| // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "cryptohome/homedirs.h" |
| |
| #include <algorithm> |
| #include <memory> |
| #include <vector> |
| |
| #include <base/bind.h> |
| #include <base/files/file_path.h> |
| #include <base/logging.h> |
| #include <base/strings/string_number_conversions.h> |
| #include <base/strings/stringprintf.h> |
| #include <brillo/cryptohome.h> |
| #include <brillo/secure_blob.h> |
| #include <chromeos/constants/cryptohome.h> |
| |
| #include "cryptohome/credentials.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/cryptohome_metrics.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/cryptolib.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/mount.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/platform.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/user_oldest_activity_timestamp_cache.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/username_passkey.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/vault_keyset.h" |
| |
| #include "key.pb.h" // NOLINT(build/include) |
| #include "signed_secret.pb.h" // NOLINT(build/include) |
| |
| using base::FilePath; |
| using brillo::SecureBlob; |
| |
| namespace cryptohome { |
| |
| const FilePath::CharType *kShadowRoot = "/home/.shadow"; |
| const char *kEmptyOwner = ""; |
| const char kGCacheFilesAttribute[] = "user.GCacheFiles"; |
| const char kAndroidCacheFilesAttribute[] = "user.AndroidCache"; |
| const char kTrackedDirectoryNameAttribute[] = "user.TrackedDirectoryName"; |
| |
| HomeDirs::HomeDirs() |
| : default_platform_(new Platform()), |
| platform_(default_platform_.get()), |
| shadow_root_(FilePath(kShadowRoot)), |
| timestamp_cache_(NULL), |
| enterprise_owned_(false), |
| default_policy_provider_(new policy::PolicyProvider()), |
| policy_provider_(default_policy_provider_.get()), |
| crypto_(NULL), |
| default_mount_factory_(new MountFactory()), |
| mount_factory_(default_mount_factory_.get()), |
| default_vault_keyset_factory_(new VaultKeysetFactory()), |
| vault_keyset_factory_(default_vault_keyset_factory_.get()) { } |
| |
| HomeDirs::~HomeDirs() { } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::Init(Platform* platform, Crypto* crypto, |
| UserOldestActivityTimestampCache *cache) { |
| platform_ = platform; |
| crypto_ = crypto; |
| timestamp_cache_ = cache; |
| |
| LoadDevicePolicy(); |
| if (!platform_->DirectoryExists(shadow_root_)) |
| platform_->CreateDirectory(shadow_root_); |
| return GetSystemSalt(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::FreeDiskSpace() { |
| if (platform_->AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(shadow_root_) >= |
| kFreeSpaceThresholdToTriggerCleanup) { |
| // Already have enough space. No need to cleanup. |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // If ephemeral users are enabled, remove all cryptohomes except those |
| // currently mounted or belonging to the owner. |
| // |AreEphemeralUsers| will reload the policy to guarantee freshness. |
| if (AreEphemeralUsersEnabled()) { |
| RemoveNonOwnerCryptohomes(); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Clean Cache directories for every user (except current one). |
| DoForEveryUnmountedCryptohome(base::Bind(&HomeDirs::DeleteCacheCallback, |
| base::Unretained(this))); |
| |
| int64_t freeDiskSpace = platform_->AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(shadow_root_); |
| if (freeDiskSpace >= kTargetFreeSpaceAfterCleanup) |
| return true; |
| |
| // Clean GCache directories for every user (except current one). |
| DoForEveryUnmountedCryptohome(base::Bind(&HomeDirs::DeleteGCacheTmpCallback, |
| base::Unretained(this))); |
| |
| int64_t oldFreeDiskSpace = freeDiskSpace; |
| freeDiskSpace = platform_->AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(shadow_root_); |
| ReportFreedGCacheDiskSpaceInMb((freeDiskSpace - oldFreeDiskSpace) / 1024 / |
| 1024); |
| |
| if (freeDiskSpace >= kTargetFreeSpaceAfterCleanup) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (freeDiskSpace >= kMinFreeSpaceInBytes) |
| // Disk space is still less than |kTargetFreeSpaceAfterCleanup|, but more |
| // than the threshold to do more aggressive cleanups. |
| return false; |
| |
| // Clean Android cache directories for every user (except current one). |
| DoForEveryUnmountedCryptohome(base::Bind( |
| &HomeDirs::DeleteAndroidCacheCallback, |
| base::Unretained(this))); |
| |
| freeDiskSpace = platform_->AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(shadow_root_); |
| if (freeDiskSpace >= kTargetFreeSpaceAfterCleanup) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (freeDiskSpace >= kMinFreeSpaceInBytes) |
| // Disk space is still less than |kTargetFreeSpaceAfterCleanup|, but more |
| // than the threshold to do more aggressive cleanup by removing users. |
| return false; |
| |
| // Initialize user timestamp cache if it has not been yet. This reads the |
| // last-activity time from each homedir's SerializedVaultKeyset. This value |
| // is only updated in the value keyset on unmount and every 24 hrs, so a |
| // currently logged in user probably doesn't have an up to date value. This |
| // is okay, since we don't delete currently logged in homedirs anyway. (See |
| // Mount::UpdateCurrentUserActivityTimestamp()). |
| if (!timestamp_cache_->initialized()) { |
| timestamp_cache_->Initialize(); |
| DoForEveryUnmountedCryptohome(base::Bind( |
| &HomeDirs::AddUserTimestampToCacheCallback, |
| base::Unretained(this))); |
| } |
| |
| // Delete old users, the oldest first. |
| // Don't delete anyone if we don't know who the owner is. |
| // For consumer devices, don't delete the device owner. Enterprise-enrolled |
| // devices have no owner, so don't delete the last user. |
| std::string owner; |
| if (enterprise_owned_ || GetOwner(&owner)) { |
| int mounted_cryptohomes = CountMountedCryptohomes(); |
| while (!timestamp_cache_->empty()) { |
| base::Time deleted_timestamp = timestamp_cache_->oldest_known_timestamp(); |
| FilePath deleted_user_dir = timestamp_cache_->RemoveOldestUser(); |
| std::string obfuscated = deleted_user_dir.BaseName().value(); |
| |
| if (enterprise_owned_) { |
| // If mounted_cryptohomes== 0, then there were no mounted cryptohomes |
| // and hence no logged in users. Thus we want to skip the last user in |
| // our list, since they were the most-recent user on the device. |
| if (timestamp_cache_->empty() && mounted_cryptohomes == 0) { |
| // Put this user back in the cache, since they shouldn't be |
| // permanently skipped; they may not be most-recent the next |
| // time we run, and then they should be a candidate for deletion. |
| timestamp_cache_->AddExistingUser(deleted_user_dir, |
| deleted_timestamp); |
| |
| LOG(INFO) << "Skipped deletion of the most recent device user."; |
| return true; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (obfuscated == owner) { |
| // We should never delete the device owner, so we permanently skip |
| // them by not adding them back to the cache. |
| LOG(INFO) << "Skipped deletion of the device owner."; |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (platform_->IsDirectoryMounted( |
| brillo::cryptohome::home::GetHashedUserPath(obfuscated))) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Attempt to delete currently logged in user. Skipped..."; |
| } else { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Freeing disk space by deleting user " |
| << deleted_user_dir.value(); |
| platform_->DeleteFile(deleted_user_dir, true); |
| if (platform_->AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(shadow_root_) >= |
| kTargetFreeSpaceAfterCleanup) |
| return true; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(glotov): do further cleanup. |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| int64_t HomeDirs::AmountOfFreeDiskSpace() { |
| return platform_->AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(shadow_root_); |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::LoadDevicePolicy() { |
| policy_provider_->Reload(); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::AreEphemeralUsersEnabled() { |
| LoadDevicePolicy(); |
| // If the policy cannot be loaded, default to non-ephemeral users. |
| bool ephemeral_users_enabled = false; |
| if (policy_provider_->device_policy_is_loaded()) |
| policy_provider_->GetDevicePolicy().GetEphemeralUsersEnabled( |
| &ephemeral_users_enabled); |
| return ephemeral_users_enabled; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::AreCredentialsValid(const Credentials& creds) { |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(vault_keyset_factory()->New( |
| platform_, crypto_)); |
| return GetValidKeyset(creds, vk.get()); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::GetValidKeyset(const Credentials& creds, VaultKeyset* vk) { |
| if (!vk) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::string owner; |
| std::string obfuscated = creds.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| // |AreEphemeralUsers| will reload the policy to guarantee freshness. |
| if (AreEphemeralUsersEnabled() && GetOwner(&owner) && obfuscated != owner) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::vector<int> key_indices; |
| if (!GetVaultKeysets(obfuscated, &key_indices)) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "No valid keysets on disk for " << obfuscated; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| SecureBlob passkey; |
| creds.GetPasskey(&passkey); |
| |
| for (int index : key_indices) { |
| if (!vk->Load(GetVaultKeysetPath(obfuscated, index))) |
| continue; |
| // Skip decrypt attempts if the label doesn't match. |
| // Treat an empty creds label as a wildcard. |
| // Allow a creds label of "prefix<num>" for fixed indexing. |
| if (!creds.key_data().label().empty() && |
| creds.key_data().label() != vk->serialized().key_data().label() && |
| creds.key_data().label() != |
| base::StringPrintf("%s%d", kKeyLegacyPrefix, index)) |
| continue; |
| if (vk->Decrypt(passkey)) |
| return true; |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::Exists(const Credentials& credentials) const { |
| std::string obfuscated = credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| FilePath user_dir = shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated); |
| return platform_->DirectoryExists(user_dir); |
| } |
| |
| VaultKeyset* HomeDirs::GetVaultKeyset(const Credentials& credentials) const { |
| if (credentials.key_data().label().empty()) |
| return NULL; |
| std::string obfuscated = credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| |
| // Walk all indices to find a match. |
| // We should move to label-derived suffixes to be efficient. |
| std::vector<int> key_indices; |
| if (!GetVaultKeysets(obfuscated, &key_indices)) |
| return NULL; |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(vault_keyset_factory()->New( |
| platform_, crypto_)); |
| for (int index : key_indices) { |
| if (!LoadVaultKeysetForUser(obfuscated, index, vk.get())) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| // Test against the label if the key has a label or create a label |
| // automatically from the index number. |
| std::string label = (vk->serialized().has_key_data() ? |
| vk->serialized().key_data().label() : |
| base::StringPrintf("%s%d", kKeyLegacyPrefix, index)); |
| if (label == credentials.key_data().label()) { |
| vk->set_legacy_index(index); |
| return vk.release(); |
| } |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(wad) Figure out how this might fit in with vault_keyset.cc |
| bool HomeDirs::GetVaultKeysets(const std::string& obfuscated, |
| std::vector<int>* keysets) const { |
| CHECK(keysets); |
| FilePath user_dir = shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated); |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<FileEnumerator> file_enumerator( |
| platform_->GetFileEnumerator(user_dir, false, |
| base::FileEnumerator::FILES)); |
| FilePath next_path; |
| while (!(next_path = file_enumerator->Next()).empty()) { |
| FilePath file_name = next_path.BaseName(); |
| // Scan for "master." files. |
| if (file_name.RemoveFinalExtension().value() != kKeyFile) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| std::string index_str = file_name.FinalExtension(); |
| int index; |
| if (!base::StringToInt(&index_str[1], &index)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| // The test below will catch all strtol(3) error conditions. |
| if (index < 0 || index >= kKeyFileMax) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid key file range: " << index; |
| continue; |
| } |
| keysets->push_back(static_cast<int>(index)); |
| } |
| |
| // Ensure it is sorted numerically and not lexigraphically. |
| std::sort(keysets->begin(), keysets->end()); |
| |
| return keysets->size() != 0; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::GetVaultKeysetLabels(const Credentials& credentials, |
| std::vector<std::string>* labels) const { |
| CHECK(labels); |
| std::string obfuscated = credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| FilePath user_dir = shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated); |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<FileEnumerator> file_enumerator( |
| platform_->GetFileEnumerator(user_dir, false /* Not recursive. */, |
| base::FileEnumerator::FILES)); |
| FilePath next_path; |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(vault_keyset_factory()->New( |
| platform_, crypto_)); |
| while (!(next_path = file_enumerator->Next()).empty()) { |
| FilePath file_name = next_path.BaseName(); |
| // Scan for "master." files. |
| if (file_name.RemoveFinalExtension().value() != kKeyFile) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| int index = 0; |
| std::string index_str = file_name.FinalExtension(); |
| // StringToInt will only return true for a perfect conversion. |
| if (!base::StringToInt(&index_str[1], &index)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (index < 0 || index >= kKeyFileMax) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid key file range: " << index; |
| continue; |
| } |
| // Now parse the keyset to get its label or skip it. |
| if (!LoadVaultKeysetForUser(obfuscated, index, vk.get())) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| // Test against the label if the key has a label or create a label |
| // automatically from the index number. |
| std::string label = (vk->serialized().has_key_data() ? |
| vk->serialized().key_data().label() : |
| base::StringPrintf("%s%d", kKeyLegacyPrefix, index)); |
| labels->push_back(label); |
| } |
| |
| return (labels->size() > 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::CheckAuthorizationSignature(const KeyData& existing_key_data, |
| const Key& new_key, |
| const std::string& signature) { |
| // If the existing key doesn't require authorization, then there's no |
| // work to be done. |
| // |
| // Note, only the first authorizaton_data is honored at present. |
| if (!existing_key_data.authorization_data_size() || |
| !existing_key_data.authorization_data(0).has_type()) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (!new_key.data().has_revision()) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "CheckAuthorizationSignature called with no revision"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| const KeyAuthorizationData* existing_auth_data = |
| &existing_key_data.authorization_data(0); |
| const KeyAuthorizationSecret* secret; |
| switch (existing_auth_data->type()) { |
| // The data is passed in the clear but authenticated with a shared |
| // symmetric secret. |
| case KeyAuthorizationData::KEY_AUTHORIZATION_TYPE_HMACSHA256: |
| // Ensure there is an accessible signing key. Only a single |
| // secret is allowed until there is a reason to support more. |
| secret = NULL; |
| for (int secret_i = 0; |
| secret_i < existing_auth_data->secrets_size(); |
| ++secret_i) { |
| secret = &existing_auth_data->secrets(secret_i); |
| if (secret->usage().sign() && !secret->wrapped()) |
| break; |
| secret = NULL; // Clear if the candidate doesn't match. |
| } |
| if (!secret) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Could not find a valid signing key for HMACSHA256"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| break; |
| // The data is passed encrypted and authenticated with dedicated |
| // encrypting and signing symmetric keys. |
| case KeyAuthorizationData::KEY_AUTHORIZATION_TYPE_AES256CBC_HMACSHA256: |
| LOG(ERROR) << "KEY_AUTHORIZATION_TYPE_AES256CBC_HMACSHA256 not supported"; |
| return false; |
| default: |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown KeyAuthorizationType seen"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // Now we're only handling HMACSHA256. |
| // Specifically, HMACSHA256 is meant for interoperating with a server-side |
| // signed password change operation which only specifies the revision and |
| // new passphrase. That means that change fields must be filtered to limit |
| // silent updates to fields. At present, this is done after this call. If |
| // the signed fields vary by KeyAuthorizationType in the future, it should |
| // be done here. |
| std::string changes_str; |
| ac::chrome::managedaccounts::account::Secret new_secret; |
| new_secret.set_revision(new_key.data().revision()); |
| new_secret.set_secret(new_key.secret()); |
| if (!new_secret.SerializeToString(&changes_str)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to serialized the new key"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // Compute the HMAC |
| brillo::SecureBlob hmac_key(secret->symmetric_key()); |
| brillo::SecureBlob data(changes_str.begin(), changes_str.end()); |
| SecureBlob hmac = CryptoLib::HmacSha256(hmac_key, data); |
| |
| // Check the HMAC |
| if (signature.length() != hmac.size() || |
| brillo::SecureMemcmp(signature.data(), hmac.data(), |
| std::min(signature.size(), hmac.size()))) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Supplied authorization signature was invalid."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (existing_key_data.has_revision() && |
| existing_key_data.revision() >= new_key.data().revision()) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "The supplied key revision was too old."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| CryptohomeErrorCode HomeDirs::UpdateKeyset( |
| const Credentials& credentials, |
| const Key* key_changes, |
| const std::string& authorization_signature) { |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(vault_keyset_factory()->New( |
| platform_, crypto_)); |
| if (!GetValidKeyset(credentials, vk.get())) { |
| // Differentiate between failure and non-existent. |
| if (!credentials.key_data().label().empty()) { |
| vk.reset(GetVaultKeyset(credentials)); |
| if (!vk.get()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "UpdateKeyset: key not found"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| } |
| LOG(WARNING) << "UpdateKeyset: invalid authentication provided"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| SerializedVaultKeyset *key = vk->mutable_serialized(); |
| |
| // Check the privileges to ensure Update is allowed. |
| // [In practice, Add/Remove could be used to override if present.] |
| bool authorized_update = false; |
| if (key->has_key_data()) { |
| authorized_update = key->key_data().privileges().authorized_update(); |
| if (!key->key_data().privileges().update() && !authorized_update) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "UpdateKeyset: no update() privilege"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Check the signature first so the rest of the function is untouched. |
| if (authorized_update) { |
| if (authorization_signature.empty() || |
| !CheckAuthorizationSignature(key->key_data(), |
| *key_changes, |
| authorization_signature)) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Unauthorized update attempted"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Walk through each field and update the value. |
| KeyData* merged_data = key->mutable_key_data(); |
| |
| // Note! Revisions aren't tracked in general. |
| if (key_changes->data().has_revision()) { |
| merged_data->set_revision(key_changes->data().revision()); |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(wad,dkrahn): Add privilege dropping. |
| SecureBlob passkey; |
| credentials.GetPasskey(&passkey); |
| if (key_changes->has_secret()) { |
| SecureBlob new_passkey(key_changes->secret().begin(), |
| key_changes->secret().end()); |
| passkey.swap(new_passkey); |
| } |
| |
| // Only merge additional KeyData if the update is not restricted. |
| if (!authorized_update) { |
| if (key_changes->data().has_type()) { |
| merged_data->set_type(key_changes->data().type()); |
| } |
| if (key_changes->data().has_label()) { |
| merged_data->set_label(key_changes->data().label()); |
| } |
| // Do not allow authorized_updates to change their keys unless we add |
| // a new signature type. This can be done in the future by adding |
| // the authorization_data() to the new key_data, and changing the |
| // CheckAuthorizationSignature() to check for a compatible "upgrade". |
| if (key_changes->data().authorization_data_size() > 0) { |
| // Only the first will be merged for now. |
| *(merged_data->add_authorization_data()) = |
| key_changes->data().authorization_data(0); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!vk->Encrypt(passkey) || !vk->Save(vk->source_file())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to encrypt and write the updated keyset"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET; |
| } |
| |
| CryptohomeErrorCode HomeDirs::AddKeyset( |
| const Credentials& existing_credentials, |
| const SecureBlob& new_passkey, |
| const KeyData* new_data, // NULLable |
| bool clobber, |
| int* index) { |
| // TODO(wad) Determine how to best bubble up the failures MOUNT_ERROR |
| // encapsulate wrt the TPM behavior. |
| std::string obfuscated = existing_credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername( |
| system_salt_); |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(vault_keyset_factory()->New( |
| platform_, crypto_)); |
| if (!GetValidKeyset(existing_credentials, vk.get())) { |
| // Differentiate between failure and non-existent. |
| if (!existing_credentials.key_data().label().empty()) { |
| vk.reset(GetVaultKeyset(existing_credentials)); |
| if (!vk.get()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "AddKeyset: key not found"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| } |
| LOG(WARNING) << "AddKeyset: invalid authentication provided"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| // Check the privileges to ensure Add is allowed. |
| // Keys without extended data are considered fully privileged. |
| if (vk->serialized().has_key_data() && |
| !vk->serialized().key_data().privileges().add()) { |
| // TODO(wad) Ensure this error can be returned as a KEY_DENIED error |
| // for AddKeyEx. |
| LOG(WARNING) << "AddKeyset: no add() privilege"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| // Walk the namespace looking for the first free spot. |
| // Optimizations can come later. |
| // Note, nothing is stopping simultaenous access to these files |
| // or enforcing mandatory locking. |
| int new_index = 0; |
| FILE* vk_file = NULL; |
| FilePath vk_path; |
| for ( ; new_index < kKeyFileMax; ++new_index) { |
| vk_path = GetVaultKeysetPath(obfuscated, new_index); |
| // Rely on fopen()'s O_EXCL|O_CREAT behavior to fail |
| // repeatedly until there is an opening. |
| // TODO(wad) Add a clean-up-0-byte-keysets helper to c-home startup |
| vk_file = platform_->OpenFile(vk_path, "wx"); |
| if (vk_file) // got one |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (!vk_file) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to find an available keyset slot"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_QUOTA_EXCEEDED; |
| } |
| // Once the file has been claimed, we can release the handle. |
| platform_->CloseFile(vk_file); |
| |
| // Before persisting, check, in a racy-way, if there is |
| // an existing labeled credential. |
| if (new_data) { |
| UsernamePasskey search_cred(existing_credentials.username().c_str(), |
| SecureBlob()); |
| search_cred.set_key_data(*new_data); |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> match(GetVaultKeyset(search_cred)); |
| if (match.get()) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Label already exists."; |
| platform_->DeleteFile(vk_path, false); |
| if (!clobber) { |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_LABEL_EXISTS; |
| } |
| new_index = match->legacy_index(); |
| vk_path = match->source_file(); |
| } |
| } |
| // Since we're reusing the authorizing VaultKeyset, be careful with the |
| // metadata. |
| vk->mutable_serialized()->clear_key_data(); |
| if (new_data) { |
| *(vk->mutable_serialized()->mutable_key_data()) = *new_data; |
| } |
| |
| // Repersist the VK with the new creds. |
| CryptohomeErrorCode added = CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET; |
| if (!vk->Encrypt(new_passkey) || !vk->Save(vk_path)) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to encrypt or write the new keyset"; |
| added = CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE; |
| // If we're clobbering, don't delete on error. |
| if (!clobber) { |
| platform_->DeleteFile(vk_path, false); |
| } |
| } else { |
| *index = new_index; |
| } |
| return added; |
| } |
| |
| CryptohomeErrorCode HomeDirs::RemoveKeyset( |
| const Credentials& credentials, |
| const KeyData& key_data) { |
| // This error condition should be caught by the caller. |
| if (key_data.label().empty()) |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(vault_keyset_factory()->New( |
| platform_, crypto_)); |
| if (!GetValidKeyset(credentials, vk.get())) { |
| // Differentiate between failure and non-existent. |
| if (!credentials.key_data().label().empty()) { |
| vk.reset(GetVaultKeyset(credentials)); |
| if (!vk.get()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "RemoveKeyset: key not found"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| } |
| LOG(WARNING) << "RemoveKeyset: invalid authentication provided"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| // Legacy keys can remove any other key. Otherwise a key needs explicit |
| // privileges. |
| if (vk->serialized().has_key_data() && |
| !vk->serialized().key_data().privileges().remove()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "RemoveKeyset: no remove() privilege"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| UsernamePasskey removal_creds(credentials.username().c_str(), SecureBlob()); |
| removal_creds.set_key_data(key_data); |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> remove_vk(GetVaultKeyset(removal_creds)); |
| if (!remove_vk.get()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "RemoveKeyset: key to remove not found"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| |
| std::string obfuscated = credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername( |
| system_salt_); |
| if (!ForceRemoveKeyset(obfuscated, remove_vk->legacy_index())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "RemoveKeyset: failed to remove keyset file"; |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| return CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::ForceRemoveKeyset(const std::string& obfuscated, int index) { |
| // Note, external callers should check credentials. |
| if (index < 0 || index >= kKeyFileMax) |
| return false; |
| |
| FilePath path = GetVaultKeysetPath(obfuscated, index); |
| if (!platform_->FileExists(path)) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "ForceRemoveKeyset: keyset " << index << " for " |
| << obfuscated << " does not exist"; |
| // Since it doesn't exist, then we're done. |
| return true; |
| } |
| // TODO(wad) Add file zeroing here or centralize with other code. |
| return platform_->DeleteFile(path, false); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::MoveKeyset(const std::string& obfuscated, int src, int dst) { |
| if (src < 0 || dst < 0 || src >= kKeyFileMax || dst >= kKeyFileMax) |
| return false; |
| |
| FilePath src_path = GetVaultKeysetPath(obfuscated, src); |
| FilePath dst_path = GetVaultKeysetPath(obfuscated, dst); |
| if (!platform_->FileExists(src_path)) |
| return false; |
| if (platform_->FileExists(dst_path)) |
| return false; |
| // Grab the destination exclusively |
| FILE* vk_file = platform_->OpenFile(dst_path, "wx"); |
| if (!vk_file) |
| return false; |
| // The creation occurred so there's no reason to keep the handle. |
| platform_->CloseFile(vk_file); |
| if (!platform_->Rename(src_path, dst_path)) |
| return false; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| FilePath HomeDirs::GetVaultKeysetPath(const std::string& obfuscated, |
| int index) const { |
| return shadow_root_ |
| .Append(obfuscated) |
| .Append(kKeyFile) |
| .AddExtension(base::IntToString(index)); |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::RemoveNonOwnerCryptohomesCallback(const FilePath& user_dir) { |
| if (!enterprise_owned_) { // Enterprise owned? Delete it all. |
| std::string owner; |
| if (!GetOwner(&owner) || // No owner? bail. |
| // Don't delete the owner's cryptohome! |
| // TODO(wad,ellyjones) Add GetUser*Path-helpers |
| user_dir == shadow_root_.Append(owner)) |
| return; |
| } |
| // Once we're sure this is not the owner's cryptohome, delete it. |
| platform_->DeleteFile(user_dir, true); |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::RemoveNonOwnerCryptohomes() { |
| std::string owner; |
| if (!enterprise_owned_ && !GetOwner(&owner)) |
| return; |
| |
| DoForEveryUnmountedCryptohome(base::Bind( |
| &HomeDirs::RemoveNonOwnerCryptohomesCallback, |
| base::Unretained(this))); |
| // TODO(ellyjones): is this valuable? These two directories should just be |
| // mountpoints. |
| RemoveNonOwnerDirectories(brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPathPrefix()); |
| RemoveNonOwnerDirectories(brillo::cryptohome::home::GetRootPathPrefix()); |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::DoForEveryUnmountedCryptohome( |
| const CryptohomeCallback& cryptohome_cb) { |
| std::vector<FilePath> entries; |
| if (!platform_->EnumerateDirectoryEntries(shadow_root_, false, &entries)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| for (const auto& entry : entries) { |
| const std::string obfuscated = entry.BaseName().value(); |
| if (!brillo::cryptohome::home::IsSanitizedUserName(obfuscated)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (platform_->IsDirectoryMounted( |
| brillo::cryptohome::home::GetHashedUserPath(obfuscated))) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| cryptohome_cb.Run(entry); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int HomeDirs::CountMountedCryptohomes() const { |
| std::vector<FilePath> entries; |
| int mounts = 0; |
| if (!platform_->EnumerateDirectoryEntries(shadow_root_, false, &entries)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| for (const auto& entry : entries) { |
| const std::string obfuscated = entry.BaseName().value(); |
| if (!brillo::cryptohome::home::IsSanitizedUserName(obfuscated)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| FilePath user_path = brillo::cryptohome::home::GetHashedUserPath( |
| obfuscated); |
| if (!platform_->DirectoryExists(user_path)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!platform_->IsDirectoryMounted(user_path)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| mounts++; |
| } |
| return mounts; |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::DeleteDirectoryContents(const FilePath& dir) { |
| std::unique_ptr<FileEnumerator> subdir_enumerator( |
| platform_->GetFileEnumerator(dir, false, |
| base::FileEnumerator::FILES | |
| base::FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES | |
| base::FileEnumerator::SHOW_SYM_LINKS)); |
| for (FilePath subdir_path = subdir_enumerator->Next(); |
| !subdir_path.empty(); |
| subdir_path = subdir_enumerator->Next()) { |
| platform_->DeleteFile(subdir_path, true); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::RemoveNonOwnerDirectories(const FilePath& prefix) { |
| std::vector<FilePath> dirents; |
| if (!platform_->EnumerateDirectoryEntries(prefix, false, &dirents)) |
| return; |
| std::string owner; |
| if (!enterprise_owned_ && !GetOwner(&owner)) |
| return; |
| for (const auto& dirent : dirents) { |
| const std::string basename = dirent.BaseName().value(); |
| if (!enterprise_owned_ && !strcasecmp(basename.c_str(), owner.c_str())) |
| continue; // Skip the owner's directory. |
| if (!brillo::cryptohome::home::IsSanitizedUserName(basename)) |
| continue; // Skip any directory whose name is not an obfuscated user |
| // name. |
| if (platform_->IsDirectoryMounted(dirent)) |
| continue; // Skip any directory that is currently mounted. |
| platform_->DeleteFile(dirent, true); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::GetTrackedDirectory( |
| const FilePath& user_dir, const FilePath& tracked_dir_name, FilePath* out) { |
| FilePath vault_path = user_dir.Append(kVaultDir); |
| if (platform_->DirectoryExists(vault_path)) { |
| // On Ecryptfs, tracked directories' names are not encrypted. |
| *out = user_dir.Append(kVaultDir).Append(tracked_dir_name); |
| return true; |
| } |
| // This is dircrypto. Use the xattr to locate the directory. |
| return GetTrackedDirectoryForDirCrypto( |
| user_dir.Append(kMountDir), tracked_dir_name, out); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::GetTrackedDirectoryForDirCrypto( |
| const FilePath& mount_dir, |
| const FilePath& tracked_dir_name, |
| FilePath* out) { |
| FilePath current_name; |
| FilePath current_path = mount_dir; |
| |
| // Iterate over name components. This way, we don't have to inspect every |
| // directory under |mount_dir|. |
| std::vector<std::string> name_components; |
| tracked_dir_name.GetComponents(&name_components); |
| for (const auto& name_component : name_components) { |
| FilePath next_path; |
| std::unique_ptr<FileEnumerator> enumerator( |
| platform_->GetFileEnumerator(current_path, false /* recursive */, |
| base::FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES)); |
| for (FilePath dir = enumerator->Next(); !dir.empty(); |
| dir = enumerator->Next()) { |
| std::string name; |
| if (platform_->GetExtendedFileAttributeAsString( |
| dir, kTrackedDirectoryNameAttribute, &name) && |
| name == name_component) { |
| // This is the directory we're looking for. |
| next_path = dir; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (next_path.empty()) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Tracked dir not found " << tracked_dir_name.value(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| current_path = next_path; |
| } |
| *out = current_path; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::DeleteCacheCallback(const FilePath& user_dir) { |
| FilePath cache; |
| if (!GetTrackedDirectory( |
| user_dir, FilePath(kUserHomeSuffix).Append(kCacheDir), &cache)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to locate the cache directory."; |
| return; |
| } |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Deleting Cache " << cache.value(); |
| DeleteDirectoryContents(cache); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::FindGCacheFilesDir(const FilePath& user_dir, FilePath* dir) { |
| // Start search from GCache/v1. |
| base::FilePath gcache_dir; |
| if (!GetTrackedDirectory( |
| user_dir, FilePath(kUserHomeSuffix).Append(kGCacheDir).Append( |
| kGCacheVersionDir), &gcache_dir)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| std::unique_ptr<FileEnumerator> enumerator( |
| platform_->GetFileEnumerator(gcache_dir, true, |
| base::FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES)); |
| for (FilePath current = enumerator->Next(); |
| !current.empty(); |
| current = enumerator->Next()) { |
| if (platform_->HasNoDumpFileAttribute(current) && |
| platform_->HasExtendedFileAttribute(current, kGCacheFilesAttribute)) { |
| *dir = current; |
| return true; |
| } |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::DeleteGCacheTmpCallback(const FilePath& user_dir) { |
| FilePath gcachetmp; |
| if (!GetTrackedDirectory( |
| user_dir, FilePath(kUserHomeSuffix).Append(kGCacheDir).Append( |
| kGCacheVersionDir).Append(kGCacheTmpDir), &gcachetmp)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to locate the GCache tmp directory."; |
| return; |
| } |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Deleting GCache " << gcachetmp.value(); |
| DeleteDirectoryContents(gcachetmp); |
| |
| FilePath cacheDir; |
| if (!FindGCacheFilesDir(user_dir, &cacheDir)) return; |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<FileEnumerator> enumerator(platform_->GetFileEnumerator( |
| cacheDir, false, base::FileEnumerator::FILES)); |
| for (FilePath current = enumerator->Next(); |
| !current.empty(); |
| current = enumerator->Next()) { |
| if (platform_->HasNoDumpFileAttribute(current)) { |
| if (!platform_->DeleteFile(current, false)) { |
| PLOG(WARNING) << "DeleteFile: " << current.value(); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::DeleteAndroidCacheCallback(const FilePath& user_dir) { |
| FilePath root; |
| if (!GetTrackedDirectory(user_dir, FilePath(kRootHomeSuffix), &root)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to locate the root directory."; |
| return; |
| } |
| // Find the cache directory by walking under the root directory |
| // and looking for AndroidCache xattr set. Data is stored under |
| // root/android-data/data/data/[package name]/cache. It is not |
| // desirable to make all package name directories unencrypted, they |
| // are not marked as tracked directory. |
| // TODO(crbug/625872): Mark root/android/data/data/ as pass through. |
| // TODO(uekawa): Not all boards have android running, we probably |
| // don't need to check for board that do not have an android |
| // configuration. |
| std::unique_ptr<cryptohome::FileEnumerator> file_enumerator( |
| platform_->GetFileEnumerator(root, true, |
| base::FileEnumerator::DIRECTORIES)); |
| FilePath next_path; |
| while (!(next_path = file_enumerator->Next()).empty()) { |
| std::string value; |
| if (platform_->HasExtendedFileAttribute( |
| next_path, kAndroidCacheFilesAttribute)) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Deleting Android Cache " << next_path.value(); |
| platform_->DeleteFile(next_path, true); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void HomeDirs::AddUserTimestampToCacheCallback(const FilePath& user_dir) { |
| const std::string obfuscated_username = user_dir.BaseName().value(); |
| // Add a timestamp for every key. |
| std::vector<int> key_indices; |
| // Failure is okay since the loop falls through. |
| GetVaultKeysets(obfuscated_username, &key_indices); |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> keyset( |
| vault_keyset_factory()->New(platform_, crypto_)); |
| // Collect the most recent time for a given user by walking all |
| // vaults. This avoids trying to keep them in sync atomically. |
| // TODO(wad,?) Move non-key vault metadata to a standalone file. |
| base::Time timestamp = base::Time(); |
| for (int index : key_indices) { |
| if (LoadVaultKeysetForUser(obfuscated_username, index, keyset.get()) && |
| keyset->serialized().has_last_activity_timestamp()) { |
| const base::Time t = base::Time::FromInternalValue( |
| keyset->serialized().last_activity_timestamp()); |
| if (t > timestamp) |
| timestamp = t; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!timestamp.is_null()) { |
| timestamp_cache_->AddExistingUser(user_dir, timestamp); |
| } else { |
| timestamp_cache_->AddExistingUserNotime(user_dir); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::LoadVaultKeysetForUser(const std::string& obfuscated_user, |
| int index, |
| VaultKeyset* keyset) const { |
| // Load the encrypted keyset |
| FilePath user_key_file = GetVaultKeysetPath(obfuscated_user, index); |
| // We don't have keys yet, so just load it. |
| // TODO(wad) Move to passing around keysets and not serialized versions. |
| if (!keyset->Load(user_key_file)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read keyset file for user " << obfuscated_user; |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::GetPlainOwner(std::string* owner) { |
| LoadDevicePolicy(); |
| if (!policy_provider_->device_policy_is_loaded()) |
| return false; |
| policy_provider_->GetDevicePolicy().GetOwner(owner); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::GetOwner(std::string* owner) { |
| std::string plain_owner; |
| if (!GetPlainOwner(&plain_owner) || plain_owner.empty()) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!GetSystemSalt(NULL)) |
| return false; |
| *owner = UsernamePasskey(plain_owner.c_str(), brillo::Blob()) |
| .GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::GetSystemSalt(SecureBlob* blob) { |
| FilePath salt_file = shadow_root_.Append("salt"); |
| if (!crypto_->GetOrCreateSalt(salt_file, CRYPTOHOME_DEFAULT_SALT_LENGTH, |
| false, &system_salt_)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create system salt."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (blob) |
| *blob = system_salt_; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::Remove(const std::string& username) { |
| UsernamePasskey passkey(username.c_str(), SecureBlob()); |
| std::string obfuscated = passkey.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| FilePath user_dir = shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated); |
| FilePath user_path = brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPath(username); |
| FilePath root_path = brillo::cryptohome::home::GetRootPath(username); |
| return platform_->DeleteFile(user_dir, true) && |
| platform_->DeleteFile(user_path, true) && |
| platform_->DeleteFile(root_path, true); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::Rename(const std::string& account_id_from, |
| const std::string& account_id_to) { |
| if (account_id_from == account_id_to) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| UsernamePasskey from(account_id_from.c_str(), SecureBlob()); |
| UsernamePasskey to(account_id_to.c_str(), SecureBlob()); |
| const std::string obfuscated_from = from.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| const std::string obfuscated_to = to.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| |
| const FilePath user_dir_from = shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated_from); |
| const FilePath user_path_from = |
| brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPath(account_id_from); |
| const FilePath root_path_from = |
| brillo::cryptohome::home::GetRootPath(account_id_from); |
| const FilePath new_user_path_from = |
| FilePath(Mount::GetNewUserPath(account_id_from)); |
| |
| const FilePath user_dir_to = shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated_to); |
| const FilePath user_path_to = |
| brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPath(account_id_to); |
| const FilePath root_path_to = |
| brillo::cryptohome::home::GetRootPath(account_id_to); |
| const FilePath new_user_path_to = |
| FilePath(Mount::GetNewUserPath(account_id_to)); |
| |
| LOG(INFO) << "HomeDirs::Rename(from='" << account_id_from << "', to='" |
| << account_id_to << "'):" |
| << " renaming '" << user_dir_from.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(user_dir_from) << ") " |
| << "=> '" << user_dir_to.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(user_dir_to) << "); " |
| << "renaming '" << user_path_from.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(user_path_from) << ") " |
| << "=> '" << user_path_to.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(user_path_to) << "); " |
| << "renaming '" << root_path_from.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(root_path_from) << ") " |
| << "=> '" << root_path_to.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(root_path_to) << "); " |
| << "renaming '" << new_user_path_from.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(new_user_path_from) << ") " |
| << "=> '" << new_user_path_to.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(new_user_path_to) << ")"; |
| |
| const bool already_renamed = !base::PathExists(user_dir_from); |
| |
| if (already_renamed) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "HomeDirs::Rename(from='" << account_id_from << "', to='" |
| << account_id_to << "'): Consider already renamed. " |
| << "('" << user_dir_from.value() << "' doesn't exist.)"; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| const bool can_rename = !base::PathExists(user_dir_to); |
| |
| if (!can_rename) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "HomeDirs::Rename(from='" << account_id_from << "', to='" |
| << account_id_to << "'): Destination already exists! " |
| << " '" << user_dir_from.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(user_dir_from) << ") " |
| << "=> '" << user_dir_to.value() << "' " |
| << "(exists=" << base::PathExists(user_dir_to) << "); "; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // |user_dir_renamed| is return value, because two other directories are |
| // empty and will be created as needed. |
| const bool user_dir_renamed = |
| !base::PathExists(user_dir_from) || |
| platform_->Rename(user_dir_from, user_dir_to); |
| |
| if (user_dir_renamed) { |
| const bool user_path_renamed = |
| !base::PathExists(user_path_from) || |
| platform_->Rename(user_path_from, user_path_to); |
| const bool root_path_renamed = |
| !base::PathExists(root_path_from) || |
| platform_->Rename(root_path_from, root_path_to); |
| const bool new_user_path_renamed = |
| !base::PathExists(new_user_path_from) || |
| platform_->Rename(new_user_path_from, new_user_path_to); |
| if (!user_path_renamed) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "HomeDirs::Rename(from='" << account_id_from << "', to='" |
| << account_id_to << "'): failed to rename user_path."; |
| } |
| if (!root_path_renamed) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "HomeDirs::Rename(from='" << account_id_from << "', to='" |
| << account_id_to << "'): failed to rename root_path."; |
| } |
| if (!new_user_path_renamed) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "HomeDirs::Rename(from='" << account_id_from << "', to='" |
| << account_id_to << "'): failed to rename new_user_path."; |
| } |
| } else { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "HomeDirs::Rename(from='" << account_id_from << "', to='" |
| << account_id_to << "'): failed to rename user_dir."; |
| } |
| |
| return user_dir_renamed; |
| } |
| |
| int64_t HomeDirs::ComputeSize(const std::string& account_id) { |
| UsernamePasskey passkey(account_id.c_str(), SecureBlob()); |
| std::string obfuscated = passkey.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| FilePath user_dir = FilePath(shadow_root_).Append(obfuscated); |
| FilePath user_path = brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPath(account_id); |
| FilePath root_path = brillo::cryptohome::home::GetRootPath(account_id); |
| int64_t total_size = 0; |
| int64_t size = platform_->ComputeDirectorySize(user_dir); |
| if (size > 0) { |
| total_size += size; |
| } |
| size = platform_->ComputeDirectorySize(user_path); |
| if (size > 0) { |
| total_size += size; |
| } |
| size = platform_->ComputeDirectorySize(root_path); |
| if (size > 0) { |
| total_size += size; |
| } |
| return total_size; |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::Migrate(const Credentials& newcreds, |
| const SecureBlob& oldkey) { |
| SecureBlob newkey; |
| newcreds.GetPasskey(&newkey); |
| UsernamePasskey oldcreds(newcreds.username().c_str(), oldkey); |
| scoped_refptr<Mount> mount = mount_factory_->New(); |
| mount->Init(platform_, crypto_, timestamp_cache_); |
| std::string obfuscated = newcreds.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| if (!mount->MountCryptohome(oldcreds, Mount::MountArgs(), NULL)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Migrate: Mount failed"; |
| // Fail as early as possible. Note that we don't have to worry about leaking |
| // this mount - Mount unmounts itself if it's still mounted in the |
| // destructor. |
| return false; |
| } |
| int key_index = mount->CurrentKey(); |
| if (key_index == -1) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Attempted migration of key-less mount."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Grab the current key and check its permissions early. |
| // add() and remove() are required. mount() was checked |
| // already during MountCryptohome(). |
| std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk( |
| vault_keyset_factory()->New(platform_, crypto_)); |
| if (!LoadVaultKeysetForUser(obfuscated, key_index, vk.get())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Migrate: failed to reload the active keyset"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| const KeyData *key_data = NULL; |
| if (vk->serialized().has_key_data()) { |
| key_data = &(vk->serialized().key_data()); |
| // legacy keys are full privs |
| if (!vk->serialized().key_data().privileges().add() || |
| !vk->serialized().key_data().privileges().remove()) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Migrate: key lacks sufficient privileges()"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| SecureBlob old_auth_data; |
| SecureBlob auth_data; |
| std::string username = newcreds.username(); |
| FilePath salt_file = GetChapsTokenSaltPath(username); |
| if (!crypto_->PasskeyToTokenAuthData(newkey, salt_file, &auth_data) || |
| !crypto_->PasskeyToTokenAuthData(oldkey, salt_file, &old_auth_data)) { |
| // On failure, token data may be partially migrated. Ideally, the user |
| // will re-attempt with the same passphrase. |
| return false; |
| } |
| chaps_client_.ChangeTokenAuthData( |
| GetChapsTokenDir(username), |
| old_auth_data, |
| auth_data); |
| |
| int new_key_index = -1; |
| // For a labeled key with the same label as the old key, |
| // this will overwrite the existing keyset file. |
| if (AddKeyset(oldcreds, newkey, key_data, true, &new_key_index) != |
| CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Migrate: failed to add the new keyset"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // For existing unlabeled keys, we need to remove the old key and swap |
| // the slot. If the key was labeled and clobbered, the key indices will |
| // match. |
| if (new_key_index != key_index) { |
| if (!ForceRemoveKeyset(obfuscated, key_index)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Migrate: unable to delete the old keyset: " << key_index; |
| // TODO(wad) Should we zero it or move it into space? |
| // Fallthrough |
| } |
| // Put the new one in its slot. |
| if (!MoveKeyset(obfuscated, new_key_index, key_index)) { |
| // This is bad, but non-terminal since we have a valid, migrated key. |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Migrate: failed to move the new key to the old slot"; |
| key_index = new_key_index; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Remove all other keysets during a "migration". |
| std::vector<int> key_indices; |
| if (!GetVaultKeysets(obfuscated, &key_indices)) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to enumerate keysets after adding one. Weird."; |
| // Fallthrough: The user is migrated, but something else changed keys. |
| } |
| for (int index : key_indices) { |
| if (index == key_index) |
| continue; |
| LOG(INFO) << "Removing keyset " << index << " due to migration."; |
| ForceRemoveKeyset(obfuscated, index); // Failure is ok. |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| namespace { |
| const char *kChapsDaemonName = "chaps"; |
| const char *kChapsDirName = ".chaps"; |
| const char *kChapsSaltName = "auth_data_salt"; |
| } |
| |
| FilePath HomeDirs::GetChapsTokenDir(const std::string& user) const { |
| return brillo::cryptohome::home::GetDaemonPath(user, kChapsDaemonName); |
| } |
| |
| FilePath HomeDirs::GetLegacyChapsTokenDir(const std::string& user) const { |
| return brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPath(user).Append(kChapsDirName); |
| } |
| |
| FilePath HomeDirs::GetChapsTokenSaltPath(const std::string& user) const { |
| return GetChapsTokenDir(user).Append(kChapsSaltName); |
| } |
| |
| bool HomeDirs::NeedsDircryptoMigration(const Credentials& credentials) const { |
| // Bail if dircrypto is not supported. |
| const dircrypto::KeyState state = |
| platform_->GetDirCryptoKeyState(shadow_root_); |
| if (state == dircrypto::KeyState::UNKNOWN || |
| state == dircrypto::KeyState::NOT_SUPPORTED) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Use the existence of eCryptfs vault as a single of whether the user needs |
| // dircrypto migration. eCryptfs test is adapted from |
| // Mount::DoesEcryptfsCryptohomeExist. |
| const std::string obfuscated = |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| const FilePath user_ecryptfs_vault_dir = |
| shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated).Append(kVaultDir); |
| return platform_->DirectoryExists(user_ecryptfs_vault_dir); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace cryptohome |