blob: 7e25d7edc3e989d7d68a97f728aeaf37f3dcf2e1 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2019 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <unordered_map>
#include <unordered_set>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
#include <base/bind.h>
#include <base/json/json_writer.h>
#include <base/message_loop/message_pump_type.h>
#include <base/strings/string_util.h>
#include <base/system/sys_info.h>
#include <base/threading/thread_task_runner_handle.h>
#include <brillo/cryptohome.h>
#include <chaps/isolate.h>
#include <chaps/token_manager_client.h>
#include <dbus/cryptohome/dbus-constants.h>
#include <tpm_manager/client/tpm_manager_utility.h>
#include "cryptohome/bootlockbox/boot_lockbox.h"
#include "cryptohome/bootlockbox/boot_lockbox_client.h"
#include "cryptohome/challenge_credentials/challenge_credentials_helper_impl.h"
#include "cryptohome/cryptohome_common.h"
#include "cryptohome/cryptohome_metrics.h"
#include "cryptohome/cryptolib.h"
#include "cryptohome/disk_cleanup.h"
#include "cryptohome/filesystem_layout.h"
#include "cryptohome/key_challenge_service.h"
#include "cryptohome/key_challenge_service_factory.h"
#include "cryptohome/key_challenge_service_factory_impl.h"
#include "cryptohome/stateful_recovery.h"
#include "cryptohome/tpm.h"
#include "cryptohome/user_oldest_activity_timestamp_cache.h"
#include "cryptohome/user_session.h"
#include "cryptohome/userdataauth.h"
using base::FilePath;
using brillo::Blob;
using brillo::SecureBlob;
using brillo::cryptohome::home::SanitizeUserNameWithSalt;
namespace cryptohome {
constexpr char kMountThreadName[] = "MountThread";
constexpr char kNotFirstBootFilePath[] = "/run/cryptohome/not_first_boot";
namespace {
// Some utility functions used by UserDataAuth.
// Get the Account ID for an AccountIdentifier proto.
const std::string& GetAccountId(const AccountIdentifier& id) {
if (id.has_account_id()) {
return id.account_id();
}
return id.email();
}
// If any of the authorization data contained in the key have a secret that is
// wrapped, then return true. Otherwise, false is returned.
bool KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(const Key& k) {
for (const KeyAuthorizationData& auth_data : k.data().authorization_data()) {
for (const KeyAuthorizationSecret& secret : auth_data.secrets()) {
// If wrapping becomes richer in the future, this may change.
if (secret.wrapped())
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
// Convert MountError used by mount.cc to CryptohomeErrorCode defined in the
// protos.
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode MountErrorToCryptohomeError(
const MountError code) {
static const std::unordered_map<MountError,
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode>
error_code_lut = {
{MOUNT_ERROR_NONE, user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET},
{MOUNT_ERROR_FATAL, user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL},
{MOUNT_ERROR_KEY_FAILURE,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED},
{MOUNT_ERROR_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY},
{MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR},
{MOUNT_ERROR_UNPRIVILEGED_KEY,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED},
{MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_DEFEND_LOCK,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_DEFEND_LOCK},
{MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_UPDATE_REQUIRED,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_UPDATE_REQUIRED},
{MOUNT_ERROR_USER_DOES_NOT_EXIST,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND},
{MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_NEEDS_REBOOT,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_NEEDS_REBOOT},
{MOUNT_ERROR_OLD_ENCRYPTION,
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_OLD_ENCRYPTION},
{MOUNT_ERROR_PREVIOUS_MIGRATION_INCOMPLETE,
user_data_auth::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_PREVIOUS_MIGRATION_INCOMPLETE},
{MOUNT_ERROR_RECREATED, user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET}};
if (error_code_lut.count(code) != 0) {
return error_code_lut.at(code);
}
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
}
// Returns whether the Chrome OS image is a test one.
bool IsOsTestImage() {
std::string chromeos_release_track;
if (!base::SysInfo::GetLsbReleaseValue("CHROMEOS_RELEASE_TRACK",
&chromeos_release_track)) {
// Fall back to the safer assumption that we're not in a test image.
return false;
}
return base::StartsWith(chromeos_release_track, "test",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE);
}
// Whether the key can be used for lightweight challenge-response authentication
// check against the given user session.
bool KeyMatchesForLightweightChallengeResponseCheck(
const KeyData& key_data, const UserSession& session) {
DCHECK_EQ(key_data.type(), KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE);
DCHECK_EQ(key_data.challenge_response_key_size(), 1);
if (session.key_data().type() != KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE ||
session.key_data().label().empty() ||
session.key_data().label() != key_data.label())
return false;
if (session.key_data().challenge_response_key_size() != 1) {
// Using multiple challenge-response keys at once is currently unsupported.
return false;
}
if (session.key_data().challenge_response_key(0).public_key_spki_der() !=
key_data.challenge_response_key(0).public_key_spki_der()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Public key mismatch for lightweight challenge-response "
"authentication check";
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Performs a single attempt to Mount a non-annonimous user.
MountError AttemptUserMount(const Credentials& credentials,
const Mount::MountArgs& mount_args,
scoped_refptr<UserSession> user_session) {
if (user_session->GetMount()->IsMounted()) {
return MOUNT_ERROR_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY;
}
if (mount_args.is_ephemeral) {
return user_session->MountEphemeral(credentials);
}
return user_session->MountVault(credentials, mount_args);
}
} // namespace
UserDataAuth::UserDataAuth()
: origin_thread_id_(base::PlatformThread::CurrentId()),
mount_thread_(kMountThreadName),
disable_threading_(false),
shadow_root_(base::FilePath(kShadowRoot)),
system_salt_(),
tpm_(nullptr),
default_tpm_init_(nullptr),
tpm_init_(nullptr),
default_platform_(new Platform()),
platform_(default_platform_.get()),
default_crypto_(new Crypto(platform_)),
crypto_(default_crypto_.get()),
default_chaps_client_(new chaps::TokenManagerClient()),
chaps_client_(default_chaps_client_.get()),
default_pkcs11_init_(new Pkcs11Init()),
pkcs11_init_(default_pkcs11_init_.get()),
firmware_management_parameters_(nullptr),
default_fingerprint_manager_(),
fingerprint_manager_(nullptr),
default_tpm_ownership_proxy_(),
tpm_ownership_proxy_(nullptr),
default_boot_lockbox_(),
boot_lockbox_(nullptr),
upload_alerts_period_ms_(kUploadAlertsPeriodMS),
ownership_callback_has_run_(false),
default_install_attrs_(new cryptohome::InstallAttributes(NULL)),
install_attrs_(default_install_attrs_.get()),
enterprise_owned_(false),
reported_pkcs11_init_fail_(false),
default_homedirs_(nullptr),
homedirs_(nullptr),
user_timestamp_cache_(new UserOldestActivityTimestampCache()),
default_mount_factory_(new cryptohome::MountFactory()),
mount_factory_(default_mount_factory_.get()),
public_mount_salt_(),
guest_user_(brillo::cryptohome::home::kGuestUserName),
force_ecryptfs_(true),
legacy_mount_(true),
default_arc_disk_quota_(nullptr),
arc_disk_quota_(nullptr),
default_disk_cleanup_(nullptr),
disk_cleanup_(nullptr),
disk_cleanup_threshold_(kFreeSpaceThresholdToTriggerCleanup),
disk_cleanup_aggressive_threshold_(
kFreeSpaceThresholdToTriggerAggressiveCleanup),
disk_cleanup_target_free_space_(kTargetFreeSpaceAfterCleanup),
low_disk_notification_period_ms_(kLowDiskNotificationPeriodMS),
low_disk_space_signal_was_emitted_(false),
low_disk_space_callback_(base::Bind([](uint64_t free_disk_space) {})) {}
UserDataAuth::~UserDataAuth() {
mount_thread_.Stop();
}
bool UserDataAuth::Initialize() {
AssertOnOriginThread();
if (!disable_threading_) {
// Note that |origin_task_runner_| is initialized here because in some cases
// such as unit testing, the current thread Task Runner might not be
// available, so we should not attempt to retrieve the current thread task
// runner during the creation of this class.
origin_task_runner_ = base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
}
// Note that we check to see if |tpm_| is available here because it may have
// been set to an overridden value during unit testing before Initialize() is
// called.
if (!tpm_) {
tpm_ = Tpm::GetSingleton();
}
// Note that we check to see if |tpm_init_| is available here because it may
// have been set to an overridden value during unit testing before
// Initialize() is called.
if (!tpm_init_) {
default_tpm_init_.reset(new TpmInit(tpm_, platform_));
tpm_init_ = default_tpm_init_.get();
}
if (!boot_lockbox_) {
default_boot_lockbox_.reset(new BootLockbox(tpm_, platform_, crypto_));
boot_lockbox_ = default_boot_lockbox_.get();
}
// Initialize Firmware Management Parameters
if (!firmware_management_parameters_) {
default_firmware_management_params_.reset(
new FirmwareManagementParameters(tpm_));
firmware_management_parameters_ = default_firmware_management_params_.get();
}
if (!crypto_->Init(tpm_init_)) {
return false;
}
if (!InitializeFilesystemLayout(platform_, crypto_, shadow_root_,
&system_salt_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize filesystem layout.";
return false;
}
if (!homedirs_) {
default_homedirs_ = std::make_unique<HomeDirs>(
platform_, crypto_, shadow_root_, system_salt_,
user_timestamp_cache_.get(), std::make_unique<policy::PolicyProvider>(),
std::make_unique<VaultKeysetFactory>());
homedirs_ = default_homedirs_.get();
}
if (!arc_disk_quota_) {
default_arc_disk_quota_ = std::make_unique<ArcDiskQuota>(
homedirs_, platform_, base::FilePath(kArcDiskHome));
arc_disk_quota_ = default_arc_disk_quota_.get();
}
// Initialize ARC Disk Quota Service.
arc_disk_quota_->Initialize();
if (!disk_cleanup_) {
default_disk_cleanup_ = std::make_unique<DiskCleanup>(
platform_, homedirs_, user_timestamp_cache_.get());
disk_cleanup_ = default_disk_cleanup_.get();
}
disk_cleanup_->set_cleanup_threshold(disk_cleanup_threshold_);
disk_cleanup_->set_aggressive_cleanup_threshold(
disk_cleanup_aggressive_threshold_);
disk_cleanup_->set_target_free_space(disk_cleanup_target_free_space_);
if (!disable_threading_) {
base::Thread::Options options;
options.message_pump_type = base::MessagePumpType::IO;
mount_thread_.StartWithOptions(options);
}
if (platform_->FileExists(base::FilePath(kNotFirstBootFilePath))) {
// Clean up any unreferenced mountpoints at startup.
PostTaskToMountThread(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
[](UserDataAuth* userdataauth) {
userdataauth->CleanUpStaleMounts(false);
},
base::Unretained(this)));
} else {
platform_->TouchFileDurable(base::FilePath(kNotFirstBootFilePath));
}
// We expect |tpm_| and |tpm_init_| to be available by this point.
DCHECK(tpm_ && tpm_init_);
// Seed /dev/urandom
SeedUrandom();
// Initialize the state used by LowDiskCallback(). Last user activity
// timestamp is set to the current time.
last_user_activity_timestamp_time_ = last_auto_cleanup_time_;
if (!disable_threading_) {
// Clean up space on start (once).
PostTaskToMountThread(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::DoAutoCleanup,
base::Unretained(this)));
// Start scheduling periodic check for low-disk space and cleanup events.
// Subsequent events are scheduled by the callback itself.
PostTaskToMountThread(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::LowDiskCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
// Start scheduling periodic TPM alerts upload to UMA. Subsequent events are
// scheduled by the callback itself.
PostTaskToOriginThread(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::UploadAlertsDataCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
// Do Stateful Recovery if requested.
auto mountfn =
base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::StatefulRecoveryMount, base::Unretained(this));
auto unmountfn = base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::StatefulRecoveryUnmount,
base::Unretained(this));
auto isownerfn = base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::StatefulRecoveryIsOwner,
base::Unretained(this));
StatefulRecovery recovery(platform_, mountfn, unmountfn, isownerfn);
if (recovery.Requested()) {
if (recovery.Recover()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Stateful recovery was performed successfully.";
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Stateful recovery failed.";
}
recovery.PerformReboot();
}
return true;
}
bool UserDataAuth::StatefulRecoveryMount(const std::string& username,
const std::string& passkey,
FilePath* out_home_path) {
user_data_auth::MountRequest mount_req;
mount_req.mutable_account()->set_account_id(username);
mount_req.mutable_authorization()->mutable_key()->set_secret(passkey);
bool mount_path_retrieved = false;
// This will store the mount_reply when it finished.
user_data_auth::MountReply mount_reply;
// This will be used to let code outside of the callback know that we're
// done.
base::WaitableEvent done_event(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
auto on_done = base::BindOnce(
[](UserDataAuth* uda, std::string username, FilePath* out_home_path,
bool* mount_path_retrieved,
user_data_auth::MountReply* mount_reply_ptr,
base::WaitableEvent* done_event_ptr,
const user_data_auth::MountReply& reply) {
*mount_reply_ptr = reply;
// After the mount is successful, we need to obtain the user
// mount.
scoped_refptr<UserSession> user_session = uda->GetUserSession(username);
if (!user_session || !user_session->GetMount()->IsMounted()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get mount in stateful recovery.";
}
*out_home_path = user_session->GetMount()->mount_point();
*mount_path_retrieved = true;
done_event_ptr->Signal();
},
base::Unretained(this), username, base::Unretained(out_home_path),
base::Unretained(&mount_path_retrieved), base::Unretained(&mount_reply),
base::Unretained(&done_event));
PostTaskToMountThread(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::DoMount, base::Unretained(this),
mount_req, std::move(on_done)));
done_event.Wait();
if (mount_reply.error()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Mount during stateful recovery failed: "
<< mount_reply.error();
return false;
}
if (!mount_path_retrieved) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get user home path in stateful recovery.";
return false;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Mount succeeded during stateful recovery.";
return true;
}
bool UserDataAuth::StatefulRecoveryUnmount() {
bool result;
base::WaitableEvent done_event(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
PostTaskToMountThread(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
[](UserDataAuth* uda, base::WaitableEvent* done_event_ptr,
bool* result_ptr) {
*result_ptr = uda->Unmount();
done_event_ptr->Signal();
},
base::Unretained(this), base::Unretained(&done_event),
base::Unretained(&result)));
done_event.Wait();
return result;
}
bool UserDataAuth::StatefulRecoveryIsOwner(const std::string& username) {
std::string owner;
if (homedirs_->GetPlainOwner(&owner) && username.length() &&
username == owner) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool UserDataAuth::PostDBusInitialize() {
AssertOnOriginThread();
CHECK(bus_);
// Initialize the tpm_ownership_proxy_ and register the signals.
if (!default_tpm_ownership_proxy_) {
default_tpm_ownership_proxy_.reset(
new org::chromium::TpmManagerProxy(bus_));
}
if (!tpm_ownership_proxy_) {
tpm_ownership_proxy_ = default_tpm_ownership_proxy_.get();
}
tpm_manager::TpmManagerUtility* tpm_manager_util =
tpm_manager::TpmManagerUtility::GetSingleton();
if (tpm_manager_util) {
tpm_manager_util->AddOwnershipCallback(base::Bind(
&UserDataAuth::OnOwnershipTakenSignal, base::Unretained(this)));
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Failed to get TpmManagerUtility singleton!";
}
// If the TPM is unowned or doesn't exist, it's safe for
// this function to be called again. However, it shouldn't
// be called across multiple threads in parallel.
PostTaskToMountThread(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::InitializeInstallAttributes,
base::Unretained(this)));
PostTaskToMountThread(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::CreateFingerprintManager,
base::Unretained(this)));
return true;
}
void UserDataAuth::CreateFingerprintManager() {
if (!fingerprint_manager_) {
if (!default_fingerprint_manager_) {
default_fingerprint_manager_ = FingerprintManager::Create(
mount_thread_bus_,
dbus::ObjectPath(std::string(biod::kBiodServicePath)
.append(kCrosFpBiometricsManagerRelativePath)));
}
fingerprint_manager_ = default_fingerprint_manager_.get();
}
}
void UserDataAuth::OnOwnershipTakenSignal() {
// Use the same code path as when ownership is taken through tpm_init_.
OwnershipCallback(true, true);
}
bool UserDataAuth::PostTaskToOriginThread(const base::Location& from_here,
base::OnceClosure task,
const base::TimeDelta& delay) {
if (disable_threading_) {
CHECK(delay.is_zero());
std::move(task).Run();
return true;
}
if (delay.is_zero()) {
return origin_task_runner_->PostTask(from_here, std::move(task));
}
return origin_task_runner_->PostDelayedTask(from_here, std::move(task),
delay);
}
bool UserDataAuth::PostTaskToMountThread(const base::Location& from_here,
base::OnceClosure task,
const base::TimeDelta& delay) {
if (disable_threading_) {
CHECK(delay.is_zero());
std::move(task).Run();
return true;
}
if (delay.is_zero()) {
return mount_thread_.task_runner()->PostTask(from_here, std::move(task));
}
return mount_thread_.task_runner()->PostDelayedTask(from_here,
std::move(task), delay);
}
bool UserDataAuth::IsMounted(const std::string& username,
bool* is_ephemeral_out) {
// Note: This can only run in mount_thread_
AssertOnMountThread();
bool is_mounted = false;
bool is_ephemeral = false;
if (username.empty()) {
// No username is specified, so we consider "the cryptohome" to be mounted
// if any existing cryptohome is mounted.
for (const auto& session_pair : sessions_) {
if (session_pair.second->GetMount()->IsMounted()) {
is_mounted = true;
is_ephemeral |=
!session_pair.second->GetMount()->IsNonEphemeralMounted();
}
}
} else {
// A username is specified, check the associated mount object.
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session = GetUserSession(username);
if (session.get()) {
is_mounted = session->GetMount()->IsMounted();
is_ephemeral =
is_mounted && !session->GetMount()->IsNonEphemeralMounted();
}
}
if (is_ephemeral_out) {
*is_ephemeral_out = is_ephemeral;
}
return is_mounted;
}
scoped_refptr<UserSession> UserDataAuth::GetUserSession(
const std::string& username) {
// Note: This can only run in mount_thread_
AssertOnMountThread();
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session = nullptr;
if (sessions_.count(username) == 1) {
session = sessions_[username];
}
return session;
}
bool UserDataAuth::RemoveAllMounts(bool unmount) {
AssertOnMountThread();
bool success = true;
for (auto it = sessions_.begin(); it != sessions_.end();) {
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session = it->second;
if (unmount && session->GetMount()->IsMounted()) {
if (session->GetMount()->pkcs11_state() ==
cryptohome::Mount::kIsBeingInitialized) {
// Reset the state.
session->GetMount()->set_pkcs11_state(
cryptohome::Mount::kUninitialized);
// And also reset the global failure reported state.
reported_pkcs11_init_fail_ = false;
}
success = success && session->Unmount();
}
sessions_.erase(it++);
}
return success;
}
bool UserDataAuth::FilterActiveMounts(
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath>* mounts,
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath>* active_mounts,
bool include_busy_mount) {
// Note: This can only run in mount_thread_
AssertOnMountThread();
bool skipped = false;
std::set<const FilePath> children_to_preserve;
for (auto match = mounts->begin(); match != mounts->end();) {
// curr->first is the source device of the group that we are processing in
// this outer loop.
auto curr = match;
bool keep = false;
// Note that we organize the set of mounts with the same source, then
// process them together. That is, say there's /dev/mmcblk0p1 mounted on
// /home/user/xxx and /home/chronos/u-xxx/MyFiles/Downloads. They are both
// from the same source (/dev/mmcblk0p1, or match->first). In this case,
// we'll decide the fate of all mounts with the same source together. For
// each such group, the outer loop will run once. The inner loop will
// iterate through every mount in the group with |match| variable, looking
// to see if it's owned by any active mounts. If it is, the entire group is
// kept. Otherwise, (and assuming no open files), the entire group is
// discarded, as in, not moved into the active_mounts multimap.
// Walk each set of sources as one group since multimaps are key ordered.
for (; match != mounts->end() && match->first == curr->first; ++match) {
// Ignore known mounts.
for (const auto& session_pair : sessions_) {
if (session_pair.second->GetMount()->OwnsMountPoint(match->second)) {
keep = true;
// If !include_busy_mount, other mount points not owned scanned after
// should be preserved as well.
if (include_busy_mount)
break;
}
}
// Ignore mounts pointing to children of used mounts.
if (!include_busy_mount) {
if (children_to_preserve.find(match->second) !=
children_to_preserve.end()) {
keep = true;
skipped = true;
LOG(WARNING) << "Stale mount " << match->second.value() << " from "
<< match->first.value() << " is a just a child.";
}
}
// Optionally, ignore mounts with open files.
if (!keep && !include_busy_mount) {
std::vector<ProcessInformation> processes;
platform_->GetProcessesWithOpenFiles(match->second, &processes);
if (processes.size()) {
const std::vector<std::string> cmd_line = processes[0].get_cmd_line();
const std::string first_cmd =
(cmd_line.size() > 0 ? cmd_line[0] : "<empty>");
LOG(WARNING) << "Stale mount " << match->second.value() << " from "
<< match->first.value() << " has " << processes.size()
<< " active holders. First one " << first_cmd;
keep = true;
skipped = true;
}
}
}
if (keep) {
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> children;
LOG(WARNING) << "Looking for children of " << curr->first;
platform_->GetMountsBySourcePrefix(curr->first, &children);
for (const auto& child : children) {
children_to_preserve.insert(child.second);
}
active_mounts->insert(curr, match);
mounts->erase(curr, match);
}
}
return skipped;
}
void UserDataAuth::GetEphemeralLoopDevicesMounts(
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath>* mounts) {
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> loop_mounts;
platform_->GetLoopDeviceMounts(&loop_mounts);
const FilePath sparse_path =
FilePath(kEphemeralCryptohomeDir).Append(kSparseFileDir);
for (const auto& device : platform_->GetAttachedLoopDevices()) {
// Ephemeral mounts are mounts from a loop device with ephemeral sparse
// backing file.
if (sparse_path.IsParent(device.backing_file)) {
auto range = loop_mounts.equal_range(device.device);
mounts->insert(range.first, range.second);
}
}
}
bool UserDataAuth::UnloadPkcs11Tokens(const std::vector<FilePath>& exclude) {
SecureBlob isolate =
chaps::IsolateCredentialManager::GetDefaultIsolateCredential();
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
if (!chaps_client_->GetTokenList(isolate, &tokens))
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tokens.size(); ++i) {
if (tokens[i] != chaps::kSystemTokenPath &&
!PrefixPresent(exclude, tokens[i])) {
// It's not a system token and is not under one of the excluded path.
LOG(INFO) << "Unloading up PKCS #11 token: " << tokens[i];
chaps_client_->UnloadToken(isolate, FilePath(tokens[i]));
}
}
return true;
}
bool UserDataAuth::CleanUpStaleMounts(bool force) {
// This function is meant to aid in a clean recovery from a crashed or
// manually restarted cryptohomed. Cryptohomed may restart:
// 1. Before any mounts occur
// 2. While mounts are active
// 3. During an unmount
// In case #1, there should be no special work to be done.
// The best way to disambiguate #2 and #3 is to determine if there are
// any active open files on any stale mounts. If there are open files,
// then we've likely(*) resumed an active session. If there are not,
// the last cryptohome should have been unmounted.
// It's worth noting that a restart during active use doesn't impair
// other user session behavior, like CheckKey, because it doesn't rely
// exclusively on mount state.
//
// In the future, it may make sense to attempt to keep the MountMap
// persisted to disk which would make resumption much easier.
//
// (*) Relies on the expectation that all processes have been killed off.
// Stale shadow and ephemeral mounts.
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> shadow_mounts;
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> ephemeral_mounts;
// Active mounts that we don't intend to unmount.
std::multimap<const FilePath, const FilePath> active_mounts;
// Retrieve all the mounts that's currently mounted by the kernel and concerns
// us
platform_->GetMountsBySourcePrefix(shadow_root_, &shadow_mounts);
GetEphemeralLoopDevicesMounts(&ephemeral_mounts);
// Remove mounts that we've a record of or have open files on them
bool skipped = FilterActiveMounts(&shadow_mounts, &active_mounts, force) ||
FilterActiveMounts(&ephemeral_mounts, &active_mounts, force);
// Unload PKCS#11 tokens on any mount that we're going to unmount.
std::vector<FilePath> excluded_mount_points;
for (const auto& mount : active_mounts) {
excluded_mount_points.push_back(mount.second);
}
UnloadPkcs11Tokens(excluded_mount_points);
// Unmount anything left.
for (const auto& match : shadow_mounts) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Lazily unmounting stale shadow mount: "
<< match.second.value() << " from " << match.first.value();
// true for lazy unmount, nullptr for us not needing to know if it's really
// unmounted.
platform_->Unmount(match.second, true, nullptr);
}
// Attempt to clear the encryption key for the shadow directories once
// the mount has been unmounted. The encryption key needs to be cleared
// after all the unmounts are done to ensure that none of the existing
// submounts becomes inaccessible.
if (force && !shadow_mounts.empty()) {
// Attempt to clear fscrypt encryption keys for the shadow mounts.
for (const auto& match : shadow_mounts) {
if (!platform_->InvalidateDirCryptoKey(dircrypto::KeyReference(),
match.first)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to clear fscrypt keys for stale mount: "
<< match.first;
}
}
// Clear all keys in the user keyring for ecryptfs mounts.
if (!platform_->ClearUserKeyring()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to clear stale user keys.";
}
}
for (const auto& match : ephemeral_mounts) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Lazily unmounting stale ephemeral mount: "
<< match.second.value() << " from " << match.first.value();
// true for lazy unmount, nullptr for us not needing to know if it's really
// unmounted.
platform_->Unmount(match.second, true, nullptr);
// Clean up destination directory for ephemeral mounts under ephemeral
// cryptohome dir.
if (base::StartsWith(match.first.value(), kLoopPrefix,
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) &&
FilePath(kEphemeralCryptohomeDir).IsParent(match.second)) {
platform_->DeleteFile(match.second, true /* recursive */);
}
}
// Clean up all stale sparse files, this is comprised of two stages:
// 1. Clean up stale loop devices.
// 2. Clean up stale sparse files.
// Note that some mounts are backed by loop devices, and loop devices are
// backed by sparse files.
std::vector<Platform::LoopDevice> loop_devices =
platform_->GetAttachedLoopDevices();
const FilePath sparse_dir =
FilePath(kEphemeralCryptohomeDir).Append(kSparseFileDir);
std::vector<FilePath> stale_sparse_files;
platform_->EnumerateDirectoryEntries(sparse_dir, false /* is_recursive */,
&stale_sparse_files);
// We'll go through all loop devices, and for every of them, we'll see if we
// can remove it. Also in the process, we'll get to keep track of which sparse
// files are actually used by active loop devices.
for (const auto& device : loop_devices) {
// Check whether the loop device is created from an ephemeral sparse file.
if (!sparse_dir.IsParent(device.backing_file)) {
// Nah, it's this loop device is not backed by an ephemeral sparse file
// created by cryptohome, so we'll leave it alone.
continue;
}
// Check if any of our active mounts are backed by this loop device.
if (active_mounts.count(device.device) == 0) {
// Nope, this loop device have nothing to do with our active mounts.
LOG(WARNING) << "Detaching stale loop device: " << device.device.value();
if (!platform_->DetachLoop(device.device)) {
ReportCryptohomeError(kEphemeralCleanUpFailed);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Can't detach stale loop: " << device.device.value();
}
} else {
// This loop device backs one of our active_mounts, so we can't count it
// as stale. Thus removing from the stale_sparse_files list.
stale_sparse_files.erase(
std::remove(stale_sparse_files.begin(), stale_sparse_files.end(),
device.backing_file),
stale_sparse_files.end());
}
}
// Now we clean up the stale sparse files.
for (const auto& file : stale_sparse_files) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Deleting stale ephemeral backing sparse file: "
<< file.value();
if (!platform_->DeleteFile(file, false /* recursive */)) {
ReportCryptohomeError(kEphemeralCleanUpFailed);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to clean up ephemeral sparse file: "
<< file.value();
}
}
// |force| and |skipped| cannot be true at the same time. If |force| is true,
// then we'll not skip over any stale mount because there are open files, so
// |skipped| must be false.
DCHECK(!(force && skipped));
return skipped;
}
bool UserDataAuth::PrefixPresent(const std::vector<FilePath>& prefixes,
const std::string path) {
return std::any_of(
prefixes.begin(), prefixes.end(), [&path](const FilePath& prefix) {
return base::StartsWith(path, prefix.value(),
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
});
}
bool UserDataAuth::Unmount() {
bool unmount_ok = RemoveAllMounts(true);
// If there are any unexpected mounts lingering from a crash/restart,
// clean them up now.
// Note that we do not care about the return value of CleanUpStaleMounts()
// because it doesn't matter if any mount is skipped due to open files, and
// additionally, since we've specified force=true, it'll not skip over mounts
// with open files.
CleanUpStaleMounts(true);
return unmount_ok;
}
void UserDataAuth::InitializePkcs11(UserSession* session) {
// We should not pass nullptr to this method.
DCHECK(session);
if (!IsOnMountThread()) {
// We are not on mount thread, but to be safe, we'll only access Mount
// objects on mount thread, so let's post ourself there.
PostTaskToMountThread(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::InitializePkcs11, base::Unretained(this),
base::Unretained(session)));
return;
}
AssertOnMountThread();
// Wait for ownership if there is a working TPM.
if (tpm_ && tpm_->IsEnabled() && !tpm_->IsOwned()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "TPM was not owned. TPM initialization call back will"
<< " handle PKCS#11 initialization.";
session->GetMount()->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kIsWaitingOnTPM);
return;
}
bool still_mounted = false;
// The mount have be mounted, that is, still tracked by cryptohome. Otherwise
// there's no point in initializing PKCS#11 for it. The reason for this check
// is because it might be possible for Unmount() to be called after mounting
// and before getting here.
for (const auto& session_pair : sessions_) {
if (session_pair.second.get() == session &&
session->GetMount()->IsMounted()) {
still_mounted = true;
break;
}
}
if (!still_mounted) {
LOG(WARNING)
<< "PKCS#11 initialization requested but cryptohome is not mounted.";
return;
}
session->GetMount()->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kIsBeingInitialized);
// Note that the timer stops in the Mount class' method.
ReportTimerStart(kPkcs11InitTimer);
session->GetMount()->InsertPkcs11Token();
LOG(INFO) << "PKCS#11 initialization succeeded.";
session->GetMount()->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kIsInitialized);
}
void UserDataAuth::ResumeAllPkcs11Initialization() {
if (!IsOnMountThread()) {
// We are not on mount thread, but to be safe, we'll only access Mount
// objects on mount thread, so let's post ourself there.
PostTaskToMountThread(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::ResumeAllPkcs11Initialization,
base::Unretained(this)));
return;
}
for (auto& session_pair : sessions_) {
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session = session_pair.second;
if (session->GetMount()->pkcs11_state() == Mount::kIsWaitingOnTPM) {
InitializePkcs11(session.get());
}
}
}
void UserDataAuth::ResetAllTPMContext() {
if (!IsOnMountThread()) {
// We are not on mount thread, but to be safe, we'll only access Mount
// objects on mount thread, so let's post ourself there.
PostTaskToMountThread(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::ResetAllTPMContext,
base::Unretained(this)));
return;
}
crypto_->EnsureTpm(true);
}
void UserDataAuth::set_cleanup_threshold(uint64_t cleanup_threshold) {
disk_cleanup_threshold_ = cleanup_threshold;
}
void UserDataAuth::set_aggressive_cleanup_threshold(
uint64_t aggressive_cleanup_threshold) {
disk_cleanup_aggressive_threshold_ = aggressive_cleanup_threshold;
}
void UserDataAuth::set_target_free_space(uint64_t target_free_space) {
disk_cleanup_target_free_space_ = target_free_space;
}
void UserDataAuth::OwnershipCallback(bool status, bool took_ownership) {
// Note that this function should only be called once during the lifetime of
// this process, extra calls will be dropped.
if (ownership_callback_has_run_) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Duplicated call to OwnershipCallback.";
return;
}
ownership_callback_has_run_ = true;
if (took_ownership) {
// Since ownership is already taken, we are not currently taking ownership.
tpm_init_->SetTpmBeingOwned(false);
// Let the |tpm_| object know as well.
PostTaskToOriginThread(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(
[](UserDataAuth* userdataauth) {
if (userdataauth->tpm_)
userdataauth->tpm_->HandleOwnershipTakenEvent();
},
base::Unretained(this)));
// Reset the TPM context of all mounts, that is, force a reload of
// cryptohome keys, and make sure it is loaded and ready for every mount.
PostTaskToMountThread(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::ResetAllTPMContext,
base::Unretained(this)));
// There might be some mounts that is half way through the PKCS#11
// initialization, let's resume them.
PostTaskToMountThread(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::ResumeAllPkcs11Initialization,
base::Unretained(this)));
// Initialize the install-time locked attributes since we can't do it prior
// to ownership.
PostTaskToMountThread(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::InitializeInstallAttributes,
base::Unretained(this)));
// If we mounted before the TPM finished initialization, we must finalize
// the install attributes now too, otherwise it takes a full re-login cycle
// to finalize.
PostTaskToMountThread(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::FinalizeInstallAttributesIfMounted,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
void UserDataAuth::SetEnterpriseOwned(bool enterprise_owned) {
AssertOnMountThread();
enterprise_owned_ = enterprise_owned;
homedirs_->set_enterprise_owned(enterprise_owned);
}
void UserDataAuth::DetectEnterpriseOwnership() {
AssertOnMountThread();
static const std::string true_str = "true";
brillo::Blob true_value(true_str.begin(), true_str.end());
true_value.push_back(0);
brillo::Blob value;
if (install_attrs_->Get("enterprise.owned", &value) && value == true_value) {
// Update any active mounts with the state, have to be done on mount thread.
SetEnterpriseOwned(true);
}
// Note: Right now there's no way to convert an enterprise owned machine to a
// non-enterprise owned machine without clearing the TPM, so we don't try
// calling SetEnterpriseOwned() with false.
}
void UserDataAuth::InitializeInstallAttributes() {
AssertOnMountThread();
// Don't reinitialize when install attributes are valid.
if (install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kValid) {
return;
}
// The TPM owning instance may have changed since initialization.
// InstallAttributes can handle a NULL or !IsEnabled Tpm object.
install_attrs_->SetTpm(tpm_);
install_attrs_->Init(tpm_init_);
// Check if the machine is enterprise owned and report to mount_ then.
DetectEnterpriseOwnership();
}
void UserDataAuth::FinalizeInstallAttributesIfMounted() {
AssertOnMountThread();
bool is_mounted = IsMounted();
if (is_mounted &&
install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kFirstInstall) {
scoped_refptr<UserSession> guest_session = GetUserSession(guest_user_);
bool guest_mounted =
guest_session.get() && guest_session->GetMount()->IsMounted();
if (!guest_mounted) {
install_attrs_->Finalize();
}
}
}
bool UserDataAuth::CreatePublicMountSaltIfNeeded() {
if (!public_mount_salt_.empty())
return true;
FilePath saltfile(kPublicMountSaltFilePath);
return crypto_->GetOrCreateSalt(saltfile, CRYPTOHOME_DEFAULT_SALT_LENGTH,
false, &public_mount_salt_);
}
bool UserDataAuth::GetPublicMountPassKey(const std::string& public_mount_id,
std::string* public_mount_passkey) {
if (!CreatePublicMountSaltIfNeeded())
return false;
SecureBlob passkey;
Crypto::PasswordToPasskey(public_mount_id.c_str(), public_mount_salt_,
&passkey);
*public_mount_passkey = passkey.to_string();
return true;
}
bool UserDataAuth::GetShouldMountAsEphemeral(
const std::string& account_id,
bool is_ephemeral_mount_requested,
bool has_create_request,
bool* is_ephemeral,
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode* error) const {
const bool is_or_will_be_owner = homedirs_->IsOrWillBeOwner(account_id);
if (is_ephemeral_mount_requested && is_or_will_be_owner) {
LOG(ERROR) << "An ephemeral cryptohome can only be mounted when the user "
"is not the owner.";
*error = user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
return false;
}
*is_ephemeral =
!is_or_will_be_owner &&
(homedirs_->AreEphemeralUsersEnabled() || is_ephemeral_mount_requested);
if (*is_ephemeral && !has_create_request) {
LOG(ERROR) << "An ephemeral cryptohome can only be mounted when its "
"creation on-the-fly is allowed.";
*error =
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
return false;
}
return true;
}
scoped_refptr<Mount> UserDataAuth::CreateMount(const std::string& username) {
scoped_refptr<Mount> m;
// TODO(dlunev): Decide if finalization should be moved to MountFactory.
EnsureBootLockboxFinalized();
m = mount_factory_->New(platform_, homedirs_);
if (!m->Init()) {
return nullptr;
}
m->set_legacy_mount(legacy_mount_);
return m;
}
void UserDataAuth::EnsureBootLockboxFinalized() {
if (boot_lockbox_ && !boot_lockbox_->FinalizeBoot()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to finalize boot lockbox when mounting guest "
"cryptohome";
}
#if USE_TPM2
// Lock NVRamBootLockbox
auto nvram_boot_lockbox_client = BootLockboxClient::CreateBootLockboxClient();
if (!nvram_boot_lockbox_client) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create nvram_boot_lockbox_client";
return;
}
if (!nvram_boot_lockbox_client->Finalize()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to finalize nvram lockbox.";
}
#endif // USE_TMP2
}
scoped_refptr<UserSession> UserDataAuth::GetOrCreateUserSession(
const std::string& username) {
// This method touches the |sessions_| object so it needs to run on
// |mount_thread_|
AssertOnMountThread();
if (sessions_.count(username) == 0U) {
// We don't have a mount associated with |username|, let's create one.
scoped_refptr<cryptohome::Mount> m = CreateMount(username);
if (!m) {
return nullptr;
}
sessions_[username] = new UserSession(homedirs_, system_salt_, m);
}
return sessions_[username];
}
bool UserDataAuth::CleanUpHiddenMounts() {
AssertOnMountThread();
bool ok = true;
for (auto it = sessions_.begin(); it != sessions_.end();) {
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session = it->second;
if (session->GetMount()->IsMounted() &&
session->GetMount()->IsShadowOnly()) {
ok = ok && session->Unmount();
it = sessions_.erase(it);
} else {
++it;
}
}
return ok;
}
void UserDataAuth::GetChallengeCredentialsPcrRestrictions(
const std::string& obfuscated_username,
std::vector<std::map<uint32_t, brillo::Blob>>* pcr_restrictions) {
{
std::map<uint32_t, brillo::Blob> pcrs_1;
for (const auto& pcr :
tpm_->GetPcrMap(obfuscated_username, false /* use_extended_pcr */)) {
pcrs_1[pcr.first] = brillo::BlobFromString(pcr.second);
}
pcr_restrictions->push_back(pcrs_1);
}
{
std::map<uint32_t, brillo::Blob> pcrs_2;
for (const auto& pcr :
tpm_->GetPcrMap(obfuscated_username, true /* use_extended_pcr */)) {
pcrs_2[pcr.first] = brillo::BlobFromString(pcr.second);
}
pcr_restrictions->push_back(pcrs_2);
}
}
bool UserDataAuth::RemoveUserSession(const std::string& username) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (sessions_.count(username) != 0) {
return (1U == sessions_.erase(username));
}
return true;
}
void UserDataAuth::MountGuest(
base::OnceCallback<void(const user_data_auth::MountReply&)> on_done) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (sessions_.size() != 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Guest mount requested with other sessions active.";
}
// Rather than make it safe to check the size, then clean up, just always
// clean up.
bool ok = RemoveAllMounts(true);
user_data_auth::MountReply reply;
if (!ok) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount cryptohomes for Guest use";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
ReportTimerStart(kMountGuestExTimer);
// Create a ref-counted guest mount for async use and then throw it away.
scoped_refptr<UserSession> guest_session =
GetOrCreateUserSession(guest_user_);
if (!guest_session || guest_session->MountGuest() != MOUNT_ERROR_NONE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not initialize guest session.";
reply.set_error(
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
}
if (reply.error() ==
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET) {
// We only report the guest mount time for successful cases.
ReportTimerStop(kMountGuestExTimer);
}
// TODO(b/137073669): Cleanup guest_mount if mount failed.
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
}
void UserDataAuth::DoMount(
user_data_auth::MountRequest request,
base::OnceCallback<void(const user_data_auth::MountReply&)> on_done) {
AssertOnMountThread();
LOG(INFO) << "Received a mount request.";
// DoMount current supports guest login/mount, normal plaintext password login
// and challenge response login. For guest mount, a special process
// (MountGuest()) is used. Meanwhile, for normal plaintext password login and
// challenge response login, both will flow through this method. This method
// generally does some parameter validity checking, then pass the request onto
// ContinueMountWithCredentials() for plaintext password login and
// DoChallengeResponseMount() for challenge response login.
// DoChallengeResponseMount() will contact a dbus service and transmit the
// challenge, and once the response is received and checked with the TPM,
// it'll pass the request to ContinueMountWithCredentials(), which is the same
// as password login case, and in ContinueMountWithCredentials(), the mount is
// actually mounted through system call.
// Check for guest mount case.
if (request.guest_mount()) {
MountGuest(std::move(on_done));
return;
}
user_data_auth::MountReply reply;
// At present, we only enforce non-empty email addresses.
// In the future, we may wish to canonicalize if we don't move
// to requiring a IdP-unique identifier.
const std::string& account_id = GetAccountId(request.account());
// Check for empty account ID
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No email supplied";
reply.set_error(
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
if (request.public_mount()) {
// Public mount have a set of passkey/password that is generated directly
// from the username (and a local system salt.)
std::string public_mount_passkey;
if (!GetPublicMountPassKey(account_id, &public_mount_passkey)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not get public mount passkey.";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
// Set the secret as the key for cryptohome authorization/creation.
request.mutable_authorization()->mutable_key()->set_secret(
public_mount_passkey);
if (request.has_create()) {
request.mutable_create()->mutable_keys(0)->set_secret(
public_mount_passkey);
}
}
// We do not allow empty password, except for challenge response type login.
if (request.authorization().key().secret().empty() &&
request.authorization().key().data().type() !=
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key secret supplied";
reply.set_error(
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
if (request.has_create()) {
// copy_authorization_key in CreateRequest means that we'll copy the
// authorization request's key and use it as if it's the key specified in
// CreateRequest.
if (request.create().copy_authorization_key()) {
Key* auth_key = request.mutable_create()->add_keys();
*auth_key = request.authorization().key();
}
// Validity check for |request.create.keys|.
int keys_size = request.create().keys_size();
if (keys_size == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CreateRequest supplied with no keys";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
} else if (keys_size > 1) {
LOG(ERROR) << "MountEx: unimplemented CreateRequest with multiple keys";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
} else {
const Key key = request.create().keys(0);
// TODO(wad) Ensure the labels are all unique.
if (!key.has_data() || key.data().label().empty() ||
(key.secret().empty() &&
key.data().type() != KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CreateRequest Keys are not fully specified";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
if (KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(key)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "KeyAuthorizationSecrets may not be wrapped";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
}
}
// Determine whether the mount should be ephemeral.
bool is_ephemeral = false;
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode mount_error =
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
if (!GetShouldMountAsEphemeral(account_id, request.require_ephemeral(),
request.has_create(), &is_ephemeral,
&mount_error)) {
reply.set_error(mount_error);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
// MountArgs is a set of parameters that we'll be passing around to
// ContinueMountWithCredentials() and DoChallengeResponseMount().
Mount::MountArgs mount_args;
mount_args.create_if_missing = request.has_create();
mount_args.is_ephemeral = is_ephemeral;
mount_args.create_as_ecryptfs =
force_ecryptfs_ ||
(request.has_create() && request.create().force_ecryptfs());
mount_args.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs = request.to_migrate_from_ecryptfs();
// Force_ecryptfs_ wins.
mount_args.force_dircrypto =
!force_ecryptfs_ && request.force_dircrypto_if_available();
mount_args.shadow_only = request.hidden_mount();
// Process challenge-response credentials asynchronously.
if (request.authorization().key().data().type() ==
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) {
DoChallengeResponseMount(request, mount_args, std::move(on_done));
return;
}
auto credentials = std::make_unique<Credentials>(
account_id, SecureBlob(request.authorization().key().secret()));
// Everything else can be the default.
credentials->set_key_data(request.authorization().key().data());
ContinueMountWithCredentials(request, std::move(credentials), mount_args,
std::move(on_done));
LOG(INFO) << "Finished mount request process";
}
bool UserDataAuth::InitForChallengeResponseAuth(
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode* error_code) {
if (challenge_credentials_helper_) {
// Already successfully initialized.
return true;
}
if (!tpm_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot do challenge-response authentication without TPM";
*error_code = user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
return false;
}
if (!tpm_init_->IsTpmReady()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "TPM must be initialized in order to do challenge-response "
"authentication";
*error_code = user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
return false;
}
// Fail if the TPM is known to be vulnerable and we're not in a test image.
const base::Optional<bool> is_srk_roca_vulnerable =
tpm_->IsSrkRocaVulnerable();
if (!is_srk_roca_vulnerable.has_value()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot do challenge-response mount: Failed to check for "
"ROCA vulnerability";
*error_code = user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
return false;
}
if (is_srk_roca_vulnerable.value()) {
if (!IsOsTestImage()) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "Cannot do challenge-response mount: TPM is ROCA vulnerable";
*error_code = user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_TPM_UPDATE_REQUIRED;
return false;
}
LOG(WARNING) << "TPM is ROCA vulnerable; ignoring this for "
"challenge-response mount due to running in test image";
}
if (!mount_thread_bus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot do challenge-response mount without system D-Bus bus";
*error_code = user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
return false;
}
// Lazily create the helper object that manages generation/decryption of
// credentials for challenge-protected vaults.
Blob delegate_blob, delegate_secret;
bool has_reset_lock_permissions = false;
// TPM Delegate is required for TPM1.2. For TPM2.0, this is a no-op.
if (!tpm_->GetDelegate(&delegate_blob, &delegate_secret,
&has_reset_lock_permissions)) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "Cannot do challenge-response authentication without TPM delegate";
*error_code = user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
return false;
}
default_challenge_credentials_helper_ =
std::make_unique<ChallengeCredentialsHelperImpl>(tpm_, delegate_blob,
delegate_secret);
challenge_credentials_helper_ = default_challenge_credentials_helper_.get();
return true;
}
void UserDataAuth::DoChallengeResponseMount(
const user_data_auth::MountRequest& request,
const Mount::MountArgs& mount_args,
base::OnceCallback<void(const user_data_auth::MountReply&)> on_done) {
DCHECK_EQ(request.authorization().key().data().type(),
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE);
// Setup a reply for use during error handling.
user_data_auth::MountReply reply;
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode error_code =
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
if (!InitForChallengeResponseAuth(&error_code)) {
reply.set_error(error_code);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
const std::string& account_id = GetAccountId(request.account());
const std::string obfuscated_username =
SanitizeUserNameWithSalt(account_id, system_salt_);
const KeyData key_data = request.authorization().key().data();
if (!request.authorization().has_key_delegate() ||
!request.authorization().key_delegate().has_dbus_service_name()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot do challenge-response mount without key delegate "
"information";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
// KeyChallengeService is tasked with contacting the challenge response D-Bus
// service that'll provide the response once we send the challenge.
std::unique_ptr<KeyChallengeService> key_challenge_service =
key_challenge_service_factory_->New(
mount_thread_bus_,
request.authorization().key_delegate().dbus_service_name());
if (!key_challenge_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create key challenge service";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username) &&
!mount_args.create_if_missing) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot do challenge-response mount. Account not found.";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vault_keyset(homedirs_->GetVaultKeyset(
obfuscated_username, request.authorization().key().data().label()));
const bool use_existing_credentials =
vault_keyset && !mount_args.is_ephemeral;
// If the home directory already exist (and thus the corresponding encrypted
// VaultKeyset exists) and the mount is not ephemeral, then we'll use the
// ChallengeCredentialsHelper (which handles challenge response
// authentication) to decrypt the VaultKeyset.
if (use_existing_credentials) {
// Home directory already exist and we are not doing ephemeral mount, so
// we'll decrypt existing VaultKeyset.
challenge_credentials_helper_->Decrypt(
account_id, key_data,
vault_keyset->serialized().signature_challenge_info(),
std::move(key_challenge_service),
base::BindOnce(
&UserDataAuth::OnChallengeResponseMountCredentialsObtained,
base::Unretained(this), request, mount_args, std::move(on_done)));
} else {
// We'll create a new VaultKeyset that accepts challenge response
// authentication.
if (!mount_args.create_if_missing) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No existing challenge-response vault keyset found";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
std::vector<std::map<uint32_t, brillo::Blob>> pcr_restrictions;
GetChallengeCredentialsPcrRestrictions(obfuscated_username,
&pcr_restrictions);
challenge_credentials_helper_->GenerateNew(
account_id, key_data, pcr_restrictions,
std::move(key_challenge_service),
base::BindOnce(
&UserDataAuth::OnChallengeResponseMountCredentialsObtained,
base::Unretained(this), request, mount_args, std::move(on_done)));
}
}
void UserDataAuth::OnChallengeResponseMountCredentialsObtained(
const user_data_auth::MountRequest& request,
const Mount::MountArgs mount_args,
base::OnceCallback<void(const user_data_auth::MountReply&)> on_done,
std::unique_ptr<Credentials> credentials) {
// If we get here, that means the ChallengeCredentialsHelper have finished the
// process of doing challenge response authentication, either successful or
// otherwise.
// Setup a reply for use during error handling.
user_data_auth::MountReply reply;
DCHECK_EQ(request.authorization().key().data().type(),
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE);
if (!credentials) {
// Challenge response authentication have failed.
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not mount due to failure to obtain challenge-response "
"credentials";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(credentials->key_data().type(),
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE);
ContinueMountWithCredentials(request, std::move(credentials), mount_args,
std::move(on_done));
}
void UserDataAuth::ContinueMountWithCredentials(
const user_data_auth::MountRequest& request,
std::unique_ptr<Credentials> credentials,
const Mount::MountArgs& mount_args,
base::OnceCallback<void(const user_data_auth::MountReply&)> on_done) {
if (!CleanUpHiddenMounts()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to clean up hidden mounts";
}
// Setup a reply for use during error handling.
user_data_auth::MountReply reply;
// This is safe even if cryptohomed restarts during a multi-mount
// session and a new mount is added because cleanup is not forced.
// An existing process will keep the mount alive. On the next
// Unmount() it'll be forcibly cleaned up. In the case that
// cryptohomed crashes and misses the Unmount call, the stale
// mountpoints should still be cleaned up on the next daemon
// interaction.
//
// As we introduce multiple mounts, we can consider API changes to
// make it clearer what the UI expectations are (AddMount, etc).
bool other_sessions_active = true;
if (sessions_.size() == 0) {
other_sessions_active = CleanUpStaleMounts(false);
// This could run on every interaction to catch any unused mounts.
}
// If the home directory for our user doesn't exist and we aren't instructed
// to create the home directory, and reply with the error.
if (!request.has_create() &&
!homedirs_->Exists(credentials->GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Account not found when mounting with credentials.";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account());
// Provide an authoritative filesystem-sanitized username.
reply.set_sanitized_username(
brillo::cryptohome::home::SanitizeUserName(account_id));
// While it would be cleaner to implement the privilege enforcement
// here, that can only be done if a label was supplied. If a wildcard
// was supplied, then we can only perform the enforcement after the
// matching key is identified.
//
// See Mount::MountCryptohome for privilege checking.
// Check if the guest user is mounted, if it is, we can't proceed.
scoped_refptr<UserSession> guest_session = GetUserSession(guest_user_);
bool guest_mounted =
guest_session.get() && guest_session->GetMount()->IsMounted();
// TODO(wad,ellyjones) Change this behavior to return failure even
// on a succesful unmount to tell chrome MOUNT_ERROR_NEEDS_RESTART.
if (guest_mounted && !guest_session->Unmount()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount cryptohome from Guest session";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<UserSession> user_session = GetOrCreateUserSession(account_id);
if (!user_session) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not initialize user session.";
reply.set_error(
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
if (request.hidden_mount() && user_session->GetMount()->IsMounted()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Hidden mount requested, but mount already exists.";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
// For public mount, don't proceed if there is any existing mount or stale
// mount. Exceptionally, it is normal and ok to have a failed previous mount
// attempt for the same user.
const bool only_self_unmounted_attempt =
sessions_.size() == 1 && !user_session->GetMount()->IsMounted();
if (request.public_mount() && other_sessions_active &&
!only_self_unmounted_attempt) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Public mount requested with other sessions active.";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
// Don't overlay an ephemeral mount over a file-backed one.
if (mount_args.is_ephemeral &&
user_session->GetMount()->IsNonEphemeralMounted()) {
// TODO(wad,ellyjones) Change this behavior to return failure even
// on a succesful unmount to tell chrome MOUNT_ERROR_NEEDS_RESTART.
if (!user_session->Unmount()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not unmount vault before an ephemeral mount.";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
}
if (mount_args.is_ephemeral && !mount_args.create_if_missing) {
LOG(ERROR) << "An ephemeral cryptohome can only be mounted when its "
"creation on-the-fly is allowed.";
reply.set_error(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
// If a user's home directory is already mounted, then we'll just recheck its
// credential with what's cached in memory. This is much faster than going to
// the TPM.
if (user_session->GetMount()->IsMounted()) {
// Attempt a short-circuited credential test.
if (user_session->VerifyCredentials(*credentials)) {
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(*credentials);
return;
}
// If the Mount has invalid credentials (repopulated from system state)
// this will ensure a user can still sign-in with the right ones.
// TODO(wad) Should we unmount on a failed re-mount attempt?
if (!user_session->VerifyCredentials(*credentials) &&
!homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(*credentials)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Credentials are invalid";
reply.set_error(
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED);
} else {
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(*credentials);
}
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
// Any non-guest mount attempt triggers InstallAttributes finalization.
// The return value is ignored as it is possible we're pre-ownership.
// The next login will assure finalization if possible.
if (install_attrs_->status() == InstallAttributes::Status::kFirstInstall) {
install_attrs_->Finalize();
}
// As per the other timers, this really only tracks time spent in
// MountCryptohome() not in the other areas prior.
ReportTimerStart(kMountExTimer);
// Remove all existing cryptohomes, except for the owner's one, if the
// ephemeral users policy is on.
// Note that a fresh policy value is read here, which in theory can conflict
// with the one used for calculation of |mount_args.is_ephemeral|. However,
// this inconsistency (whose probability is anyway pretty low in practice)
// should only lead to insignificant transient glitches, like an attempt to
// mount a non existing anymore cryptohome.
if (homedirs_->AreEphemeralUsersEnabled())
homedirs_->RemoveNonOwnerCryptohomes();
// Does actual mounting here.
MountError code = AttemptUserMount(*credentials, mount_args, user_session);
if (code == MOUNT_ERROR_TPM_COMM_ERROR) {
LOG(WARNING) << "TPM communication error. Retrying.";
code = AttemptUserMount(*credentials, mount_args, user_session);
}
// TODO(chromium:1140868, dlunev): extract the recreation behaviour to the
// higher layer and then return VAULT_UNRECOVERABLE directly.
if (code == MOUNT_ERROR_VAULT_UNRECOVERABLE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unrecoverable vault, removing.";
if (!homedirs_->Remove(credentials->username())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to remove unrecoverable vault.";
code = MOUNT_ERROR_REMOVE_INVALID_USER_FAILED;
} else {
code = AttemptUserMount(*credentials, mount_args, user_session);
if (code == MOUNT_ERROR_NONE) {
code = MOUNT_ERROR_RECREATED;
}
// Return VAULT_UNRECOVERABLE as FATAL for the higher level code doesn't
// know such an error.
if (code == MOUNT_ERROR_VAULT_UNRECOVERABLE) {
code = MOUNT_ERROR_FATAL;
}
}
}
// PKCS#11 always starts out uninitialized right after a fresh mount.
user_session->GetMount()->set_pkcs11_state(cryptohome::Mount::kUninitialized);
// Mark the timer as done.
ReportTimerStop(kMountExTimer);
if (code == MOUNT_ERROR_RECREATED) {
// MOUNT_ERROR_RECREATED is not actually an error, so we'll not reply with
// an error. Instead, we'll set the recreated flag to true.
reply.set_recreated(true);
} else if (code != MOUNT_ERROR_NONE) {
// Mount returned a non-OK status.
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to mount cryptohome, error = " << code;
reply.set_error(MountErrorToCryptohomeError(code));
ResetDictionaryAttackMitigation();
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
return;
}
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(*credentials);
std::move(on_done).Run(reply);
// Update user timestamp and kick off PKCS#11 initialization for non-hidden
// mount.
if (!request.hidden_mount()) {
// Time to push the task for PKCS#11 initialization.
// TODO(wad) This call will PostTask back to the same thread. It is safe,
// but it seems pointless.
InitializePkcs11(user_session.get());
}
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::AddKey(
const user_data_auth::AddKeyRequest request) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_account_id() || !request.has_authorization_request()) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "AddKeyRequest must have account_id and authorization_request.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "AddKeyRequest must have vaid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
// Note that there's no check for empty AuthorizationRequest key label because
// such a key will test against all VaultKeysets of a compatible
// key().data().type(), and thus is valid.
if (request.authorization_request().key().secret().empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key secret in AddKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (request.key().secret().empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No new key in AddKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (request.key().data().label().empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No new key label in AddKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
// Ensure any new keys do not contain a wrapped authorization key.
if (KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(request.key())) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "KeyAuthorizationSecrets may not be wrapped in AddKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
const std::string& auth_key_secret =
request.authorization_request().key().secret();
Credentials credentials(account_id, SecureBlob(auth_key_secret));
credentials.set_key_data(request.authorization_request().key().data());
if (!homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
}
// An integer for AddKeyset to write the resulting index. This is discarded in
// the end.
int unused_keyset_index;
const std::string& new_key_secret = request.key().secret();
SecureBlob new_secret(new_key_secret);
CryptohomeErrorCode result;
result =
homedirs_->AddKeyset(credentials, new_secret, &request.key().data(),
request.clobber_if_exists(), &unused_keyset_index);
// Note that cryptohome::CryptohomeErrorCode and
// user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode are same in content, and it'll remain
// so until the end of the refactor, so we can safely cast from one to
// another. This is enforced in our unit test.
return static_cast<user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode>(result);
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::AddDataRestoreKey(
const user_data_auth::AddDataRestoreKeyRequest request,
brillo::SecureBlob* key_out) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_account_id() || !request.has_authorization_request()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "AddDataRestoreKeyRequest must have account_id and "
"authorization_request.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "AddDataRestoreKeyRequest must have valid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!request.authorization_request().has_key() ||
!request.authorization_request().key().has_secret()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key secret in AddDataRestoreKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
// Generate the data restore key and its associated data.
const auto data_restore_key =
CryptoLib::CreateSecureRandomBlob(kDefaultDataRestoreKeyLength);
KeyData new_key_data;
new_key_data.set_label(kDataRestoreKeyLabel);
const std::string& auth_key_secret =
request.authorization_request().key().secret();
Credentials credentials(account_id, SecureBlob(auth_key_secret));
credentials.set_key_data(request.authorization_request().key().data());
if (!homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
}
// An integer for AddKeyset to write the resulting index. This is discarded in
// the end.
int unused_keyset_index;
CryptohomeErrorCode result;
result = homedirs_->AddKeyset(credentials, data_restore_key, &new_key_data,
true, &unused_keyset_index);
// We need to respond with the data restore key if the operation is
// successful.
if (result == CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET) {
*key_out = data_restore_key;
}
// Note that cryptohome::CryptohomeErrorCode and
// user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode are same in content, and it'll remain
// so until the end of the refactor, so we can safely cast from one to
// another. This is enforced in our unit test.
return static_cast<user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode>(result);
}
void UserDataAuth::CheckKey(
const user_data_auth::CheckKeyRequest& request,
base::OnceCallback<void(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode)> on_done) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_account_id() || !request.has_authorization_request()) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "CheckKeyRequest must have account_id and authorization_request.";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CheckKeyRequest must have valid account_id.";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return;
}
// Process challenge-response credentials asynchronously.
if (request.authorization_request().key().data().type() ==
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) {
DoChallengeResponseCheckKey(request, std::move(on_done));
return;
}
// Process fingerprint credentials asynchronously.
if (request.authorization_request().key().data().type() ==
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_FINGERPRINT) {
if (!fingerprint_manager_) {
// Fingerprint manager failed to initialize, or the device may not
// support fingerprint auth at all.
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_FINGERPRINT_ERROR_INTERNAL);
return;
}
if (!fingerprint_manager_->HasAuthSessionForUser(
SanitizeUserNameWithSalt(account_id, system_salt_))) {
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_FINGERPRINT_DENIED);
return;
}
fingerprint_manager_->SetAuthScanDoneCallback(
base::Bind(&UserDataAuth::CompleteFingerprintCheckKey,
base::Unretained(this), base::Passed(std::move(on_done))));
return;
}
// Note that there's no check for empty AuthorizationRequest key label because
// such a key will test against all VaultKeysets of a compatible
// key().data().type(), and thus is valid.
const std::string& auth_secret =
request.authorization_request().key().secret();
if (auth_secret.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key secret in CheckKeyRequest.";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return;
}
Credentials credentials(account_id, SecureBlob(auth_secret));
credentials.set_key_data(request.authorization_request().key().data());
const std::string obfuscated_username =
credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_);
bool found_valid_credentials = false;
for (const auto& session_pair : sessions_) {
if (session_pair.second->VerifyCredentials(credentials)) {
found_valid_credentials = true;
break;
}
}
if (found_valid_credentials) {
// Entered the right creds, so reset LE credentials.
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(credentials);
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET);
return;
}
// Cover different keys for the same user with homedirs.
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username)) {
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
return;
}
if (!homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(credentials)) {
// TODO(wad) Should this pass along KEY_NOT_FOUND too?
std::move(on_done).Run(
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED);
ResetDictionaryAttackMitigation();
return;
}
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(credentials);
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET);
return;
}
void UserDataAuth::CompleteFingerprintCheckKey(
base::OnceCallback<void(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode)> on_done,
FingerprintScanStatus status) {
if (status == FingerprintScanStatus::FAILED_RETRY_ALLOWED) {
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_FINGERPRINT_RETRY_REQUIRED);
return;
} else if (status == FingerprintScanStatus::FAILED_RETRY_NOT_ALLOWED) {
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode::
CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_FINGERPRINT_DENIED);
return;
}
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET);
}
void UserDataAuth::DoChallengeResponseCheckKey(
const user_data_auth::CheckKeyRequest& request,
base::OnceCallback<void(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode)> on_done) {
AssertOnMountThread();
const auto& authorization = request.authorization_request();
DCHECK_EQ(authorization.key().data().type(),
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE);
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode error_code =
user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
if (!InitForChallengeResponseAuth(&error_code)) {
std::move(on_done).Run(error_code);
return;
}
if (!authorization.has_key_delegate() ||
!authorization.key_delegate().has_dbus_service_name()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot do challenge-response authentication without key "
"delegate information";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
return;
}
if (!authorization.key().data().challenge_response_key_size()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Missing challenge-response key information";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
return;
}
if (authorization.key().data().challenge_response_key_size() > 1) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "Using multiple challenge-response keys at once is unsupported";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
return;
}
// Begin from attempting a lightweight check that doesn't use the vault keyset
// or heavy TPM operations, and therefore is faster than the full check and
// also works in case the mount is ephemeral.
TryLightweightChallengeResponseCheckKey(request, std::move(on_done));
}
void UserDataAuth::TryLightweightChallengeResponseCheckKey(
const user_data_auth::CheckKeyRequest& request,
base::OnceCallback<void(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode)> on_done) {
AssertOnMountThread();
const auto& authorization = request.authorization_request();
const auto& identifier = request.account_id();
DCHECK_EQ(authorization.key().data().type(),
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE);
DCHECK(challenge_credentials_helper_);
const std::string& account_id = GetAccountId(identifier);
const std::string obfuscated_username =
SanitizeUserNameWithSalt(account_id, system_salt_);
base::Optional<KeyData> found_session_key_data;
for (const auto& session_pair : sessions_) {
const scoped_refptr<UserSession>& session = session_pair.second;
if (session->VerifyUser(obfuscated_username) &&
KeyMatchesForLightweightChallengeResponseCheck(
authorization.key().data(), *session)) {
found_session_key_data = session->key_data();
break;
}
}
if (!found_session_key_data) {
// No matching user session found, so fall back to the full check.
OnLightweightChallengeResponseCheckKeyDone(request, std::move(on_done),
/*success=*/false);
return;
}
// KeyChallengeService is tasked with contacting the challenge response D-Bus
// service that'll provide the response once we send the challenge.
std::unique_ptr<KeyChallengeService> key_challenge_service =
key_challenge_service_factory_->New(
mount_thread_bus_, authorization.key_delegate().dbus_service_name());
if (!key_challenge_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create key challenge service";
OnLightweightChallengeResponseCheckKeyDone(request, std::move(on_done),
/*success=*/false);
return;
}
// Attempt the lightweight check against the found user session.
challenge_credentials_helper_->VerifyKey(
account_id, *found_session_key_data, std::move(key_challenge_service),
base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::OnLightweightChallengeResponseCheckKeyDone,
base::Unretained(this), request, std::move(on_done)));
}
void UserDataAuth::OnLightweightChallengeResponseCheckKeyDone(
const user_data_auth::CheckKeyRequest& request,
base::OnceCallback<void(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode)> on_done,
bool is_key_valid) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!is_key_valid) {
DoFullChallengeResponseCheckKey(request, std::move(on_done));
return;
}
// Note that the LE credentials are not reset here, since we don't have the
// full credentials after the lightweight check.
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET);
}
void UserDataAuth::DoFullChallengeResponseCheckKey(
const user_data_auth::CheckKeyRequest& request,
base::OnceCallback<void(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode)> on_done) {
AssertOnMountThread();
const auto& authorization = request.authorization_request();
const auto& identifier = request.account_id();
DCHECK_EQ(authorization.key().data().type(),
KeyData::KEY_TYPE_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE);
DCHECK(challenge_credentials_helper_);
const std::string& account_id = GetAccountId(identifier);
const std::string obfuscated_username =
SanitizeUserNameWithSalt(account_id, system_salt_);
// KeyChallengeService is tasked with contacting the challenge response D-Bus
// service that'll provide the response once we send the challenge.
std::unique_ptr<KeyChallengeService> key_challenge_service =
key_challenge_service_factory_->New(
mount_thread_bus_, authorization.key_delegate().dbus_service_name());
if (!key_challenge_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create key challenge service";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
return;
}
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username)) {
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND);
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vault_keyset(homedirs_->GetVaultKeyset(
obfuscated_username, authorization.key().data().label()));
if (!vault_keyset) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No existing challenge-response vault keyset found";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
return;
}
challenge_credentials_helper_->Decrypt(
account_id, authorization.key().data(),
vault_keyset->serialized().signature_challenge_info(),
std::move(key_challenge_service),
base::BindOnce(&UserDataAuth::OnFullChallengeResponseCheckKeyDone,
base::Unretained(this), std::move(on_done)));
}
void UserDataAuth::OnFullChallengeResponseCheckKeyDone(
base::OnceCallback<void(user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode)> on_done,
std::unique_ptr<Credentials> credentials) {
if (!credentials) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Key checking failed due to failure to obtain "
"challenge-response credentials";
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL);
return;
}
// Entered the right creds, so reset LE credentials.
homedirs_->ResetLECredentials(*credentials);
std::move(on_done).Run(user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET);
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::RemoveKey(
const user_data_auth::RemoveKeyRequest request) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_account_id() || !request.has_authorization_request()) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "RemoveKeyRequest must have account_id and authorization_request.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RemoveKeyRequest must have vaid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
// Note that there's no check for empty AuthorizationRequest key label because
// such a key will test against all VaultKeysets of a compatible
// key().data().type(), and thus is valid.
const std::string& auth_secret =
request.authorization_request().key().secret();
if (auth_secret.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key secret in RemoveKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (request.key().data().label().empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No new key label in RemoveKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
Credentials credentials(account_id, SecureBlob(auth_secret));
credentials.set_key_data(request.authorization_request().key().data());
if (!homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
}
CryptohomeErrorCode result;
result = homedirs_->RemoveKeyset(credentials, request.key().data());
// Note that cryptohome::CryptohomeErrorCode and
// user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode are same in content, and it'll remain
// so until the end of the refactor, so we can safely cast from one to
// another.
return static_cast<user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode>(result);
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::MassRemoveKeys(
const user_data_auth::MassRemoveKeysRequest request) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_account_id() || !request.has_authorization_request()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "MassRemoveKeysRequest must have account_id and "
"authorization_request.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "MassRemoveKeysRequest must have vaid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
// Note that there's no check for empty AuthorizationRequest key label because
// such a key will test against all VaultKeysets of a compatible
// key().data().type(), and thus is valid.
const std::string& auth_secret =
request.authorization_request().key().secret();
if (auth_secret.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key secret in MassRemoveKeysRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
Credentials credentials(account_id, SecureBlob(auth_secret));
credentials.set_key_data(request.authorization_request().key().data());
const std::string obfuscated_username =
credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_);
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (!homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(credentials)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED;
}
// get all labels under the username
std::vector<std::string> labels;
if (!homedirs_->GetVaultKeysetLabels(obfuscated_username, &labels)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
}
// get all exempt labels from |request|
std::unordered_set<std::string> exempt_labels;
for (int i = 0; i < request.exempt_key_data_size(); i++) {
exempt_labels.insert(request.exempt_key_data(i).label());
}
for (std::string label : labels) {
if (exempt_labels.find(label) == exempt_labels.end()) {
// non-exempt label, should be removed
std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> remove_vk(
homedirs_->GetVaultKeyset(obfuscated_username, label));
if (!homedirs_->ForceRemoveKeyset(obfuscated_username,
remove_vk->legacy_index())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "MassRemoveKeys: failed to remove keyset " << label;
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE;
}
}
}
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::ListKeys(
const user_data_auth::ListKeysRequest& request,
std::vector<std::string>* labels_out) {
AssertOnMountThread();
DCHECK(labels_out);
if (!request.has_account_id()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ListKeysRequest must have account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
const std::string& account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ListKeysRequest must have valid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
const std::string obfuscated_username =
SanitizeUserNameWithSalt(account_id, system_salt_);
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (!homedirs_->GetVaultKeysetLabels(obfuscated_username, labels_out)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
}
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::GetKeyData(
const user_data_auth::GetKeyDataRequest& request,
cryptohome::KeyData* data_out,
bool* found) {
if (!request.has_account_id()) {
// Note that authorization request is currently not required.
LOG(ERROR) << "GetKeyDataRequest must have account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GetKeyDataRequest must have vaid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!request.has_key()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key attributes provided in GetKeyDataRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
const std::string obfuscated_username =
SanitizeUserNameWithSalt(account_id, system_salt_);
if (!homedirs_->Exists(obfuscated_username)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
}
// Requests only support using the key label at present.
std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk(homedirs_->GetVaultKeyset(
obfuscated_username, request.key().data().label()));
if (vk) {
*data_out = vk->serialized().key_data();
// Clear any symmetric KeyAuthorizationSecrets even if they are wrapped.
for (int a = 0; a < data_out->authorization_data_size(); ++a) {
KeyAuthorizationData* auth_data = data_out->mutable_authorization_data(a);
for (int s = 0; s < auth_data->secrets_size(); ++s) {
auth_data->mutable_secrets(s)->clear_symmetric_key();
auth_data->mutable_secrets(s)->set_wrapped(false);
}
}
*found = true;
} else {
// No error is thrown if there is no match.
*found = false;
}
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::UpdateKey(
const user_data_auth::UpdateKeyRequest& request) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_account_id() || !request.has_authorization_request()) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "UpdateKeyRequest must have account_id and authorization_request.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdateKeyRequest must have vaid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
// Note that there's no check for empty AuthorizationRequest key label because
// such a key will test against all VaultKeysets of a compatible
// key().data().type(), and thus is valid.
auto& auth_key = request.authorization_request().key();
const std::string& auth_secret = auth_key.secret();
if (auth_secret.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key secret in UpdateKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
// Any undefined field in changes() will be left as it is.
if (!request.has_changes()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No updates requested in UpdateKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (KeyHasWrappedAuthorizationSecrets(request.changes())) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "KeyAuthorizationSecrets may not be wrapped in UpdateKeyRequest.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
Credentials credentials(account_id, SecureBlob(auth_secret));
credentials.set_key_data(auth_key.data());
if (!homedirs_->Exists(credentials.GetObfuscatedUsername(system_salt_))) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND;
}
cryptohome::CryptohomeErrorCode result = homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(
credentials, &request.changes(), request.authorization_signature());
// Note that cryptohome::CryptohomeErrorCode and
// user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode are same in content, and it'll remain
// so until the end of the refactor, so we can safely cast from one to
// another.
return static_cast<user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode>(result);
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::MigrateKey(
const user_data_auth::MigrateKeyRequest& request) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_account_id() || !request.has_authorization_request()) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "MigrateKeyRequest must have account_id and authorization_request.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.account_id());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "MigrateKeyRequest must have valid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
Credentials credentials(account_id, SecureBlob(request.secret()));
int key_index = -1;
if (!homedirs_->Migrate(
credentials,
SecureBlob(request.authorization_request().key().secret()),
&key_index)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MIGRATE_KEY_FAILED;
}
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session = GetUserSession(account_id);
if (session.get()) {
if (!session->SetCredentials(credentials, key_index)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to set new creds";
}
}
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::Remove(
const user_data_auth::RemoveRequest& request) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_identifier()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RemoveRequest must have identifier.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string account_id = GetAccountId(request.identifier());
if (account_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RemoveRequest must have valid account_id.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!homedirs_->Remove(request.identifier().account_id())) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_REMOVE_FAILED;
}
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
}
user_data_auth::CryptohomeErrorCode UserDataAuth::Rename(
const user_data_auth::RenameRequest& request) {
AssertOnMountThread();
if (!request.has_id_from() || !request.has_id_to()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenameRequest must have id_from and id_to.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
std::string username_from = GetAccountId(request.id_from());
std::string username_to = GetAccountId(request.id_to());
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session = GetUserSession(username_from);
const bool is_mounted = session.get() && session->GetMount()->IsMounted();
if (is_mounted) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenameCryptohome('" << username_from << "','" << username_to
<< "'): Unable to rename mounted cryptohome.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY;
} else if (!homedirs_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenameCryptohome('" << username_from << "','" << username_to
<< "'): Homedirs not initialized.";
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_MOUNT_POINT_BUSY;
} else if (!homedirs_->Rename(username_from, username_to)) {
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_MOUNT_FATAL;
}
return user_data_auth::CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET;
}
void UserDataAuth::StartMigrateToDircrypto(
const user_data_auth::StartMigrateToDircryptoRequest& request,
base::Callback<void(const user_data_auth::DircryptoMigrationProgress&)>
progress_callback) {
AssertOnMountThread();
MigrationType migration_type = request.minimal_migration()
? MigrationType::MINIMAL
: MigrationType::FULL;
// Note that total_bytes and current_bytes field in |progress| is discarded by
// client whenever |progress.status| is not DIRCRYPTO_MIGRATION_IN_PROGRESS,
// this is why they are left with the default value of 0 here. Please see
// MigrationHelper::ProgressCallback for more details.
user_data_auth::DircryptoMigrationProgress progress;
scoped_refptr<UserSession> session =
GetUserSession(GetAccountId(request.account_id()));
if (!session.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "StartMigrateToDircrypto: Failed to get session.";
progress.set_status(user_data_auth::DIRCRYPTO_MIGRATION_FAILED);
progress_callback.Run(progress);
return;