blob: 2c23b71c0e62a805fb60608bb64ed900e5d2f1aa [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2015 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
syntax = "proto2";
option optimize_for = LITE_RUNTIME;
import "attestation_ca.proto";
import "keystore.proto";
package attestation;
option go_package = "chromiumos/system_api/attestation_proto";
enum AttestationStatus {
STATUS_SUCCESS = 0;
STATUS_UNEXPECTED_DEVICE_ERROR = 1;
STATUS_NOT_AVAILABLE = 2;
STATUS_NOT_READY = 3;
STATUS_NOT_ALLOWED = 4;
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER = 5;
STATUS_REQUEST_DENIED_BY_CA = 6;
STATUS_CA_NOT_AVAILABLE = 7;
STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED = 8;
// The error that is translated into by the client to indicate any kind of
// D-Bus error.
STATUS_DBUS_ERROR = 9;
}
enum ACAType {
DEFAULT_ACA = 0;
TEST_ACA = 1;
}
enum VAType {
DEFAULT_VA = 0;
TEST_VA = 1;
}
message GetKeyInfoRequest {
optional string key_label = 1;
optional string username = 2;
}
message GetKeyInfoReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
optional KeyType key_type = 2;
optional KeyUsage key_usage = 3;
// The public key (X.509/DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo).
optional bytes public_key = 4;
// The serialized TPM_CERTIFY_INFO or TPM2B_ATTEST for the new key.
optional bytes certify_info = 5;
// The signature of certify_info by the Attestation Key.
optional bytes certify_info_signature = 6;
// The certificate data associated with the key (if any).
optional bytes certificate = 7;
// The payload associated with the key.
optional bytes payload = 8;
}
message GetEndorsementInfoRequest {
reserved 1;
}
message GetEndorsementInfoReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The endorsement public key (X.509/DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo).
optional bytes ek_public_key = 2;
// The endorsement certificate (X.509/DER).
optional bytes ek_certificate = 3;
// Human-readable string with EK information. Contains EK certificate in PEM
// format and SHA256 hash of the raw DER encoded certificate.
optional string ek_info = 4;
}
message GetAttestationKeyInfoRequest {
reserved 1;
// What kind of ACA to use.
optional ACAType aca_type = 2;
}
message GetAttestationKeyInfoReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The attestation public key (X.509/DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo).
optional bytes public_key = 2;
// The attestation public key in TPM_PUBKEY form.
optional bytes public_key_tpm_format = 3;
// The attestation key certificate.
optional bytes certificate = 4;
// A quote of PCR0 at the time of attestation key creation.
optional Quote pcr0_quote = 5;
// A quote of PCR1 at the time of attestation key creation.
optional Quote pcr1_quote = 6;
}
message ActivateAttestationKeyRequest {
reserved 1;
optional EncryptedIdentityCredential encrypted_certificate = 2;
// Whether, on success, the decrypted certificate should be retained in
// association with the attestation key. When using an ACA, this is normally
// set to true. Other protocols may use a nonce as the 'certificate' and in
// these cases this field is normally set to false.
optional bool save_certificate = 3;
// What kind of ACA to use.
optional ACAType aca_type = 4;
}
message ActivateAttestationKeyReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The decrypted attestation key certificate.
optional bytes certificate = 2;
}
message CreateCertifiableKeyRequest {
// An arbitrary label which can be used to reference the key later.
optional string key_label = 1;
// Provided if the new key should be accessible only by a
// particular user. If this field is not set or is the empty
// string, the key will be accessible system-wide.
optional string username = 2;
optional KeyType key_type = 3;
optional KeyUsage key_usage = 4;
}
message CreateCertifiableKeyReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The new public key (X.509/DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo).
optional bytes public_key = 2;
// The serialized TPM_CERTIFY_INFO or TPM2B_ATTEST for the new key.
optional bytes certify_info = 3;
// The signature of certify_info by the Attestation Key.
optional bytes certify_info_signature = 4;
}
message DecryptRequest {
optional string key_label = 1;
optional string username = 2;
optional bytes encrypted_data = 3;
}
message DecryptReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
optional bytes decrypted_data = 2;
}
message SignRequest {
optional string key_label = 1;
optional string username = 2;
optional bytes data_to_sign = 3;
}
message SignReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
optional bytes signature = 2;
}
message RegisterKeyWithChapsTokenRequest {
optional string key_label = 1;
optional string username = 2;
optional bool include_certificates = 3;
}
message RegisterKeyWithChapsTokenReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
}
// Message to check whether attestation is prepared for enrollment or not.
message GetEnrollmentPreparationsRequest {
optional ACAType aca_type = 1;
}
// Reply to a check of whether attestation is prepared for enrollment or not.
message GetEnrollmentPreparationsReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
map<int32, bool> enrollment_preparations = 2;
}
message GetStatusRequest {
// Get extended status (see GetStatusReply below).
optional bool extended_status = 1;
}
message GetStatusReply {
message Identity {
// The identity features.
optional int32 features = 1;
}
message IdentityCertificate {
// The identity that is enrolled.
optional int32 identity = 1;
// The Privacy CA that the identity is enrolled with.
optional int32 aca = 2;
}
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// Is prepared for enrollment? True if prepared for *any* CA.
optional bool prepared_for_enrollment = 2;
// Is enrolled (AIK certificate created)? True if enrolled with *any* CA.
optional bool enrolled = 3;
// Is in verified boot mode (according to PCR0 quote)?
// [Only included in reply if extended_status is set]
optional bool verified_boot = 4;
// List of identities and their identity features.
repeated Identity identities = 5;
// List of identity certificates.
map<int32, IdentityCertificate> identity_certificates = 6;
// Map of CA types to whether we are prepared for enrollment with that CA.
map<int32, bool> enrollment_preparations = 7;
}
// Verify attestation data.
message VerifyRequest {
// Use CrosCore CA to verify that the EK is endorsed.
optional bool cros_core = 1;
// Verify EK only.
// Otherwise, in addition to EK, verify all attestation data as a CA would.
optional bool ek_only = 2;
}
message VerifyReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
optional bool verified = 2;
}
// Create an enrollment request to be sent to the Privacy CA. This request
// is a serialized AttestationEnrollmentRequest protobuf. Attestation
// enrollment is a process by which the Privacy CA verifies the EK certificate
// of a device and issues a certificate for an AIK. The enrollment process can
// be finished by sending FinishEnrollRequest with the response from the CA.
message CreateEnrollRequestRequest {
// What kind of ACA to use.
optional ACAType aca_type = 1;
}
message CreateEnrollRequestReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// AttestationEnrollmentRequest to be sent to CA server.
optional bytes pca_request = 2;
}
// Finish the enrollment process.
message FinishEnrollRequest {
// AttestationEnrollmentResponse received from CA server.
optional bytes pca_response = 1;
// What kind of ACA to use.
optional ACAType aca_type = 2;
}
message FinishEnrollReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
}
// Goes through the entire enrollment process, including creating enroll
// request, sending the request to the corresponding PCA server, and storing the
// response from PCA server if success. The message field is identical to
// |CreateEnrollRequestRequest|.
message EnrollRequest {
// What kind of ACA to use.
optional ACAType aca_type = 1;
// No matter is the device is enrolled, (re-)enroll the device.
optional bool forced = 2;
}
message EnrollReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
}
// Create an attestation certificate request to be sent to the Privacy CA.
// The request is a serialized AttestationCertificateRequest protobuf. The
// certificate request process generates and certifies a key in the TPM and
// sends the AIK certificate along with information about the certified key to
// the Privacy CA. The PCA verifies the information and issues a certificate
// for the certified key. The certificate request process can be finished by
// sending FinishCertificateRequestRequest with the response from the CA.
message CreateCertificateRequestRequest {
// Type of certificate to be requested.
optional CertificateProfile certificate_profile = 1;
// The canonical username of the active user profile. Leave blank
// if not associated with the current user.
optional string username = 2;
// Some certificate requests require information about the origin
// of the request. If no origin is needed, this can be empty.
optional string request_origin = 3;
// What kind of ACA to use.
optional ACAType aca_type = 4;
// The key algorithm of certified key.
optional KeyType key_type = 5;
}
message CreateCertificateRequestReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The request to be sent to the Privacy CA.
optional bytes pca_request = 2;
}
// Finish the certificate request process. The |pca_response| from the PCA
// is a serialized AttestationCertificateResponse protobuf. This final step
// verifies the PCA operation succeeded and extracts the certificate for the
// certified key. The certificate is stored with the key.
message FinishCertificateRequestRequest {
// The Privacy CA's response to a certificate request.
optional bytes pca_response = 1;
// A name for the key. If a key already exists with this name it
// will be destroyed and replaced with this one.
optional string key_label = 2;
// This should match |username| in CreateCertificateRequestRequest.
optional string username = 3;
}
message FinishCertificateRequestReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The PCA issued certificate chain in PEM format. By
// convention the certified key certificate is listed
// first followed by intermediate CA certificate(s).
// The PCA root certificate is not included.
optional bytes certificate = 2;
// The public key (X.509/DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo).
optional bytes public_key = 3;
}
// Goes through the entire cert process, including creating cert, sending the
// request to the corresponding PCA server, and storing the response from PCA
// server if success. The message fields are basically the union of
// |CreateCertificateRequestRequest| and |FinishCertificateRequestRequest|.
message GetCertificateRequest {
// Type of certificate to be requested.
optional CertificateProfile certificate_profile = 1;
// The canonical username of the active user profile. Leave blank
// if not associated with the current user.
optional string username = 2;
// Some certificate requests require information about the origin
// of the request. If no origin is needed, this can be empty.
optional string request_origin = 3;
// What kind of ACA to use.
optional ACAType aca_type = 4;
// The key algorithm of certified key.
optional KeyType key_type = 5;
// A name for the key. If a key already exists with this name it
// will be destroyed and replaced with this one.
optional string key_label = 6;
// Ignores the current certificate if any and gets the new certificate.
optional bool forced = 7;
// If set to |true|, this request also triggers enrollment process if the
// device is not enrolled yet.
optional bool shall_trigger_enrollment = 8;
}
message GetCertificateReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The PCA issued certificate chain in PEM format. By
// convention the certified key certificate is listed
// first followed by intermediate CA certificate(s).
// The PCA root certificate is not included.
optional bytes certificate = 2;
// The public key (X.509/DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo).
optional bytes public_key = 3;
}
// Sign a challenge for an enterprise device / user. This challenge is
// typically generated by and the response verified by the Enterprise Device
// Verification Server (DVServer).
message SignEnterpriseChallengeRequest {
// The key name. This is the same name previously passed to
// FinishCertficateRequestRequest.
optional string key_label = 1;
// The canonical username of the active user profile.
// When this is set, an EUK challenge will be performed.
// When this is unset or empty, an EMK challenge will be performed.
optional string username = 2;
// A domain value to be included in the challenge response.
// This is supposed to be the user's canonical e-mail address for an EUK
// challenge. Ignored for EMK challenges.
optional string domain = 3;
// A device identifier to be included in the challenge response.
optional bytes device_id = 4;
// Whether the challenge response should include
// a SignedPublicKeyAndChallenge.
optional bool include_signed_public_key = 5;
// The challenge to be signed.
optional bytes challenge = 6;
// The VA server that will handle the challenge.
optional VAType va_type = 7;
// The name of the key used for SignedPublicKeyAndChallenge. If left empty,
// the same key used to sign the challenge response (EMK or EUK) will be used
// for SignedPublicKeyAndChallenge.
optional string key_name_for_spkac = 8;
// Device Trust Signals
optional DeviceTrustSignals device_trust_signals = 9;
}
message SignEnterpriseChallengeReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The challenge response.
optional bytes challenge_response = 2;
}
// Sign a challenge outside of an enterprise context: generate a random nonce
// and append it to challenge, then sign and return the signature in the
// |challenge_response|.
// This challenge is typically generated by some module running within Chrome.
message SignSimpleChallengeRequest {
// The key name. This is the same name previously passed to
// FinishCertficateRequestRequest.
optional string key_label = 1;
// The canonical username of the active user profile. Leave blank
// if not associated with the current user.
optional string username = 2;
// The challenge to be signed.
optional bytes challenge = 3;
}
message SignSimpleChallengeReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// The challenge response.
optional bytes challenge_response = 2;
}
// Set a payload for a key; any previous payload will be overwritten.
message SetKeyPayloadRequest {
// The key name. This is the same name previously passed to
// FinishCertficateRequestRequest.
optional string key_label = 1;
// The canonical username of the active user profile. Leave blank
// if not associated with the current user.
optional string username = 2;
optional bytes payload = 3;
}
message SetKeyPayloadReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
}
// Delete keys either by key label prefix or by exact key label.
message DeleteKeysRequest {
enum MatchBehavior {
// Match type not specified. Behavior defaults to |MATCH_TYPE_PREFIX|.
MATCH_BEHAVIOR_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
// Will delete all keys that start with |key_label_match|.
// If no such key exists, the operation still succeeds.
MATCH_BEHAVIOR_PREFIX = 1;
// Will delete the key which has a key_label exactly matching
// |key_label_match|.
// If no such key exists, the operation still succeeds.
MATCH_BEHAVIOR_EXACT = 2;
}
// The key label prefix or the exact key label (depends on |match_behavior|).
optional string key_label_match = 1;
// The canonical username of the active user profile. Leave blank
// if not associated with the current user.
optional string username = 2;
// The matching behavior - see comments on the enum values. If omitted,
// defaults to MATCH_BEHAVIOR_PREFIX for backwards compatibility.
optional MatchBehavior match_behavior = 3;
}
message DeleteKeysReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
}
// Create a request to be sent to the PCA which will reset the identity for
// this device on future AIK enrollments. The |reset_token| is put in the
// request protobuf verbatim.
message ResetIdentityRequest {
optional string reset_token = 1;
}
message ResetIdentityReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
// Request to be sent to the CA.
optional bytes reset_request = 2;
}
message GetEnrollmentIdRequest {
optional bool ignore_cache = 1;
}
message GetEnrollmentIdReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
optional string enrollment_id = 2;
}
// Gets a copy of the specific NV data, signed using the key with the specified
// label, eg "attest-ent-machine".
message GetCertifiedNvIndexRequest {
optional int32 nv_index = 1;
optional int32 nv_size = 2;
optional string key_label = 3;
}
message GetCertifiedNvIndexReply {
optional AttestationStatus status = 1;
optional bytes certified_data = 2;
optional bytes signature = 3;
optional bytes key_certificate = 4;
}