| // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| // Contains the implementation of class Mount. |
| |
| #include "cryptohome/mount.h" |
| |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <sys/mount.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| |
| #include <map> |
| #include <memory> |
| #include <set> |
| #include <utility> |
| |
| #include <base/bind.h> |
| #include <base/callback_helpers.h> |
| #include <base/files/file_path.h> |
| #include <base/logging.h> |
| #include <base/sha1.h> |
| #include <base/strings/string_number_conversions.h> |
| #include <base/strings/string_util.h> |
| #include <base/strings/stringprintf.h> |
| #include <base/threading/platform_thread.h> |
| #include <base/values.h> |
| #include <chaps/isolate.h> |
| #include <chaps/token_manager_client.h> |
| #include <brillo/cryptohome.h> |
| #include <brillo/process.h> |
| #include <brillo/scoped_umask.h> |
| #include <brillo/secure_blob.h> |
| #include <chromeos/constants/cryptohome.h> |
| |
| #include "cryptohome/bootlockbox/boot_lockbox.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/chaps_client_factory.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/crypto.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/cryptohome_common.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/cryptohome_metrics.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/cryptolib.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/dircrypto_data_migrator/migration_helper.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/dircrypto_util.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/homedirs.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/mount_utils.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/obfuscated_username.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/pkcs11_init.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/platform.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/tpm.h" |
| #include "cryptohome/vault_keyset.h" |
| |
| #include "vault_keyset.pb.h" // NOLINT(build/include) |
| |
| using base::FilePath; |
| using base::StringPrintf; |
| using brillo::BlobToString; |
| using brillo::SecureBlob; |
| using brillo::cryptohome::home::GetRootPath; |
| using brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPath; |
| using brillo::cryptohome::home::IsSanitizedUserName; |
| using brillo::cryptohome::home::kGuestUserName; |
| using brillo::cryptohome::home::SanitizeUserName; |
| using chaps::IsolateCredentialManager; |
| |
| namespace { |
| bool __attribute__((unused)) IsolateUserSession() { |
| #if USE_USER_SESSION_ISOLATION |
| return true; |
| #else |
| return false; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| namespace cryptohome { |
| |
| const char kChapsUserName[] = "chaps"; |
| const char kDefaultSharedAccessGroup[] = "chronos-access"; |
| |
| // TODO(fes): Remove once UI for BWSI switches to MountGuest() |
| const char kIncognitoUser[] = "incognito"; |
| |
| const char kKeyFile[] = "master"; |
| const int kKeyFileMax = 100; // master.0 ... master.99 |
| const mode_t kKeyFilePermissions = 0600; |
| const char kKeyLegacyPrefix[] = "legacy-"; |
| |
| void StartUserFileAttrsCleanerService(cryptohome::Platform* platform, |
| const std::string& username) { |
| std::unique_ptr<brillo::Process> file_attrs = |
| platform->CreateProcessInstance(); |
| |
| file_attrs->AddArg("/sbin/initctl"); |
| file_attrs->AddArg("start"); |
| file_attrs->AddArg("--no-wait"); |
| file_attrs->AddArg("file_attrs_cleaner_tool"); |
| file_attrs->AddArg( |
| base::StringPrintf("OBFUSCATED_USERNAME=%s", username.c_str())); |
| |
| if (file_attrs->Run() != 0) |
| PLOG(WARNING) << "Error while running file_attrs_cleaner_tool"; |
| } |
| |
| Mount::Mount() |
| : default_user_(-1), |
| chaps_user_(-1), |
| default_group_(-1), |
| default_access_group_(-1), |
| shadow_root_(kDefaultShadowRoot), |
| skel_source_(kDefaultSkeletonSource), |
| system_salt_(), |
| default_platform_(new Platform()), |
| platform_(default_platform_.get()), |
| crypto_(NULL), |
| default_homedirs_(new HomeDirs()), |
| homedirs_(default_homedirs_.get()), |
| use_tpm_(true), |
| default_current_user_(new UserSession()), |
| current_user_(default_current_user_.get()), |
| user_timestamp_cache_(NULL), |
| enterprise_owned_(false), |
| pkcs11_state_(kUninitialized), |
| is_pkcs11_passkey_migration_required_(false), |
| dircrypto_key_id_(dircrypto::kInvalidKeySerial), |
| legacy_mount_(true), |
| mount_type_(MountType::NONE), |
| shadow_only_(false), |
| default_chaps_client_factory_(new ChapsClientFactory()), |
| chaps_client_factory_(default_chaps_client_factory_.get()), |
| boot_lockbox_(NULL), |
| dircrypto_migration_stopped_condition_(&active_dircrypto_migrator_lock_), |
| mount_guest_session_out_of_process_(true), |
| mount_guest_session_non_root_namespace_(true) {} |
| |
| Mount::~Mount() { |
| if (IsMounted()) |
| UnmountCryptohome(); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::Init(Platform* platform, Crypto* crypto, |
| UserOldestActivityTimestampCache* cache, |
| PreMountCallback pre_mount_callback) { |
| platform_ = platform; |
| crypto_ = crypto; |
| user_timestamp_cache_ = cache; |
| pre_mount_callback_ = pre_mount_callback; |
| |
| bool result = true; |
| |
| homedirs_->set_platform(platform_); |
| homedirs_->set_shadow_root(FilePath(shadow_root_)); |
| homedirs_->set_enterprise_owned(enterprise_owned_); |
| |
| // Make sure |homedirs_| uses the same PolicyProvider instance as we in case |
| // it was set by a test. |
| if (policy_provider_) |
| homedirs_->set_policy_provider(policy_provider_.get()); |
| |
| if (!homedirs_->Init(platform, crypto, user_timestamp_cache_)) |
| result = false; |
| |
| // Get the user id and group id of the default user |
| if (!platform_->GetUserId(kDefaultSharedUser, &default_user_, |
| &default_group_)) { |
| result = false; |
| } |
| |
| // Get the user id of the chaps user. |
| gid_t not_used; |
| if (!platform_->GetUserId(kChapsUserName, &chaps_user_, ¬_used)) { |
| result = false; |
| } |
| |
| // Get the group id of the default shared access group. |
| if (!platform_->GetGroupId(kDefaultSharedAccessGroup, |
| &default_access_group_)) { |
| result = false; |
| } |
| |
| { |
| brillo::ScopedUmask scoped_umask(kDefaultUmask); |
| // Create the shadow root if it doesn't exist |
| if (!platform_->DirectoryExists(shadow_root_)) { |
| platform_->CreateDirectory(shadow_root_); |
| } |
| |
| if (use_tpm_ && !boot_lockbox_) { |
| default_boot_lockbox_.reset( |
| new BootLockbox(Tpm::GetSingleton(), platform_, crypto_)); |
| boot_lockbox_ = default_boot_lockbox_.get(); |
| } |
| |
| // One-time load of the global system salt (used in generating username |
| // hashes) |
| FilePath system_salt_file = shadow_root_.Append(kSystemSaltFile); |
| if (!crypto_->GetOrCreateSalt(system_salt_file, |
| CRYPTOHOME_DEFAULT_SALT_LENGTH, false, |
| &system_salt_)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load or create the system salt"; |
| result = false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| current_user_->Init(system_salt_); |
| |
| mounter_.reset(new MountHelper( |
| default_user_, default_group_, default_access_group_, shadow_root_, |
| skel_source_, system_salt_, legacy_mount_, platform_)); |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<MountNamespace> chrome_mnt_ns; |
| if (mount_guest_session_non_root_namespace_) { |
| chrome_mnt_ns = std::make_unique<MountNamespace>( |
| base::FilePath(kUserSessionMountNamespacePath), platform_); |
| if (!chrome_mnt_ns->Create()) { |
| std::string message = |
| base::StringPrintf("Failed to create mount namespace at %s", |
| kUserSessionMountNamespacePath); |
| cryptohome::ForkAndCrash(message); |
| result = false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (mount_guest_session_out_of_process_) { |
| out_of_process_mounter_.reset(new OutOfProcessMountHelper( |
| system_salt_, std::move(chrome_mnt_ns), legacy_mount_, platform_)); |
| } |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::EnsureCryptohome(const Credentials& credentials, |
| const MountArgs& mount_args, |
| bool* created) { |
| // If the user has an old-style cryptohome, delete it. |
| FilePath old_image_path = GetUserDirectory(credentials).Append("image"); |
| if (platform_->FileExists(old_image_path)) { |
| platform_->DeleteFile(GetUserDirectory(credentials), true); |
| } |
| if (!mount_args.shadow_only) { |
| if (!mounter_->EnsureUserMountPoints(credentials.username())) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| const std::string obfuscated_username = |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| // Now check for the presence of a cryptohome. |
| if (homedirs_->CryptohomeExists(obfuscated_username)) { |
| // Now check for the presence of a vault directory. |
| FilePath vault_path = |
| homedirs_->GetEcryptfsUserVaultPath(obfuscated_username); |
| if (platform_->DirectoryExists(vault_path)) { |
| if (mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs) { |
| // When migrating, set the mount_type_ to dircrypto even if there is an |
| // eCryptfs vault. |
| mount_type_ = MountType::DIR_CRYPTO; |
| } else { |
| mount_type_ = MountType::ECRYPTFS; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "No eCryptfs vault to migrate."; |
| return false; |
| } else { |
| mount_type_ = MountType::DIR_CRYPTO; |
| } |
| } |
| *created = false; |
| return true; |
| } |
| // Create the cryptohome from scratch. |
| // If the kernel supports it, steer toward ext4 crypto. |
| if (mount_args.create_as_ecryptfs) { |
| mount_type_ = MountType::ECRYPTFS; |
| } else { |
| dircrypto::KeyState state = platform_->GetDirCryptoKeyState(shadow_root_); |
| switch (state) { |
| case dircrypto::KeyState::UNKNOWN: |
| case dircrypto::KeyState::ENCRYPTED: |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected state " << static_cast<int>(state); |
| return false; |
| case dircrypto::KeyState::NOT_SUPPORTED: |
| mount_type_ = MountType::ECRYPTFS; |
| break; |
| case dircrypto::KeyState::NO_KEY: |
| mount_type_ = MountType::DIR_CRYPTO; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| *created = CreateCryptohome(credentials); |
| return *created; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::MountCryptohome(const Credentials& credentials, |
| const Mount::MountArgs& mount_args, |
| MountError* mount_error) { |
| CHECK(boot_lockbox_ || !use_tpm_); |
| if (boot_lockbox_ && !boot_lockbox_->FinalizeBoot()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to finalize boot lockbox when mounting cryptohome."; |
| } |
| |
| if (!pre_mount_callback_.is_null()) { |
| pre_mount_callback_.Run(); |
| } |
| |
| if (IsMounted()) { |
| if (mount_error) |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| MountError local_mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE; |
| bool result = MountCryptohomeInner(credentials, |
| mount_args, |
| true, |
| &local_mount_error); |
| // Retry once if there is a TPM communications failure |
| if (!result && local_mount_error == MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "TPM communication error. Retrying."; |
| result = MountCryptohomeInner(credentials, |
| mount_args, |
| true, |
| &local_mount_error); |
| } |
| if (mount_error) { |
| *mount_error = local_mount_error; |
| } |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::AddEcryptfsAuthToken(const VaultKeyset& vault_keyset, |
| std::string* key_signature, |
| std::string* filename_key_signature) const { |
| // Add the File Encryption key (FEK) from the vault keyset. This is the key |
| // that is used to encrypt the file contents when the file is persisted to the |
| // lower filesystem by eCryptfs. |
| *key_signature = CryptoLib::SecureBlobToHex(vault_keyset.fek_sig()); |
| if (!platform_->AddEcryptfsAuthToken( |
| vault_keyset.fek(), *key_signature, |
| vault_keyset.fek_salt())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't add eCryptfs file encryption key to keyring."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Add the File Name Encryption Key (FNEK) from the vault keyset. This is the |
| // key that is used to encrypt the file name when the file is persisted to the |
| // lower filesystem by eCryptfs. |
| *filename_key_signature = CryptoLib::SecureBlobToHex(vault_keyset.fnek_sig()); |
| if (!platform_->AddEcryptfsAuthToken( |
| vault_keyset.fnek(), *filename_key_signature, |
| vault_keyset.fnek_salt())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't add eCryptfs filename encryption key to keyring."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::MountCryptohomeInner(const Credentials& credentials, |
| const Mount::MountArgs& mount_args, |
| bool recreate_on_decrypt_fatal, |
| MountError* mount_error) { |
| current_user_->Reset(); |
| |
| std::string username = credentials.username(); |
| if (username.compare(kIncognitoUser) == 0) { |
| // TODO(fes): Have guest set error conditions? |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE; |
| return MountGuestCryptohome(); |
| } |
| |
| // Remove all existing cryptohomes, except for the owner's one, if the |
| // ephemeral users policy is on. |
| // Note that a fresh policy value is read here, which in theory can conflict |
| // with the one used for calculation of |mount_args.is_ephemeral|. However, |
| // this inconsistency (whose probability is anyway pretty low in practice) |
| // should only lead to insignificant transient glitches, like an attempt to |
| // mount a non existing anymore cryptohome. |
| if (homedirs_->AreEphemeralUsersEnabled()) |
| homedirs_->RemoveNonOwnerCryptohomes(); |
| |
| const std::string obfuscated_username = |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| const bool is_owner = homedirs_->IsOrWillBeOwner(username); |
| |
| // Process ephemeral mounts in a special manner. |
| if (mount_args.is_ephemeral) { |
| if (!mount_args.create_if_missing) { |
| NOTREACHED() << "An ephemeral cryptohome can only be mounted when its " |
| "creation on-the-fly is allowed."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_owner) { |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_EPHEMERAL_MOUNT_BY_OWNER; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // This callback will be executed in the destructor at the latest so |this| |
| // will always be valid. |
| base::Closure cleanup = base::Bind( |
| [](Mount* m) { |
| m->UnmountAndDropKeys(); |
| m->CleanUpEphemeral(); |
| }, |
| base::Unretained(this)); |
| |
| // Ephemeral cryptohomes for regular users are mounted in-process. |
| if (!MountEphemeralCryptohome(credentials.username(), mounter_.get(), |
| std::move(cleanup))) { |
| homedirs_->Remove(credentials.username()); |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_FATAL; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Ephemeral and guest users will not have a key index. |
| current_user_->SetUser(credentials); |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| if (!mount_args.create_if_missing && |
| !homedirs_->CryptohomeExists(obfuscated_username)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Asked to mount nonexistent user"; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_USER_DOES_NOT_EXIST; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool created = false; |
| if (!EnsureCryptohome(credentials, mount_args, &created)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating cryptohome."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_CREATE_CRYPTOHOME_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Attempt to decrypt the vault keyset with the specified credentials. |
| VaultKeyset vault_keyset; |
| vault_keyset.Initialize(platform_, crypto_); |
| SerializedVaultKeyset serialized; |
| MountError local_mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE; |
| int index = -1; |
| if (!DecryptVaultKeyset(credentials, &vault_keyset, &serialized, &index, |
| &local_mount_error)) { |
| *mount_error = local_mount_error; |
| if (recreate_on_decrypt_fatal && local_mount_error == MOUNT_ERROR_FATAL) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "cryptohome must be re-created because of fatal error."; |
| if (!homedirs_->Remove(credentials.username())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Fatal decryption error, but unable to remove " |
| << "cryptohome."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_REMOVE_INVALID_USER_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // Allow one recursion into MountCryptohomeInner by blocking re-create on |
| // fatal. |
| bool local_result = MountCryptohomeInner(credentials, |
| mount_args, |
| false, |
| mount_error); |
| // If the mount was successful, set the status to indicate that the |
| // cryptohome was recreated. |
| if (local_result) { |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_RECREATED; |
| } |
| return local_result; |
| } |
| |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to decrypt VK, error = " << local_mount_error; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // It's safe to generate a reset_seed here. |
| if (!serialized.has_wrapped_reset_seed()) { |
| vault_keyset.CreateRandomResetSeed(); |
| } |
| |
| if (!serialized.has_wrapped_chaps_key()) { |
| is_pkcs11_passkey_migration_required_ = true; |
| vault_keyset.CreateRandomChapsKey(); |
| ReEncryptVaultKeyset(credentials, index, &vault_keyset, &serialized); |
| } |
| |
| SecureBlob local_chaps_key(vault_keyset.chaps_key().begin(), |
| vault_keyset.chaps_key().end()); |
| pkcs11_token_auth_data_.swap(local_chaps_key); |
| if (!platform_->ClearUserKeyring()) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to clear user keyring"; |
| } |
| |
| // Before we use the matching keyset, make sure it isn't being misused. |
| // Note, privileges don't protect against information leakage, they are |
| // just software/DAC policy enforcement mechanisms. |
| // |
| // In the future we may provide some assurance by wrapping privileges |
| // with the wrapped_key, but that is still of limited benefit. |
| if (serialized.has_key_data() && // legacy keys are full privs |
| !serialized.key_data().privileges().mount()) { |
| // TODO(wad): Convert to CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED |
| // TODO(wad): Expose the safe-printable label rather than the Chrome |
| // supplied one for log output. |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Mount attempt with unprivileged key."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_UNPRIVILEGED_KEY; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Checks whether migration from ecryptfs to dircrypto is needed, and returns |
| // an error when necessary. Do this after the check by DecryptVaultKeyset, |
| // because a correct credential is required before switching to migration UI. |
| if (homedirs_->EcryptfsCryptohomeExists(obfuscated_username) && |
| homedirs_->DircryptoCryptohomeExists(obfuscated_username) && |
| !mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs) { |
| // If both types of home directory existed, it implies that the migration |
| // attempt was aborted in the middle before doing clean up. |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Mount failed because both eCryptfs and dircrypto home" |
| << " directories were found. Need to resume and finish" |
| << " migration first."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_PREVIOUS_MIGRATION_INCOMPLETE; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (mount_type_ == MountType::ECRYPTFS && mount_args.force_dircrypto) { |
| // If dircrypto is forced, it's an error to mount ecryptfs home. |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Mount attempt with force_dircrypto on eCryptfs."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_OLD_ENCRYPTION; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (!platform_->SetupProcessKeyring()) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set up a process keyring."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_SETUP_PROCESS_KEYRING_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // When migrating, mount both eCryptfs and dircrypto. |
| const bool should_mount_ecryptfs = mount_type_ == MountType::ECRYPTFS || |
| mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs; |
| const bool should_mount_dircrypto = mount_type_ == MountType::DIR_CRYPTO; |
| if (!should_mount_ecryptfs && !should_mount_dircrypto) { |
| NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected mount type " << static_cast<int>(mount_type_); |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_MOUNT_TYPE; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Ensure we don't leave any mounts hanging on intermediate errors. |
| // The closure won't outlive the class so |this| will always be valid. |
| base::ScopedClosureRunner unmount_and_drop_keys_runner( |
| base::Bind(&Mount::UnmountAndDropKeys, base::Unretained(this))); |
| |
| std::string key_signature, fnek_signature; |
| if (should_mount_ecryptfs) { |
| // Add the decrypted key to the keyring so that ecryptfs can use it. |
| if (!AddEcryptfsAuthToken(vault_keyset, &key_signature, |
| &fnek_signature)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Error adding eCryptfs keys."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_KEYRING_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| if (should_mount_dircrypto) { |
| LOG_IF(WARNING, dircrypto_key_id_ != dircrypto::kInvalidKeySerial) |
| << "Already mounting with key " << dircrypto_key_id_; |
| if (!platform_->AddDirCryptoKeyToKeyring( |
| vault_keyset.fek(), vault_keyset.fek_sig(), &dircrypto_key_id_)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Error adding dircrypto key."; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_KEYRING_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Mount cryptohome |
| // /home/.shadow: owned by root |
| // /home/.shadow/$hash: owned by root |
| // /home/.shadow/$hash/vault: owned by root |
| // /home/.shadow/$hash/mount: owned by root |
| // /home/.shadow/$hash/mount/root: owned by root |
| // /home/.shadow/$hash/mount/user: owned by chronos |
| // /home/chronos: owned by chronos |
| // /home/chronos/user: owned by chronos |
| // /home/user/$hash: owned by chronos |
| // /home/root/$hash: owned by root |
| |
| FilePath vault_path = |
| homedirs_->GetEcryptfsUserVaultPath(obfuscated_username); |
| |
| mount_point_ = homedirs_->GetUserMountDirectory(obfuscated_username); |
| if (!platform_->CreateDirectory(mount_point_)) { |
| PLOG(ERROR) << "User mount directory creation failed for " |
| << mount_point_.value(); |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_DIR_CREATION_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs) { |
| FilePath temporary_mount_point = |
| GetUserTemporaryMountDirectory(obfuscated_username); |
| if (!platform_->CreateDirectory(temporary_mount_point)) { |
| PLOG(ERROR) << "User temporary mount directory creation failed for " |
| << temporary_mount_point.value(); |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_DIR_CREATION_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Since Service::Mount cleans up stale mounts, we should only reach |
| // this point if someone attempts to re-mount an in-use mount point. |
| if (platform_->IsDirectoryMounted(mount_point_)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Mount point is busy: " << mount_point_.value() |
| << " for " << vault_path.value(); |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_FATAL; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (should_mount_dircrypto) { |
| if (!platform_->SetDirCryptoKey(mount_point_, vault_keyset.fek_sig())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set directory encryption policy for " |
| << mount_point_.value(); |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_SET_DIR_CRYPTO_KEY_FAILED; |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Set the current user here so we can rely on it in the helpers. |
| // On failure, they will linger, but should be reset on a new MountCryptohome |
| // request. |
| current_user_->SetUser(credentials); |
| current_user_->set_key_index(index); |
| if (serialized.has_key_data()) { |
| current_user_->set_key_data(serialized.key_data()); |
| } |
| |
| MountHelper::Options mount_opts = { |
| mount_type_, mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs, mount_args.shadow_only}; |
| |
| if (!mounter_->PerformMount(mount_opts, credentials, key_signature, |
| fnek_signature, created, mount_error)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "MountHelper::PerformMount failed, error = " << *mount_error; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (!UserSignInEffects(true /* is_mount */, is_owner)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set user type, aborting mount"; |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // At this point we're done mounting so move the clean-up closure to the |
| // instance variable. |
| mount_cleanup_ = unmount_and_drop_keys_runner.Release(); |
| |
| *mount_error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE; |
| |
| switch (mount_type_) { |
| case MountType::ECRYPTFS: |
| ReportHomedirEncryptionType(HomedirEncryptionType::kEcryptfs); |
| break; |
| case MountType::DIR_CRYPTO: |
| ReportHomedirEncryptionType(HomedirEncryptionType::kDircrypto); |
| break; |
| default: |
| // We're only interested in encrypted home directories. |
| NOTREACHED() << "Unknown homedir encryption type: " |
| << static_cast<int>(mount_type_); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_pkcs11_passkey_migration_required_) { |
| credentials.GetPasskey(&legacy_pkcs11_passkey_); |
| } |
| |
| // Start file attribute cleaner service. |
| StartUserFileAttrsCleanerService(platform_, obfuscated_username); |
| |
| // TODO(fqj,b/116072767) Ignore errors since unlabeled files are currently |
| // still okay during current development progress. |
| platform_->RestoreSELinuxContexts( |
| homedirs_->GetUserMountDirectory(obfuscated_username), |
| true); |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void Mount::CleanUpEphemeral() { |
| if (!mounter_->CleanUpEphemeral()) { |
| ReportCryptohomeError(kEphemeralCleanUpFailed); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::MountEphemeralCryptohome( |
| const std::string& username, |
| EphemeralMountHelperInterface* ephemeral_mounter, |
| base::Closure cleanup) { |
| // Ephemeral cryptohome can't be mounted twice. |
| CHECK(ephemeral_mounter->CanPerformEphemeralMount()); |
| |
| base::ScopedClosureRunner cleanup_runner(cleanup); |
| |
| if (!ephemeral_mounter->PerformEphemeralMount(username)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "PerformEphemeralMount() failed, aborting ephemeral mount"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (!UserSignInEffects(true /* is_mount */, false /* is_owner */)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set user type, aborting ephemeral mount"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Mount succeeded, move the clean-up closure to the instance variable. |
| mount_cleanup_ = cleanup_runner.Release(); |
| |
| mount_type_ = MountType::EPHEMERAL; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void Mount::UnmountAndDropKeys() { |
| mounter_->UnmountAll(); |
| |
| // Invalidate dircrypto key to make directory contents inaccessible. |
| if (dircrypto_key_id_ != dircrypto::kInvalidKeySerial) { |
| platform_->InvalidateDirCryptoKey(dircrypto_key_id_, shadow_root_); |
| dircrypto_key_id_ = dircrypto::kInvalidKeySerial; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::UnmountCryptohome() { |
| if (!UserSignInEffects(false /* is_mount */, false /* is_owner */)) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to set user type, but continuing with unmount"; |
| } |
| |
| // There should be no file access when unmounting. |
| // Stop dircrypto migration if in progress. |
| MaybeCancelActiveDircryptoMigrationAndWait(); |
| |
| if (!mount_cleanup_.is_null()) { |
| std::move(mount_cleanup_).Run(); |
| } |
| |
| if (homedirs_->AreEphemeralUsersEnabled()) |
| homedirs_->RemoveNonOwnerCryptohomes(); |
| else |
| UpdateCurrentUserActivityTimestamp(0); |
| |
| RemovePkcs11Token(); |
| current_user_->Reset(); |
| mount_type_ = MountType::NONE; |
| |
| platform_->ClearUserKeyring(); |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::IsMounted() const { |
| return (mounter_ && mounter_->MountPerformed()) || |
| (out_of_process_mounter_ && out_of_process_mounter_->MountPerformed()); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::IsNonEphemeralMounted() const { |
| return IsMounted() && mount_type_ != MountType::EPHEMERAL; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::OwnsMountPoint(const FilePath& path) const { |
| return (mounter_ && mounter_->IsPathMounted(path)) || |
| (out_of_process_mounter_ && mounter_->IsPathMounted(path)); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::CreateCryptohome(const Credentials& credentials) const { |
| brillo::ScopedUmask scoped_umask(kDefaultUmask); |
| |
| // Create the user's entry in the shadow root |
| FilePath user_dir(GetUserDirectory(credentials)); |
| platform_->CreateDirectory(user_dir); |
| |
| // Generate a new master key |
| VaultKeyset vault_keyset; |
| vault_keyset.Initialize(platform_, crypto_); |
| vault_keyset.CreateRandom(); |
| SerializedVaultKeyset serialized; |
| if (!AddVaultKeyset(credentials, &vault_keyset, &serialized)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to add vault keyset to new user"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // Merge in the key data from credentials using the label() as |
| // the existence test. (All new-format calls must populate the |
| // label on creation.) |
| if (!credentials.key_data().label().empty()) { |
| *serialized.mutable_key_data() = credentials.key_data(); |
| } |
| if (credentials.key_data().type() == KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) { |
| *serialized.mutable_signature_challenge_info() = |
| credentials.challenge_credentials_keyset_info(); |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(wad) move to storage by label-derivative and not number. |
| if (!StoreVaultKeysetForUser( |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_), |
| 0, // first key |
| serialized)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to store vault keyset for new user"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (mount_type_ == MountType::ECRYPTFS) { |
| // Create the user's vault. |
| FilePath vault_path = homedirs_->GetEcryptfsUserVaultPath( |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_)); |
| if (!platform_->CreateDirectory(vault_path)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't create vault path: " << vault_path.value(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::CreateTrackedSubdirectories(const Credentials& credentials, |
| bool is_new) const { |
| return mounter_->CreateTrackedSubdirectories(credentials, mount_type_, |
| is_new); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::UpdateCurrentUserActivityTimestamp(int time_shift_sec) { |
| std::string obfuscated_username; |
| current_user_->GetObfuscatedUsername(&obfuscated_username); |
| if (!obfuscated_username.empty() && mount_type_ != MountType::EPHEMERAL) { |
| SerializedVaultKeyset serialized; |
| // TODO(wad) Start using current_user_'s key_data label when |
| // it is defined. |
| LoadVaultKeysetForUser(obfuscated_username, current_user_->key_index(), |
| &serialized); |
| base::Time timestamp = platform_->GetCurrentTime(); |
| if (time_shift_sec > 0) |
| timestamp -= base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(time_shift_sec); |
| serialized.set_last_activity_timestamp(timestamp.ToInternalValue()); |
| // Only update the key in use. |
| StoreVaultKeysetForUser(obfuscated_username, current_user_->key_index(), |
| serialized); |
| if (user_timestamp_cache_->initialized()) { |
| user_timestamp_cache_->UpdateExistingUser( |
| FilePath(GetUserDirectoryForUser(obfuscated_username)), timestamp); |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::AreSameUser(const std::string& obfuscated_username) { |
| return current_user_->CheckUser(obfuscated_username); |
| } |
| |
| const UserSession* Mount::GetCurrentUserSession() const { |
| return current_user_; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::AreValid(const Credentials& credentials) { |
| // If the current logged in user matches, use the UserSession to verify the |
| // credentials. This is less costly than a trip to the TPM, and only verifies |
| // a user during their logged in session. |
| if (current_user_->CheckUser( |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) { |
| return current_user_->Verify(credentials); |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::LoadVaultKeyset(const Credentials& credentials, |
| int index, |
| SerializedVaultKeyset* serialized) const { |
| return LoadVaultKeysetForUser(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_), |
| index, |
| serialized); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::LoadVaultKeysetForUser(const std::string& obfuscated_username, |
| int index, |
| SerializedVaultKeyset* serialized) const { |
| if (index < 0 || index > kKeyFileMax) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Attempted to load an invalid key index: " << index; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // Load the encrypted keyset. |
| FilePath user_key_file = |
| GetUserLegacyKeyFileForUser(obfuscated_username, index); |
| if (!platform_->FileExists(user_key_file)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| brillo::Blob cipher_text; |
| if (!platform_->ReadFile(user_key_file, &cipher_text)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read keyset file for user " << obfuscated_username; |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!serialized->ParseFromArray(cipher_text.data(), cipher_text.size())) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to parse keyset for user " << obfuscated_username; |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::StoreVaultKeysetForUser( |
| const std::string& obfuscated_username, |
| int index, |
| const SerializedVaultKeyset& serialized) const { |
| if (index < 0 || index > kKeyFileMax) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Attempted to store an invalid key index: " << index; |
| return false; |
| } |
| brillo::Blob final_blob(serialized.ByteSize()); |
| serialized.SerializeWithCachedSizesToArray( |
| static_cast<google::protobuf::uint8*>(final_blob.data())); |
| return platform_->WriteFileAtomicDurable( |
| GetUserLegacyKeyFileForUser(obfuscated_username, index), |
| final_blob, |
| kKeyFilePermissions); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::DecryptVaultKeyset(const Credentials& credentials, |
| VaultKeyset* vault_keyset, |
| SerializedVaultKeyset* serialized, |
| int* index, |
| MountError* error) const { |
| *error = MOUNT_ERROR_NONE; |
| |
| if (!homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(credentials, vault_keyset, index, error)) |
| return false; |
| *serialized = vault_keyset->serialized(); |
| |
| // Calling EnsureTpm here handles the case where a user logged in while |
| // cryptohome was taking TPM ownership. In that case, their vault keyset |
| // would be scrypt-wrapped and the TPM would not be connected. If we're |
| // configured to use the TPM, calling EnsureTpm will try to connect, and |
| // if successful, the call to has_tpm() below will succeed, allowing |
| // re-wrapping (migration) using the TPM. |
| if (use_tpm_) { |
| crypto_->EnsureTpm(false); |
| } |
| |
| // If the vault keyset's TPM state is not the same as that configured for |
| // the device, re-save the keyset (this will save in the device's default |
| // method). |
| // In the table below: X = true, - = false, * = any value |
| // |
| // 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 |
| // should_tpm X X X X - - - * X |
| // |
| // pcr_bound - X * - - * - * - |
| // |
| // tpm_wrapped - X X - - X - X * |
| // |
| // scrypt_wrapped - - - X - - X X * |
| // |
| // scrypt_derived * X - * * * * * * |
| // |
| // migrate Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y |
| // |
| // If the vault keyset is signature-challenge protected, we should not |
| // re-encrypt it at all (that is unnecessary). |
| const unsigned crypt_flags = serialized->flags(); |
| bool pcr_bound = |
| (crypt_flags & SerializedVaultKeyset::PCR_BOUND) != 0; |
| bool tpm_wrapped = |
| (crypt_flags & SerializedVaultKeyset::TPM_WRAPPED) != 0; |
| bool scrypt_wrapped = |
| (crypt_flags & SerializedVaultKeyset::SCRYPT_WRAPPED) != 0; |
| bool scrypt_derived = |
| (crypt_flags & SerializedVaultKeyset::SCRYPT_DERIVED) != 0; |
| bool is_signature_challenge_protected = |
| (crypt_flags & SerializedVaultKeyset::SIGNATURE_CHALLENGE_PROTECTED) != 0; |
| bool should_tpm = (crypto_->has_tpm() && use_tpm_ && |
| crypto_->is_cryptohome_key_loaded() && |
| !is_signature_challenge_protected); |
| bool is_le_credential = |
| (crypt_flags & SerializedVaultKeyset::LE_CREDENTIAL) != 0; |
| bool can_unseal_with_user_auth = crypto_->CanUnsealWithUserAuth(); |
| do { |
| if (is_signature_challenge_protected) |
| break; |
| // If the keyset was TPM-wrapped, but there was no public key hash, |
| // always re-save. Otherwise, check the table. |
| if (serialized->has_tpm_public_key_hash() || is_le_credential) { |
| if (is_le_credential && !crypto_->NeedsPcrBinding(serialized->le_label())) |
| break; |
| if (tpm_wrapped && should_tpm && scrypt_derived && !scrypt_wrapped) { |
| if ((pcr_bound && can_unseal_with_user_auth) || |
| (!pcr_bound && !can_unseal_with_user_auth)) { |
| break; // 2 |
| } |
| } |
| if (scrypt_wrapped && !should_tpm && !tpm_wrapped) |
| break; // 7 |
| } |
| LOG(INFO) << "Migrating keyset " << *index << ": should_tpm=" << should_tpm |
| << ", has_hash=" << serialized->has_tpm_public_key_hash() |
| << ", flags=" << crypt_flags << ", pcr_bound=" << pcr_bound |
| << ", can_unseal_with_user_auth=" << can_unseal_with_user_auth; |
| // This is not considered a fatal error. Re-saving with the desired |
| // protection is ideal, but not required. |
| SerializedVaultKeyset new_serialized; |
| new_serialized.CopyFrom(*serialized); |
| if (ReEncryptVaultKeyset(credentials, *index, vault_keyset, |
| &new_serialized)) { |
| serialized->CopyFrom(new_serialized); |
| } |
| } while (false); |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::AddVaultKeyset(const Credentials& credentials, |
| VaultKeyset* vault_keyset, |
| SerializedVaultKeyset* serialized) const { |
| // We don't do passkey to wrapper conversion because it is salted during save |
| SecureBlob passkey; |
| credentials.GetPasskey(&passkey); |
| |
| std::string obfuscated_username = |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| |
| if (credentials.key_data().type() == KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) { |
| vault_keyset->mutable_serialized()->set_flags( |
| vault_keyset->serialized().flags() | |
| SerializedVaultKeyset::SIGNATURE_CHALLENGE_PROTECTED); |
| } |
| |
| // Encrypt the vault keyset |
| const auto salt = |
| CryptoLib::CreateSecureRandomBlob(CRYPTOHOME_DEFAULT_KEY_SALT_SIZE); |
| if (!crypto_->EncryptVaultKeyset(*vault_keyset, passkey, salt, |
| obfuscated_username, serialized)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Encrypting vault keyset failed"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::ReEncryptVaultKeyset(const Credentials& credentials, |
| int key_index, |
| VaultKeyset* vault_keyset, |
| SerializedVaultKeyset* serialized) const { |
| std::string obfuscated_username = |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_); |
| std::vector<FilePath> files(2); |
| files[0] = GetUserSaltFileForUser(obfuscated_username, key_index); |
| files[1] = GetUserLegacyKeyFileForUser(obfuscated_username, key_index); |
| if (!CacheOldFiles(files)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't cache old key material."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| uint64_t label = serialized->le_label(); |
| if (!AddVaultKeyset(credentials, vault_keyset, serialized)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't add keyset."; |
| RevertCacheFiles(files); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if ((serialized->flags() & SerializedVaultKeyset::LE_CREDENTIAL) != 0) { |
| if (!crypto_->RemoveLECredential(label)) { |
| // This is non-fatal error. |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to remove label = " << label; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Note that existing legacy keysets are not automatically annotated. |
| // All _new_ interfaces that support KeyData will implicitly translate |
| // master.<index> to label=<kKeyLegacyFormat,index> for checking on |
| // label uniqueness. This means that we will still be able to use the |
| // lack of KeyData in the future as input to migration. |
| if (!StoreVaultKeysetForUser( |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_), |
| key_index, *serialized)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Write to master key failed"; |
| RevertCacheFiles(files); |
| return false; |
| } |
| DeleteCacheFiles(files); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::MountGuestCryptohome() { |
| CHECK(boot_lockbox_ || !use_tpm_); |
| if (boot_lockbox_ && !boot_lockbox_->FinalizeBoot()) { |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to finalize boot lockbox when mounting guest " |
| "cryptohome"; |
| } |
| |
| if (!pre_mount_callback_.is_null()) { |
| pre_mount_callback_.Run(); |
| } |
| |
| current_user_->Reset(); |
| |
| EphemeralMountHelperInterface* ephemeral_mounter = nullptr; |
| base::Closure cleanup; |
| |
| if (mount_guest_session_out_of_process_) { |
| // Ephemeral cryptohomes for Guest sessions are mounted out-of-process. |
| ephemeral_mounter = out_of_process_mounter_.get(); |
| // This callback will be executed in the destructor at the latest so |
| // |out_of_process_mounter_| will always be valid. |
| cleanup = base::Bind(&OutOfProcessMountHelper::TearDownEphemeralMount, |
| base::Unretained(out_of_process_mounter_.get())); |
| } else { |
| ephemeral_mounter = mounter_.get(); |
| // This callback will be executed in the destructor at the latest so |
| // |this| will always be valid. |
| cleanup = base::Bind( |
| [](Mount* m) { |
| m->UnmountAndDropKeys(); |
| m->CleanUpEphemeral(); |
| }, |
| base::Unretained(this)); |
| } |
| return MountEphemeralCryptohome(kGuestUserName, ephemeral_mounter, |
| std::move(cleanup)); |
| } |
| |
| FilePath Mount::GetUserDirectory( |
| const Credentials& credentials) const { |
| return GetUserDirectoryForUser( |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_)); |
| } |
| |
| FilePath Mount::GetUserDirectoryForUser( |
| const std::string& obfuscated_username) const { |
| return shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated_username); |
| } |
| |
| FilePath Mount::GetUserSaltFileForUser( |
| const std::string& obfuscated_username, int index) const { |
| return GetUserLegacyKeyFileForUser(obfuscated_username, index) |
| .AddExtension("salt"); |
| } |
| |
| FilePath Mount::GetUserLegacyKeyFileForUser( |
| const std::string& obfuscated_username, int index) const { |
| DCHECK(index < kKeyFileMax && index >= 0); |
| return shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated_username) |
| .Append(kKeyFile) |
| .AddExtension(base::NumberToString(index)); |
| } |
| |
| // This is the new planned format for keyfile storage. |
| FilePath Mount::GetUserKeyFileForUser( |
| const std::string& obfuscated_username, const std::string& label) const { |
| DCHECK(!label.empty()); |
| // SHA1 is not for any other purpose than to provide a reasonably |
| // collision-resistant, fixed length, path-safe file suffix. |
| std::string digest = base::SHA1HashString(label); |
| std::string safe_label = base::HexEncode(digest.c_str(), digest.length()); |
| return shadow_root_.Append(obfuscated_username) |
| .Append(kKeyFile).AddExtension(safe_label); |
| } |
| |
| FilePath Mount::GetUserTemporaryMountDirectory( |
| const std::string& obfuscated_username) const { |
| return mounter_->GetUserTemporaryMountDirectory(obfuscated_username); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::CheckChapsDirectory(const FilePath& dir, |
| const FilePath& legacy_dir) { |
| const Platform::Permissions kChapsDirPermissions = { |
| chaps_user_, // chaps |
| default_access_group_, // chronos-access |
| S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP // 0750 |
| }; |
| const Platform::Permissions kChapsFilePermissions = { |
| chaps_user_, // chaps |
| default_access_group_, // chronos-access |
| S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP // 0640 |
| }; |
| const Platform::Permissions kChapsSaltPermissions = { |
| 0, // root |
| 0, // root |
| S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR // 0600 |
| }; |
| |
| // If the Chaps database directory does not exist, create it. |
| if (!platform_->DirectoryExists(dir)) { |
| if (platform_->DirectoryExists(legacy_dir)) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Moving chaps directory from " << legacy_dir.value() |
| << " to " << dir.value(); |
| if (!platform_->CopyWithPermissions(legacy_dir, dir)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!platform_->DeleteFile(legacy_dir, true)) { |
| PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to clean up " << legacy_dir.value(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!platform_->CreateDirectory(dir)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create " << dir.value(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!platform_->SetOwnership(dir, |
| kChapsDirPermissions.user, |
| kChapsDirPermissions.group, |
| true)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't set file ownership for " << dir.value(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!platform_->SetPermissions(dir, kChapsDirPermissions.mode)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't set permissions for " << dir.value(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| // Directory already exists so check permissions and log a warning |
| // if not as expected then attempt to apply correct permissions. |
| std::map<FilePath, Platform::Permissions> special_cases; |
| special_cases[dir.Append("auth_data_salt")] = kChapsSaltPermissions; |
| if (!platform_->ApplyPermissionsRecursive(dir, |
| kChapsFilePermissions, |
| kChapsDirPermissions, |
| special_cases)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Chaps permissions failure."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::InsertPkcs11Token() { |
| std::string username = current_user_->username(); |
| FilePath token_dir = homedirs_->GetChapsTokenDir(username); |
| FilePath legacy_token_dir = homedirs_->GetLegacyChapsTokenDir(username); |
| if (!CheckChapsDirectory(token_dir, legacy_token_dir)) |
| return false; |
| // We may create a salt file and, if so, we want to restrict access to it. |
| brillo::ScopedUmask scoped_umask(kDefaultUmask); |
| |
| // Derive authorization data for the token from the passkey. |
| FilePath salt_file = homedirs_->GetChapsTokenSaltPath(username); |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<chaps::TokenManagerClient> chaps_client( |
| chaps_client_factory_->New()); |
| |
| // If migration is required, send it before the login event. |
| if (is_pkcs11_passkey_migration_required_) { |
| LOG(INFO) << "Migrating authorization data."; |
| SecureBlob old_auth_data; |
| if (!crypto_->PasskeyToTokenAuthData(legacy_pkcs11_passkey_, |
| salt_file, |
| &old_auth_data)) |
| return false; |
| chaps_client->ChangeTokenAuthData( |
| token_dir, |
| old_auth_data, |
| pkcs11_token_auth_data_); |
| is_pkcs11_passkey_migration_required_ = false; |
| legacy_pkcs11_passkey_.clear(); |
| } |
| |
| Pkcs11Init pkcs11init; |
| int slot_id = 0; |
| if (!chaps_client->LoadToken( |
| IsolateCredentialManager::GetDefaultIsolateCredential(), |
| token_dir, |
| pkcs11_token_auth_data_, |
| pkcs11init.GetTpmTokenLabelForUser(current_user_->username()), |
| &slot_id)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load PKCS #11 token."; |
| ReportCryptohomeError(kLoadPkcs11TokenFailed); |
| } |
| pkcs11_token_auth_data_.clear(); |
| ReportTimerStop(kPkcs11InitTimer); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void Mount::RemovePkcs11Token() { |
| std::string username = current_user_->username(); |
| FilePath token_dir = homedirs_->GetChapsTokenDir(username); |
| std::unique_ptr<chaps::TokenManagerClient> chaps_client( |
| chaps_client_factory_->New()); |
| chaps_client->UnloadToken( |
| IsolateCredentialManager::GetDefaultIsolateCredential(), |
| token_dir); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::CacheOldFiles(const std::vector<FilePath>& files) const { |
| for (const auto& file : files) { |
| FilePath file_bak = file.AddExtension("bak"); |
| if (platform_->FileExists(file_bak)) { |
| if (!platform_->DeleteFile(file_bak, false)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| if (platform_->FileExists(file)) { |
| if (!platform_->Move(file, file_bak)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::RevertCacheFiles(const std::vector<FilePath>& files) const { |
| for (const auto& file : files) { |
| FilePath file_bak = file.AddExtension("bak"); |
| if (platform_->FileExists(file_bak)) { |
| if (!platform_->Move(file_bak, file)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::DeleteCacheFiles(const std::vector<FilePath>& files) const { |
| for (const auto& file : files) { |
| FilePath file_bak = file.AddExtension("bak"); |
| if (platform_->FileExists(file_bak)) { |
| if (!platform_->DeleteFile(file_bak, false)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void Mount::GetUserSalt(const Credentials& credentials, bool force, |
| int key_index, SecureBlob* salt) const { |
| FilePath path(GetUserSaltFileForUser( |
| credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_), |
| key_index)); |
| crypto_->GetOrCreateSalt(path, CRYPTOHOME_DEFAULT_SALT_LENGTH, force, salt); |
| } |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<base::Value> Mount::GetStatus() { |
| std::string user; |
| SerializedVaultKeyset keyset; |
| auto dv = std::make_unique<base::DictionaryValue>(); |
| current_user_->GetObfuscatedUsername(&user); |
| auto keysets = std::make_unique<base::ListValue>(); |
| std::vector<int> key_indices; |
| if (user.length() && homedirs_->GetVaultKeysets(user, &key_indices)) { |
| for (auto key_index : key_indices) { |
| auto keyset_dict = std::make_unique<base::DictionaryValue>(); |
| if (LoadVaultKeysetForUser(user, key_index, &keyset)) { |
| bool tpm = keyset.flags() & SerializedVaultKeyset::TPM_WRAPPED; |
| bool scrypt = keyset.flags() & SerializedVaultKeyset::SCRYPT_WRAPPED; |
| keyset_dict->SetBoolean("tpm", tpm); |
| keyset_dict->SetBoolean("scrypt", scrypt); |
| keyset_dict->SetBoolean("ok", true); |
| keyset_dict->SetInteger("last_activity", |
| keyset.last_activity_timestamp()); |
| if (keyset.has_key_data()) { |
| // TODO(wad) Add additional KeyData |
| keyset_dict->SetString("label", keyset.key_data().label()); |
| } |
| } else { |
| keyset_dict->SetBoolean("ok", false); |
| } |
| // TODO(wad) Replace key_index use with key_label() use once |
| // legacy keydata is populated. |
| if (mount_type_ != MountType::EPHEMERAL && |
| key_index == current_user_->key_index()) |
| keyset_dict->SetBoolean("current", true); |
| keyset_dict->SetInteger("index", key_index); |
| keysets->Append(std::move(keyset_dict)); |
| } |
| } |
| dv->Set("keysets", std::move(keysets)); |
| dv->SetBoolean("mounted", IsMounted()); |
| std::string obfuscated_owner; |
| homedirs_->GetOwner(&obfuscated_owner); |
| dv->SetString("owner", obfuscated_owner); |
| dv->SetBoolean("enterprise", enterprise_owned_); |
| |
| std::string mount_type_string; |
| switch (mount_type_) { |
| case MountType::NONE: |
| mount_type_string = "none"; |
| break; |
| case MountType::ECRYPTFS: |
| mount_type_string = "ecryptfs"; |
| break; |
| case MountType::DIR_CRYPTO: |
| mount_type_string = "dircrypto"; |
| break; |
| case MountType::EPHEMERAL: |
| mount_type_string = "ephemeral"; |
| break; |
| } |
| dv->SetString("type", mount_type_string); |
| |
| return std::move(dv); |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::SetUserCreds(const Credentials& credentials, int key_index) { |
| if (!current_user_->SetUser(credentials)) |
| return false; |
| current_user_->set_key_index(key_index); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::MigrateToDircrypto( |
| const dircrypto_data_migrator::MigrationHelper::ProgressCallback& callback, |
| MigrationType migration_type) { |
| std::string obfuscated_username; |
| current_user_->GetObfuscatedUsername(&obfuscated_username); |
| FilePath temporary_mount = |
| GetUserTemporaryMountDirectory(obfuscated_username); |
| if (!IsMounted() || mount_type_ != MountType::DIR_CRYPTO || |
| !platform_->DirectoryExists(temporary_mount) || |
| !mounter_->IsPathMounted(temporary_mount)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Not mounted for eCryptfs->dircrypto migration."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // Do migration. |
| constexpr uint64_t kMaxChunkSize = 128 * 1024 * 1024; |
| dircrypto_data_migrator::MigrationHelper migrator( |
| platform_, |
| temporary_mount, |
| mount_point_, |
| GetUserDirectoryForUser(obfuscated_username), |
| kMaxChunkSize, |
| migration_type); |
| { // Abort if already cancelled. |
| base::AutoLock lock(active_dircrypto_migrator_lock_); |
| if (is_dircrypto_migration_cancelled_) |
| return false; |
| CHECK(!active_dircrypto_migrator_); |
| active_dircrypto_migrator_ = &migrator; |
| } |
| bool success = migrator.Migrate(callback); |
| UnmountAndDropKeys(); |
| { // Signal the waiting thread. |
| base::AutoLock lock(active_dircrypto_migrator_lock_); |
| active_dircrypto_migrator_ = nullptr; |
| dircrypto_migration_stopped_condition_.Signal(); |
| } |
| if (!success) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to migrate."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| // Clean up. |
| FilePath vault_path = |
| homedirs_->GetEcryptfsUserVaultPath(obfuscated_username); |
| if (!platform_->DeleteFile(temporary_mount, true /* recursive */) || |
| !platform_->DeleteFile(vault_path, true /* recursive */)) { |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to delete the old vault."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void Mount::MaybeCancelActiveDircryptoMigrationAndWait() { |
| base::AutoLock lock(active_dircrypto_migrator_lock_); |
| is_dircrypto_migration_cancelled_ = true; |
| while (active_dircrypto_migrator_) { |
| active_dircrypto_migrator_->Cancel(); |
| LOG(INFO) << "Waiting for dircrypto migration to stop."; |
| dircrypto_migration_stopped_condition_.Wait(); |
| LOG(INFO) << "Dircrypto migration stopped."; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool Mount::IsShadowOnly() const { return shadow_only_; } |
| |
| // TODO(chromium:795310): include all side-effects and move out of mount.cc. |
| // Sign-in/sign-out effects hook. |
| // Performs actions that need to follow a mount/unmount operation as a part of |
| // user sign-in/sign-out. |
| // Parameters: |
| // |mount| - the mount instance that was just mounted/unmounted. |
| // |tpm| - the TPM instance. |
| // |is_mount| - true for mount operation, false for unmount. |
| // |is_owner| - true if mounted for an owner user, false otherwise. |
| // Returns true if successful, false otherwise. |
| bool Mount::UserSignInEffects(bool is_mount, bool is_owner) { |
| Tpm* tpm = crypto_->get_tpm(); |
| if (!tpm) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| Tpm::UserType user_type = |
| (is_mount & is_owner) ? Tpm::UserType::Owner : Tpm::UserType::NonOwner; |
| return tpm->SetUserType(user_type); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace cryptohome |
