One vector that has been proven |
| particularly successful is to plant malicious symlinks on the stateful file |
| system, causing privileged code that writes through an affected path to be |
| tricked into writing to an unintended file system location controlled by the |
| attacker. Another observed vector has been the conversion of normal files into |
| FIFOs as to block processes that use synchronous I/O to read the file, not |
| expecting it to be a FIFO. This test verifies that the kernel has been set up |
| to deny symlink traversal and opening of FIFOs on the stateful file system. |
| """ |
| NAME = "security_StatefulPartitionHardening" |
| PURPOSE = """ |
| To prevent verified software accessing the stateful file system from |
| inadvertently writing through malicious symlinks or opening files that have |
| been converted into FIFOs. |
| """ |
| CRITERIA = """ |
| The test verifies that opening a FIFO is totally prohibited on the stateful |
| file system, and symlink traversal is blocked except for a few white-listed |
| directories. |
| """ |
| ATTRIBUTES = "suite:bvt-inline" |
| TEST_CLASS = "security" |
| TEST_CATEGORY = "Functional" |
| TEST_TYPE = "client" |
| JOB_RETRIES = 2 |
| |
| job.run_test("security_StatefulPartitionHardening") |
