diagnostics/cros_healthd/executor/executor.cc - mirrors/cros/chromiumos/platform2 - Git at Google

 // Copyright 2020 The ChromiumOS Authors
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.

 #include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/executor/executor.h"

 #include <inttypes.h>

 #include <csignal>
 #include <cstdint>
 #include <cstdlib>
 #include <optional>
 #include <utility>

 #include <base/bind.h>
 #include <base/check.h>
 #include <base/files/file_path.h>
 #include <base/files/file_util.h>
 #include <base/logging.h>
 #include <base/strings/stringprintf.h>
 #include <base/task/task_traits.h>
 #include <base/task/thread_pool.h>
 #include <base/time/time.h>
 #include <brillo/process/process.h>
 #include <re2/re2.h>

 #include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/executor/mojom/executor.mojom.h"
 #include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/process/process_with_output.h"
 #include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/routines/memory/memory_constants.h"
 #include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/utils/file_utils.h"

 namespace diagnostics {

 namespace {

 // Amount of time we wait for a process to respond to SIGTERM before killing it.
 constexpr base::TimeDelta kTerminationTimeout = base::Seconds(2);

 // All SECCOMP policies should live in this directory.
 constexpr char kSandboxDirPath[] = "/usr/share/policy/";

 // SECCOMP policy for ectool pwmgetfanrpm:
 constexpr char kFanSpeedSeccompPolicyPath[] =
     "ectool_pwmgetfanrpm-seccomp.policy";
 constexpr char kEctoolUserAndGroup[] = "healthd_ec";
 constexpr char kEctoolBinary[] = "/usr/sbin/ectool";
 // The ectool command used to collect fan speed in RPM.
 constexpr char kGetFanRpmCommand[] = "pwmgetfanrpm";

 // SECCOMP policy for ectool motionsense lid_angle:
 constexpr char kLidAngleSeccompPolicyPath[] =
     "ectool_motionsense_lid_angle-seccomp.policy";
 // The ectool commands used to collect lid angle.
 constexpr char kMotionSenseCommand[] = "motionsense";
 constexpr char kLidAngleCommand[] = "lid_angle";

 // The iw command used to collect different wireless data.
 constexpr char kIwSeccompPolicyPath[] = "iw-seccomp.policy";
 // constexpr char kIwUserAndGroup[] = "healthd_iw";
 constexpr char kIwBinary[] = "/usr/sbin/iw";
 constexpr char kIwInterfaceCommand[] = "dev";
 constexpr char kIwInfoCommand[] = "info";
 constexpr char kIwLinkCommand[] = "link";
 constexpr std::array<const char*, 2> kIwScanDumpCommand{"scan", "dump"};
 // wireless interface name start with "wl" or "ml" and end it with a number. All
 // characters are in lowercase.  Max length is 16 characters.
 constexpr auto kWirelessInterfaceRegex = R"(([wm]l[a-z][a-z0-9]{1,12}[0-9]))";

 // SECCOMP policy for memtester, relative to kSandboxDirPath.
 constexpr char kMemtesterSeccompPolicyPath[] = "memtester-seccomp.policy";
 constexpr char kMemtesterBinary[] = "/usr/sbin/memtester";

 // Whitelist of msr registers that can be read by the ReadMsr call.
 constexpr uint32_t kMsrAccessAllowList[] = {
     cpu_msr::kIA32TmeCapability, cpu_msr::kIA32TmeActivate,
     cpu_msr::kIA32FeatureControl, cpu_msr::kVmCr};

 // Path to the UEFI SecureBoot file. This file can be read by root only.
 // It's one of EFI globally defined variables (EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE, fixed UUID
 // 8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c)
 // See also:
 // https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf
 constexpr char kUEFISecureBootVarPath[] =
     "/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c";
 // Path to the UEFI platform size file.
 constexpr char kUEFIPlatformSizeFile[] = "/sys/firmware/efi/fw_platform_size";

 // All Mojo callbacks need to be ran by the Mojo task runner, so this provides a
 // convenient wrapper that can be bound and ran by that specific task runner.
 void RunMojoProcessResultCallback(
     mojom::ExecutedProcessResult mojo_result,
     base::OnceCallback<void(mojom::ExecutedProcessResultPtr)> callback) {
   std::move(callback).Run(mojo_result.Clone());
 }

 // Reads file and reply the result to a callback. Will reply empty string if
 // cannot read the file.
 void ReadRawFileAndReplyCallback(
     const base::FilePath& file,
     base::OnceCallback<void(const std::string&)> callback) {
   std::string content = "";
   LOG_IF(ERROR, !base::ReadFileToString(file, &content))
       << "Failed to read file: " << file;
   std::move(callback).Run(content);
 }

 // Same as above but also trim the string.
 void ReadTrimFileAndReplyCallback(
     const base::FilePath& file,
     base::OnceCallback<void(const std::string&)> callback) {
   std::string content = "";
   LOG_IF(ERROR, !ReadAndTrimString(file, &content))
       << "Failed to read or trim file: " << file;
   std::move(callback).Run(content);
 }

 }  // namespace

 // Exported for testing.
 bool IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(const std::string& interface_name) {
   return (RE2::FullMatch(interface_name, kWirelessInterfaceRegex, nullptr));
 }

 Executor::Executor(
     const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> mojo_task_runner,
     mojo::PendingReceiver<mojom::Executor> receiver)
     : mojo_task_runner_(mojo_task_runner),
       receiver_{this /* impl */, std::move(receiver)} {
   receiver_.set_disconnect_handler(
       base::BindOnce([]() { std::exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); }));
 }

 void Executor::GetFanSpeed(GetFanSpeedCallback callback) {
   mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

   const auto seccomp_policy_path =
       base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kFanSpeedSeccompPolicyPath);

   // Minijail setup for ectool.
   std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-c");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("cap_sys_rawio=e");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("/dev/cros_ec");

   std::vector<std::string> binary_args = {kGetFanRpmCommand};
   base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kEctoolBinary);

   base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
       &Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
       seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, kEctoolUserAndGroup, binary_path,
       binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

   base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
 }

 void Executor::GetInterfaces(GetInterfacesCallback callback) {
   mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

   const auto seccomp_policy_path =
       base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

   // Minijail setup for iw.
   std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

   std::vector<std::string> binary_args = {kIwInterfaceCommand};
   base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

   // Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
   // cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
   base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
       &Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
       seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
       binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

   base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
 }

 void Executor::GetLink(const std::string& interface_name,
                        GetLinkCallback callback) {
   mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;
   // Sanitize against interface_name.
   if (!IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(interface_name)) {
     result.err = "Illegal interface name: " + interface_name;
     result.return_code = EXIT_FAILURE;
     std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
     return;
   }

   const auto seccomp_policy_path =
       base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

   // Minijail setup for iw.
   std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

   std::vector<std::string> binary_args;
   binary_args.push_back(interface_name);
   binary_args.push_back(kIwLinkCommand);

   base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

   // Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
   // cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
   base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
       &Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
       seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
       binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

   base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
 }

 void Executor::GetInfo(const std::string& interface_name,
                        GetInfoCallback callback) {
   mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;
   // Sanitize against interface_name.
   if (!IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(interface_name)) {
     result.err = "Illegal interface name: " + interface_name;
     result.return_code = EXIT_FAILURE;
     std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
     return;
   }

   const auto seccomp_policy_path =
       base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

   // Minijail setup for iw.
   std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

   std::vector<std::string> binary_args;
   binary_args.push_back(interface_name);
   binary_args.push_back(kIwInfoCommand);

   base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

   // Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
   // cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
   base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
       &Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
       seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
       binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

   base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
 }

 void Executor::GetScanDump(const std::string& interface_name,
                            GetScanDumpCallback callback) {
   mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;
   // Sanitize against interface_name.
   if (!IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(interface_name)) {
     result.err = "Illegal interface name: " + interface_name;
     result.return_code = EXIT_FAILURE;
     std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
     return;
   }

   const auto seccomp_policy_path =
       base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

   // Minijail setup for iw.
   std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

   std::vector<std::string> binary_args;
   binary_args.push_back(interface_name);
   binary_args.insert(binary_args.end(), kIwScanDumpCommand.begin(),
                      kIwScanDumpCommand.end());

   base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

   // Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
   // cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
   base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
       &Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
       seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
       binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

   base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
 }

 void Executor::RunMemtester(uint32_t test_mem_kib,
                             RunMemtesterCallback callback) {
   mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

   // TODO(b/193211343): Design a mechanism for multiple resource intensive task.
   // Only allow one instance of memtester at a time. This is reasonable, because
   // memtester mlocks almost the entirety of the device's memory, and a second
   // memtester process wouldn't have any memory to test.
   auto itr = processes_.find(kMemtesterBinary);
   if (itr != processes_.end()) {
     result.return_code = MemtesterErrorCodes::kAllocatingLockingInvokingError;
     result.err = kMemoryRoutineMemtesterAlreadyRunningMessage;
     std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
     return;
   }

   // Minijail setup for memtester.
   std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-c");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("cap_ipc_lock=e");

   // Additional args for memtester.
   std::vector<std::string> memtester_args;
   // Run with all free memory, except that which we left to the operating system
   // above.
   memtester_args.push_back(base::StringPrintf("%uK", test_mem_kib));
   // Run for one loop.
   memtester_args.push_back("1");

   const auto kSeccompPolicyPath =
       base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kMemtesterSeccompPolicyPath);

   // Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
   // cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
   base::ThreadPool::PostTask(
       FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()},
       base::BindOnce(&Executor::RunTrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
                      kSeccompPolicyPath, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt,
                      base::FilePath(kMemtesterBinary), memtester_args,
                      std::move(result), std::move(callback)));
 }

 void Executor::KillMemtester() {
   base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
   auto itr = processes_.find(kMemtesterBinary);
   if (itr == processes_.end())
     return;

   brillo::Process* process = itr->second.get();
   // If the process has ended, don't try to kill anything.
   if (!process->pid())
     return;

   // Try to terminate the process nicely, then kill it if necessary.
   if (!process->Kill(SIGTERM, kTerminationTimeout.InSeconds()))
     process->Kill(SIGKILL, kTerminationTimeout.InSeconds());
 }

 void Executor::GetProcessIOContents(const uint32_t pid,
                                     GetProcessIOContentsCallback callback) {
   ReadTrimFileAndReplyCallback(base::FilePath("/proc/")
                                    .Append(base::StringPrintf("%" PRId32, pid))
                                    .AppendASCII("io"),
                                std::move(callback));
 }

 void Executor::ReadMsr(const uint32_t msr_reg,
                        uint32_t cpu_index,
                        ReadMsrCallback callback) {
   if (std::find(std::begin(kMsrAccessAllowList), std::end(kMsrAccessAllowList),
                 msr_reg) == std::end(kMsrAccessAllowList)) {
     LOG(ERROR) << "MSR access not allowed";
     std::move(callback).Run(nullptr);
     return;
   }
   base::FilePath msr_path = base::FilePath("/dev/cpu")
                                 .Append(std::to_string(cpu_index))
                                 .Append("msr");
   base::File msr_fd(msr_path, base::File::FLAG_OPEN | base::File::FLAG_READ);
   if (!msr_fd.IsValid()) {
     LOG(ERROR) << "Could not open " << msr_path.value();
     std::move(callback).Run(nullptr);
     return;
   }
   uint64_t val = 0;
   // Read MSR register. See
   // https://github.com/intel/msr-tools/blob/0fcbda4e47a2aab73904e19b3fc0a7a73135c415/rdmsr.c#L235
   // for the use of reinterpret_case
   if (sizeof(val) !=
       msr_fd.Read(msr_reg, reinterpret_cast<char*>(&val), sizeof(val))) {
     LOG(ERROR) << "Could not read MSR register from " << msr_path.value();
     std::move(callback).Run(nullptr);
     return;
   }
   std::move(callback).Run(mojom::NullableUint64::New(val));
 }

 void Executor::GetUEFISecureBootContent(
     GetUEFISecureBootContentCallback callback) {
   ReadRawFileAndReplyCallback(base::FilePath(kUEFISecureBootVarPath),
                               std::move(callback));
 }

 void Executor::GetUEFIPlatformSizeContent(
     GetUEFIPlatformSizeContentCallback callback) {
   ReadTrimFileAndReplyCallback(base::FilePath{kUEFIPlatformSizeFile},
                                std::move(callback));
 }

 void Executor::GetLidAngle(GetLidAngleCallback callback) {
   mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

   const auto seccomp_policy_path =
       base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kLidAngleSeccompPolicyPath);

   // Minijail setup for ectool.
   std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
   sandboxing_args.push_back("/dev/cros_ec");

   std::vector<std::string> binary_args = {kMotionSenseCommand,
                                           kLidAngleCommand};
   base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kEctoolBinary);

   base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
       &Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
       seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, kEctoolUserAndGroup, binary_path,
       binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

   base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
 }

 void Executor::RunUntrackedBinary(
     const base::FilePath& seccomp_policy_path,
     const std::vector<std::string>& sandboxing_args,
     const std::optional<std::string>& user,
     const base::FilePath& binary_path,
     const std::vector<std::string>& binary_args,
     mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result,
     base::OnceCallback<void(mojom::ExecutedProcessResultPtr)> callback) {
   auto process = std::make_unique<ProcessWithOutput>();
   result.return_code =
       RunBinaryInternal(seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, user, binary_path,
                         binary_args, &result, process.get());
   mojo_task_runner_->PostTask(
       FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RunMojoProcessResultCallback,
                                 std::move(result), std::move(callback)));
 }

 void Executor::RunTrackedBinary(
     const base::FilePath& seccomp_policy_path,
     const std::vector<std::string>& sandboxing_args,
     const std::optional<std::string>& user,
     const base::FilePath& binary_path,
     const std::vector<std::string>& binary_args,
     mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result,
     base::OnceCallback<void(mojom::ExecutedProcessResultPtr)> callback) {
   std::string binary_path_str = binary_path.value();
   DCHECK(!processes_.count(binary_path_str));

   {
     auto process = std::make_unique<ProcessWithOutput>();
     base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
     processes_[binary_path_str] = std::move(process);
   }

   result.return_code = RunBinaryInternal(
       seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, user, binary_path, binary_args,
       &result, processes_[binary_path_str].get());

   // Get rid of the process.
   base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
   auto itr = processes_.find(binary_path_str);
   DCHECK(itr != processes_.end());
   processes_.erase(itr);
   mojo_task_runner_->PostTask(
       FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RunMojoProcessResultCallback,
                                 std::move(result), std::move(callback)));
 }

 int Executor::RunBinaryInternal(const base::FilePath& seccomp_policy_path,
                                 const std::vector<std::string>& sandboxing_args,
                                 const std::optional<std::string>& user,
                                 const base::FilePath& binary_path,
                                 const std::vector<std::string>& binary_args,
                                 mojom::ExecutedProcessResult* result,
                                 ProcessWithOutput* process) {
   DCHECK(result);
   DCHECK(process);

   if (!base::PathExists(seccomp_policy_path)) {
     result->err = "Sandbox info is missing for this architecture.";
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
   }

   // Sandboxing setup for the process.
   if (user.has_value())
     process->SandboxAs(user.value(), user.value());
   process->SetSeccompFilterPolicyFile(seccomp_policy_path.MaybeAsASCII());
   process->set_separate_stderr(true);
   if (!process->Init(sandboxing_args)) {
     result->err = "Process initialization failure.";
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
   }

   process->AddArg(binary_path.MaybeAsASCII());
   for (const auto& arg : binary_args)
     process->AddArg(arg);
   int exit_code = process->Run();
   if (exit_code != EXIT_SUCCESS) {
     process->GetError(&result->err);
     return exit_code;
   }

   if (!process->GetOutput(&result->out)) {
     result->err = "Failed to get output from process.";
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
   }

   return EXIT_SUCCESS;
 }

 }  // namespace diagnostics
	// Copyright 2020 The ChromiumOS Authors
	// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
	// found in the LICENSE file.

	#include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/executor/executor.h"

	#include <inttypes.h>

	#include <csignal>
	#include <cstdint>
	#include <cstdlib>
	#include <optional>
	#include <utility>

	#include <base/bind.h>
	#include <base/check.h>
	#include <base/files/file_path.h>
	#include <base/files/file_util.h>
	#include <base/logging.h>
	#include <base/strings/stringprintf.h>
	#include <base/task/task_traits.h>
	#include <base/task/thread_pool.h>
	#include <base/time/time.h>
	#include <brillo/process/process.h>
	#include <re2/re2.h>

	#include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/executor/mojom/executor.mojom.h"
	#include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/process/process_with_output.h"
	#include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/routines/memory/memory_constants.h"
	#include "diagnostics/cros_healthd/utils/file_utils.h"

	namespace diagnostics {

	namespace {

	// Amount of time we wait for a process to respond to SIGTERM before killing it.
	constexpr base::TimeDelta kTerminationTimeout = base::Seconds(2);

	// All SECCOMP policies should live in this directory.
	constexpr char kSandboxDirPath[] = "/usr/share/policy/";

	// SECCOMP policy for ectool pwmgetfanrpm:
	constexpr char kFanSpeedSeccompPolicyPath[] =
	"ectool_pwmgetfanrpm-seccomp.policy";
	constexpr char kEctoolUserAndGroup[] = "healthd_ec";
	constexpr char kEctoolBinary[] = "/usr/sbin/ectool";
	// The ectool command used to collect fan speed in RPM.
	constexpr char kGetFanRpmCommand[] = "pwmgetfanrpm";

	// SECCOMP policy for ectool motionsense lid_angle:
	constexpr char kLidAngleSeccompPolicyPath[] =
	"ectool_motionsense_lid_angle-seccomp.policy";
	// The ectool commands used to collect lid angle.
	constexpr char kMotionSenseCommand[] = "motionsense";
	constexpr char kLidAngleCommand[] = "lid_angle";

	// The iw command used to collect different wireless data.
	constexpr char kIwSeccompPolicyPath[] = "iw-seccomp.policy";
	// constexpr char kIwUserAndGroup[] = "healthd_iw";
	constexpr char kIwBinary[] = "/usr/sbin/iw";
	constexpr char kIwInterfaceCommand[] = "dev";
	constexpr char kIwInfoCommand[] = "info";
	constexpr char kIwLinkCommand[] = "link";
	constexpr std::array<const char*, 2> kIwScanDumpCommand{"scan", "dump"};
	// wireless interface name start with "wl" or "ml" and end it with a number. All
	// characters are in lowercase. Max length is 16 characters.
	constexpr auto kWirelessInterfaceRegex = R"(([wm]l[a-z][a-z0-9]{1,12}[0-9]))";

	// SECCOMP policy for memtester, relative to kSandboxDirPath.
	constexpr char kMemtesterSeccompPolicyPath[] = "memtester-seccomp.policy";
	constexpr char kMemtesterBinary[] = "/usr/sbin/memtester";

	// Whitelist of msr registers that can be read by the ReadMsr call.
	constexpr uint32_t kMsrAccessAllowList[] = {
	cpu_msr::kIA32TmeCapability, cpu_msr::kIA32TmeActivate,
	cpu_msr::kIA32FeatureControl, cpu_msr::kVmCr};

	// Path to the UEFI SecureBoot file. This file can be read by root only.
	// It's one of EFI globally defined variables (EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE, fixed UUID
	// 8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c)
	// See also:
	// https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf
	constexpr char kUEFISecureBootVarPath[] =
	"/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c";
	// Path to the UEFI platform size file.
	constexpr char kUEFIPlatformSizeFile[] = "/sys/firmware/efi/fw_platform_size";

	// All Mojo callbacks need to be ran by the Mojo task runner, so this provides a
	// convenient wrapper that can be bound and ran by that specific task runner.
	void RunMojoProcessResultCallback(
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult mojo_result,
	base::OnceCallback<void(mojom::ExecutedProcessResultPtr)> callback) {
	std::move(callback).Run(mojo_result.Clone());
	}

	// Reads file and reply the result to a callback. Will reply empty string if
	// cannot read the file.
	void ReadRawFileAndReplyCallback(
	const base::FilePath& file,
	base::OnceCallback<void(const std::string&)> callback) {
	std::string content = "";
	LOG_IF(ERROR, !base::ReadFileToString(file, &content))
	<< "Failed to read file: " << file;
	std::move(callback).Run(content);
	}

	// Same as above but also trim the string.
	void ReadTrimFileAndReplyCallback(
	const base::FilePath& file,
	base::OnceCallback<void(const std::string&)> callback) {
	std::string content = "";
	LOG_IF(ERROR, !ReadAndTrimString(file, &content))
	<< "Failed to read or trim file: " << file;
	std::move(callback).Run(content);
	}

	} // namespace

	// Exported for testing.
	bool IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(const std::string& interface_name) {
	return (RE2::FullMatch(interface_name, kWirelessInterfaceRegex, nullptr));
	}

	Executor::Executor(
	const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> mojo_task_runner,
	mojo::PendingReceiver<mojom::Executor> receiver)
	: mojo_task_runner_(mojo_task_runner),
	receiver_{this /* impl */, std::move(receiver)} {
	receiver_.set_disconnect_handler(
	base::BindOnce([]() { std::exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); }));
	}

	void Executor::GetFanSpeed(GetFanSpeedCallback callback) {
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

	const auto seccomp_policy_path =
	base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kFanSpeedSeccompPolicyPath);

	// Minijail setup for ectool.
	std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-c");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("cap_sys_rawio=e");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("/dev/cros_ec");

	std::vector<std::string> binary_args = {kGetFanRpmCommand};
	base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kEctoolBinary);

	base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
	&Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
	seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, kEctoolUserAndGroup, binary_path,
	binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

	base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
	}

	void Executor::GetInterfaces(GetInterfacesCallback callback) {
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

	const auto seccomp_policy_path =
	base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

	// Minijail setup for iw.
	std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

	std::vector<std::string> binary_args = {kIwInterfaceCommand};
	base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

	// Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
	// cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
	base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
	&Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
	seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
	binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

	base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
	}

	void Executor::GetLink(const std::string& interface_name,
	GetLinkCallback callback) {
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;
	// Sanitize against interface_name.
	if (!IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(interface_name)) {
	result.err = "Illegal interface name: " + interface_name;
	result.return_code = EXIT_FAILURE;
	std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
	return;
	}

	const auto seccomp_policy_path =
	base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

	// Minijail setup for iw.
	std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

	std::vector<std::string> binary_args;
	binary_args.push_back(interface_name);
	binary_args.push_back(kIwLinkCommand);

	base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

	// Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
	// cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
	base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
	&Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
	seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
	binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

	base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
	}

	void Executor::GetInfo(const std::string& interface_name,
	GetInfoCallback callback) {
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;
	// Sanitize against interface_name.
	if (!IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(interface_name)) {
	result.err = "Illegal interface name: " + interface_name;
	result.return_code = EXIT_FAILURE;
	std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
	return;
	}

	const auto seccomp_policy_path =
	base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

	// Minijail setup for iw.
	std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

	std::vector<std::string> binary_args;
	binary_args.push_back(interface_name);
	binary_args.push_back(kIwInfoCommand);

	base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

	// Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
	// cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
	base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
	&Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
	seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
	binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

	base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
	}

	void Executor::GetScanDump(const std::string& interface_name,
	GetScanDumpCallback callback) {
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;
	// Sanitize against interface_name.
	if (!IsValidWirelessInterfaceName(interface_name)) {
	result.err = "Illegal interface name: " + interface_name;
	result.return_code = EXIT_FAILURE;
	std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
	return;
	}

	const auto seccomp_policy_path =
	base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kIwSeccompPolicyPath);

	// Minijail setup for iw.
	std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("/usr/sbin/iw");

	std::vector<std::string> binary_args;
	binary_args.push_back(interface_name);
	binary_args.insert(binary_args.end(), kIwScanDumpCommand.begin(),
	kIwScanDumpCommand.end());

	base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kIwBinary);

	// Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
	// cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
	base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
	&Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
	seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt, binary_path,
	binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

	base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
	}

	void Executor::RunMemtester(uint32_t test_mem_kib,
	RunMemtesterCallback callback) {
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

	// TODO(b/193211343): Design a mechanism for multiple resource intensive task.
	// Only allow one instance of memtester at a time. This is reasonable, because
	// memtester mlocks almost the entirety of the device's memory, and a second
	// memtester process wouldn't have any memory to test.
	auto itr = processes_.find(kMemtesterBinary);
	if (itr != processes_.end()) {
	result.return_code = MemtesterErrorCodes::kAllocatingLockingInvokingError;
	result.err = kMemoryRoutineMemtesterAlreadyRunningMessage;
	std::move(callback).Run(result.Clone());
	return;
	}

	// Minijail setup for memtester.
	std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-c");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("cap_ipc_lock=e");

	// Additional args for memtester.
	std::vector<std::string> memtester_args;
	// Run with all free memory, except that which we left to the operating system
	// above.
	memtester_args.push_back(base::StringPrintf("%uK", test_mem_kib));
	// Run for one loop.
	memtester_args.push_back("1");

	const auto kSeccompPolicyPath =
	base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kMemtesterSeccompPolicyPath);

	// Since no user:group is specified, this will run with the default
	// cros_healthd:cros_healthd user and group.
	base::ThreadPool::PostTask(
	FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()},
	base::BindOnce(&Executor::RunTrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
	kSeccompPolicyPath, sandboxing_args, std::nullopt,
	base::FilePath(kMemtesterBinary), memtester_args,
	std::move(result), std::move(callback)));
	}

	void Executor::KillMemtester() {
	base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
	auto itr = processes_.find(kMemtesterBinary);
	if (itr == processes_.end())
	return;

	brillo::Process* process = itr->second.get();
	// If the process has ended, don't try to kill anything.
	if (!process->pid())
	return;

	// Try to terminate the process nicely, then kill it if necessary.
	if (!process->Kill(SIGTERM, kTerminationTimeout.InSeconds()))
	process->Kill(SIGKILL, kTerminationTimeout.InSeconds());
	}

	void Executor::GetProcessIOContents(const uint32_t pid,
	GetProcessIOContentsCallback callback) {
	ReadTrimFileAndReplyCallback(base::FilePath("/proc/")
	.Append(base::StringPrintf("%" PRId32, pid))
	.AppendASCII("io"),
	std::move(callback));
	}

	void Executor::ReadMsr(const uint32_t msr_reg,
	uint32_t cpu_index,
	ReadMsrCallback callback) {
	if (std::find(std::begin(kMsrAccessAllowList), std::end(kMsrAccessAllowList),
	msr_reg) == std::end(kMsrAccessAllowList)) {
	LOG(ERROR) << "MSR access not allowed";
	std::move(callback).Run(nullptr);
	return;
	}
	base::FilePath msr_path = base::FilePath("/dev/cpu")
	.Append(std::to_string(cpu_index))
	.Append("msr");
	base::File msr_fd(msr_path, base::File::FLAG_OPEN \| base::File::FLAG_READ);
	if (!msr_fd.IsValid()) {
	LOG(ERROR) << "Could not open " << msr_path.value();
	std::move(callback).Run(nullptr);
	return;
	}
	uint64_t val = 0;
	// Read MSR register. See
	// https://github.com/intel/msr-tools/blob/0fcbda4e47a2aab73904e19b3fc0a7a73135c415/rdmsr.c#L235
	// for the use of reinterpret_case
	if (sizeof(val) !=
	msr_fd.Read(msr_reg, reinterpret_cast<char*>(&val), sizeof(val))) {
	LOG(ERROR) << "Could not read MSR register from " << msr_path.value();
	std::move(callback).Run(nullptr);
	return;
	}
	std::move(callback).Run(mojom::NullableUint64::New(val));
	}

	void Executor::GetUEFISecureBootContent(
	GetUEFISecureBootContentCallback callback) {
	ReadRawFileAndReplyCallback(base::FilePath(kUEFISecureBootVarPath),
	std::move(callback));
	}

	void Executor::GetUEFIPlatformSizeContent(
	GetUEFIPlatformSizeContentCallback callback) {
	ReadTrimFileAndReplyCallback(base::FilePath{kUEFIPlatformSizeFile},
	std::move(callback));
	}

	void Executor::GetLidAngle(GetLidAngleCallback callback) {
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result;

	const auto seccomp_policy_path =
	base::FilePath(kSandboxDirPath).Append(kLidAngleSeccompPolicyPath);

	// Minijail setup for ectool.
	std::vector<std::string> sandboxing_args;
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-G");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("-b");
	sandboxing_args.push_back("/dev/cros_ec");

	std::vector<std::string> binary_args = {kMotionSenseCommand,
	kLidAngleCommand};
	base::FilePath binary_path = base::FilePath(kEctoolBinary);

	base::OnceClosure closure = base::BindOnce(
	&Executor::RunUntrackedBinary, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
	seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, kEctoolUserAndGroup, binary_path,
	binary_args, std::move(result), std::move(callback));

	base::ThreadPool::PostTask(FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock()}, std::move(closure));
	}

	void Executor::RunUntrackedBinary(
	const base::FilePath& seccomp_policy_path,
	const std::vector<std::string>& sandboxing_args,
	const std::optional<std::string>& user,
	const base::FilePath& binary_path,
	const std::vector<std::string>& binary_args,
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result,
	base::OnceCallback<void(mojom::ExecutedProcessResultPtr)> callback) {
	auto process = std::make_unique<ProcessWithOutput>();
	result.return_code =
	RunBinaryInternal(seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, user, binary_path,
	binary_args, &result, process.get());
	mojo_task_runner_->PostTask(
	FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RunMojoProcessResultCallback,
	std::move(result), std::move(callback)));
	}

	void Executor::RunTrackedBinary(
	const base::FilePath& seccomp_policy_path,
	const std::vector<std::string>& sandboxing_args,
	const std::optional<std::string>& user,
	const base::FilePath& binary_path,
	const std::vector<std::string>& binary_args,
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult result,
	base::OnceCallback<void(mojom::ExecutedProcessResultPtr)> callback) {
	std::string binary_path_str = binary_path.value();
	DCHECK(!processes_.count(binary_path_str));

	{
	auto process = std::make_unique<ProcessWithOutput>();
	base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
	processes_[binary_path_str] = std::move(process);
	}

	result.return_code = RunBinaryInternal(
	seccomp_policy_path, sandboxing_args, user, binary_path, binary_args,
	&result, processes_[binary_path_str].get());

	// Get rid of the process.
	base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
	auto itr = processes_.find(binary_path_str);
	DCHECK(itr != processes_.end());
	processes_.erase(itr);
	mojo_task_runner_->PostTask(
	FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RunMojoProcessResultCallback,
	std::move(result), std::move(callback)));
	}

	int Executor::RunBinaryInternal(const base::FilePath& seccomp_policy_path,
	const std::vector<std::string>& sandboxing_args,
	const std::optional<std::string>& user,
	const base::FilePath& binary_path,
	const std::vector<std::string>& binary_args,
	mojom::ExecutedProcessResult* result,
	ProcessWithOutput* process) {
	DCHECK(result);
	DCHECK(process);

	if (!base::PathExists(seccomp_policy_path)) {
	result->err = "Sandbox info is missing for this architecture.";
	return EXIT_FAILURE;
	}

	// Sandboxing setup for the process.
	if (user.has_value())
	process->SandboxAs(user.value(), user.value());
	process->SetSeccompFilterPolicyFile(seccomp_policy_path.MaybeAsASCII());
	process->set_separate_stderr(true);
	if (!process->Init(sandboxing_args)) {
	result->err = "Process initialization failure.";
	return EXIT_FAILURE;
	}

	process->AddArg(binary_path.MaybeAsASCII());
	for (const auto& arg : binary_args)
	process->AddArg(arg);
	int exit_code = process->Run();
	if (exit_code != EXIT_SUCCESS) {
	process->GetError(&result->err);
	return exit_code;
	}

	if (!process->GetOutput(&result->out)) {
	result->err = "Failed to get output from process.";
	return EXIT_FAILURE;
	}

	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
	}

	} // namespace diagnostics