cryptohome/homedirs_keyset_management_unittest.cc

// Copyright 2020 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "cryptohome/homedirs.h"

#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <vector>

#include <base/files/file_path.h>
#include <base/strings/string_number_conversions.h>
#include <base/strings/stringprintf.h>
#include <brillo/cryptohome.h>
#include <brillo/data_encoding.h>
#include <brillo/secure_blob.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>

#include "cryptohome/credentials.h"
#include "cryptohome/crypto.h"
#include "cryptohome/cryptolib.h"
#include "cryptohome/filesystem_layout.h"
#include "cryptohome/mock_le_credential_manager.h"
#include "cryptohome/mock_platform.h"
#include "cryptohome/mock_tpm.h"
#include "cryptohome/mock_tpm_init.h"
#include "cryptohome/mock_vault_keyset.h"
#include "cryptohome/mock_vault_keyset_factory.h"
#include "cryptohome/signed_secret.pb.h"
#include "cryptohome/vault_keyset.h"

using ::testing::_;
using ::testing::ContainerEq;
using ::testing::ElementsAre;
using ::testing::EndsWith;
using ::testing::MatchesRegex;
using ::testing::NiceMock;
using ::testing::Return;
using ::testing::ReturnRef;
using ::testing::StrEq;
using ::testing::UnorderedElementsAre;

namespace cryptohome {

namespace {

struct UserPassword {
  const char* name;
  const char* password;
};

constexpr char kUser0[] = "First User";
constexpr char kUserPassword0[] = "user0_pass";

constexpr char kPasswordLabel[] = "password";
constexpr char kAltPasswordLabel[] = "alt_password";

constexpr int kInitialKeysetIndex = 0;

void GetKeysetBlob(const SerializedVaultKeyset& serialized,
                   brillo::SecureBlob* blob) {
  brillo::SecureBlob local_wrapped_keyset(serialized.wrapped_keyset().length());
  serialized.wrapped_keyset().copy(local_wrapped_keyset.char_data(),
                                   serialized.wrapped_keyset().length(), 0);
  blob->swap(local_wrapped_keyset);
}

}  // namespace

class KeysetManagementTest : public ::testing::Test {
 public:
  KeysetManagementTest() : crypto_(&platform_), shadow_root_(kShadowRoot) {}
  ~KeysetManagementTest() override {}

  // Not copyable or movable
  KeysetManagementTest(const KeysetManagementTest&) = delete;
  KeysetManagementTest& operator=(const KeysetManagementTest&) = delete;
  KeysetManagementTest(KeysetManagementTest&&) = delete;
  KeysetManagementTest& operator=(KeysetManagementTest&&) = delete;

  void SetUp() override {
    crypto_.set_tpm(&tpm_);
    crypto_.set_use_tpm(false);

    InitializeFilesystemLayout(&platform_, &crypto_, shadow_root_,
                               &system_salt_);
    homedirs_ = std::make_unique<HomeDirs>(
        &platform_, &crypto_, shadow_root_, system_salt_, nullptr,
        std::make_unique<policy::PolicyProvider>(),
        std::make_unique<VaultKeysetFactory>());
    mock_vault_keyset_factory_ = new MockVaultKeysetFactory();
    homedirs_mock_vk_ = std::make_unique<HomeDirs>(
        &platform_, &crypto_, shadow_root_, system_salt_, nullptr,
        std::make_unique<policy::PolicyProvider>(),
        std::unique_ptr<VaultKeysetFactory>(mock_vault_keyset_factory_));

    platform_.GetFake()->SetSystemSaltForLibbrillo(system_salt_);

    AddUser(kUser0, kUserPassword0);

    PrepareDirectoryStructure();
  }

  void TearDown() override {
    platform_.GetFake()->RemoveSystemSaltForLibbrillo();
  }

 protected:
  NiceMock<MockPlatform> platform_;
  NiceMock<MockTpm> tpm_;
  Crypto crypto_;
  base::FilePath shadow_root_;
  brillo::SecureBlob system_salt_;
  std::unique_ptr<HomeDirs> homedirs_;
  MockVaultKeysetFactory* mock_vault_keyset_factory_;
  std::unique_ptr<HomeDirs> homedirs_mock_vk_;

  struct UserInfo {
    std::string name;
    std::string obfuscated;
    brillo::SecureBlob passkey;
    Credentials credentials;
    base::FilePath homedir_path;
    base::FilePath user_path;
  };

  // SETUPers

  // Information about users' homedirs. The order of users is equal to kUsers.
  std::vector<UserInfo> users_;

  void AddUser(const char* name, const char* password) {
    std::string obfuscated =
        brillo::cryptohome::home::SanitizeUserNameWithSalt(name, system_salt_);
    brillo::SecureBlob passkey;
    cryptohome::Crypto::PasswordToPasskey(password, system_salt_, &passkey);
    Credentials credentials(name, passkey);

    UserInfo info = {name,
                     obfuscated,
                     passkey,
                     credentials,
                     homedirs_->shadow_root().Append(obfuscated),
                     brillo::cryptohome::home::GetHashedUserPath(obfuscated)};
    users_.push_back(info);
  }

  void PrepareDirectoryStructure() {
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_.CreateDirectory(homedirs_->shadow_root()));
    ASSERT_TRUE(platform_.CreateDirectory(
        brillo::cryptohome::home::GetUserPathPrefix()));
    // We only need the homedir path, not the vault/mount paths.
    for (const auto& user : users_) {
      ASSERT_TRUE(platform_.CreateDirectory(user.homedir_path));
    }
  }

  KeyData DefaultKeyData() {
    KeyData key_data;
    key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
    return key_data;
  }

  KeyData SignedKeyData(const std::string& cipher_key,
                        const std::string& signing_key,
                        int revision) {
    KeyData key_data;
    key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
    key_data.set_revision(revision);
    key_data.mutable_privileges()->set_update(false);
    key_data.mutable_privileges()->set_authorized_update(true);
    KeyAuthorizationData* auth_data = key_data.add_authorization_data();
    // Allow the default override on the revision.
    auth_data->set_type(
        KeyAuthorizationData::KEY_AUTHORIZATION_TYPE_HMACSHA256);

    // Add cipher.
    if (!cipher_key.empty()) {
      KeyAuthorizationSecret* auth_secret = auth_data->add_secrets();
      auth_secret->mutable_usage()->set_encrypt(true);
      auth_secret->set_symmetric_key(cipher_key);
    }
    // Add signing.
    KeyAuthorizationSecret* auth_secret = auth_data->add_secrets();
    auth_secret->mutable_usage()->set_sign(true);
    auth_secret->set_symmetric_key(signing_key);

    return key_data;
  }

  Credentials CredsForUpdate(const brillo::SecureBlob& passkey) {
    Credentials credentials(users_[0].name, passkey);
    KeyData key_data;
    key_data.set_label(kAltPasswordLabel);
    credentials.set_key_data(key_data);
    return credentials;
  }

  Key KeyForUpdate(const Credentials& creds, int revision) {
    Key key;
    std::string secret_str;
    secret_str.resize(creds.passkey().size());
    secret_str.assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(creds.passkey().data()),
                      creds.passkey().size());
    key.set_secret(secret_str);
    key.mutable_data()->set_label(creds.key_data().label());
    key.mutable_data()->set_revision(revision);

    return key;
  }

  std::string SignatureForUpdate(const Key& key,
                                 const std::string& signing_key) {
    std::string changes_str;
    ac::chrome::managedaccounts::account::Secret secret;
    secret.set_revision(key.data().revision());
    secret.set_secret(key.secret());
    secret.SerializeToString(&changes_str);

    brillo::SecureBlob hmac_key(signing_key);
    brillo::SecureBlob hmac_data(changes_str.begin(), changes_str.end());
    brillo::SecureBlob hmac = CryptoLib::HmacSha256(hmac_key, hmac_data);

    return hmac.to_string();
  }

  void KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(const KeyData& key_data) {
    for (auto& user : users_) {
      VaultKeyset vk;
      vk.Initialize(&platform_, &crypto_);
      vk.CreateRandom();
      *vk.mutable_serialized()->mutable_key_data() = key_data;
      user.credentials.set_key_data(key_data);
      ASSERT_TRUE(vk.Encrypt(user.passkey, user.obfuscated));
      ASSERT_TRUE(
          vk.Save(user.homedir_path.Append(kKeyFile).AddExtension("0")));
    }
  }

  void KeysetSetUpWithoutKeyData() {
    for (auto& user : users_) {
      VaultKeyset vk;
      vk.Initialize(&platform_, &crypto_);
      vk.CreateRandom();
      ASSERT_TRUE(vk.Encrypt(user.passkey, user.obfuscated));
      ASSERT_TRUE(
          vk.Save(user.homedir_path.Append(kKeyFile).AddExtension("0")));
    }
  }

  // TESTers

  void VerifyKeysetIndicies(const std::vector<int>& expected) {
    std::vector<int> indicies;
    ASSERT_TRUE(homedirs_->GetVaultKeysets(users_[0].obfuscated, &indicies));
    EXPECT_THAT(indicies, ContainerEq(expected));
  }

  void VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(const Credentials& creds) {
    std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk =
        homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(creds, /* error */ nullptr);
    ASSERT_EQ(vk.get(), nullptr);
  }

  void VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(const Credentials& creds,
                                           int index) {
    std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk =
        homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(creds, /* error */ nullptr);
    ASSERT_NE(vk.get(), nullptr);
    EXPECT_EQ(vk->legacy_index(), index);
    EXPECT_TRUE(vk->serialized().has_wrapped_chaps_key());
    EXPECT_TRUE(vk->serialized().has_wrapped_reset_seed());
  }

  void VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndexAndRevision(const Credentials& creds,
                                                      int index,
                                                      int revision) {
    std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk =
        homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(creds, /* error */ nullptr);
    ASSERT_NE(vk.get(), nullptr);
    EXPECT_EQ(vk->legacy_index(), index);
    EXPECT_EQ(vk->serialized().key_data().revision(), revision);
    EXPECT_TRUE(vk->serialized().has_wrapped_chaps_key());
    EXPECT_TRUE(vk->serialized().has_wrapped_reset_seed());
  }
};

TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AreCredentialsValid) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithoutKeyData();
  Credentials wrong_credentials(users_[0].name, brillo::SecureBlob("wrong"));

  // TEST
  ASSERT_TRUE(homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(users_[0].credentials));
  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->AreCredentialsValid(wrong_credentials));
}

// Successfully adds initial keyset
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddInitialKeyset) {
  // SETUP

  users_[0].credentials.set_key_data(DefaultKeyData());

  // TEST

  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->AddInitialKeyset(users_[0].credentials));

  // VERIFY
  // Initial keyset is added, readable, has "new-er" fields correctly
  // populated and the initial index is "0".

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Successfully adds new keyset
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetSuccess) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, nullptr,
                                 false, &index));
  EXPECT_NE(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // After we add an additional keyset, we can list and read both of them.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex, index});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(new_credentials, index);
}

// Overrides existing keyset on label collision when "clobber" flag is present.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetClobberSuccess) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);
  // Re-use key data from existing credentials to cause label collision.
  KeyData key_data = users_[0].credentials.key_data();
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, &key_data,
                                 true, &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, 0);

  // VERIFY
  // When adding new keyset with an "existing" label and the clobber is on, we
  // expect it to override the keyset with the same label. Thus we shall have
  // a keyset readable with new_credentials under the index of the old keyset.
  // The old keyset shall be removed.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(users_[0].credentials);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(new_credentials, kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Return error on label collision when no "clobber".
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetNoClobber) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);
  // Re-use key data from existing credentials to cause label collision.
  KeyData key_data = users_[0].credentials.key_data();
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_LABEL_EXISTS,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, &key_data,
                                 false, &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // Label collision without "clobber" causes an addition error. Old keyset
  // shall still be readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not
  // exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to add new keyset due to invalid label.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetNonExistentLabel) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  Credentials not_existing_label_credentials = users_[0].credentials;
  KeyData key_data = users_[0].credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label("i do not exist");
  not_existing_label_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  ASSERT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(not_existing_label_credentials, new_passkey,
                                 nullptr, false, &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // Invalid label causes an addition error. Old keyset shall still be
  // readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not  exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to add new keyset due to invalid credentials.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetInvalidCreds) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  brillo::SecureBlob wrong_passkey("wrong");
  Credentials wrong_credentials(users_[0].name, wrong_passkey);

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  ASSERT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(wrong_credentials, new_passkey, nullptr, false,
                                 &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // Invalid credentials cause an addition error. Old keyset shall still be
  // readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not  exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to add new keyset due to lacking privilieges.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetInvalidPrivileges) {
  // SETUP

  KeyData vk_key_data;
  vk_key_data.mutable_privileges()->set_add(false);

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(vk_key_data);

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  ASSERT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, nullptr,
                                 false, &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // Invalid permissions cause an addition error. Old keyset shall still be
  // readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not  exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to add new keyset due to index pool exhaustion.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetNoFreeIndices) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  // Use mock not to literally create a hundread files.
  EXPECT_CALL(platform_, OpenFile(Property(&base::FilePath::value,
                                           MatchesRegex(".*/master\\..*$")),
                                  StrEq("wx")))
      .WillRepeatedly(Return(nullptr));

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_QUOTA_EXCEEDED,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, nullptr,
                                 false, &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // Nothing should change if we were not able to add keyset due to a lack of
  // free slots. Since we mocked the "slot" check, we should still have only
  // initial keyset index, adn the keyset is readable with the old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to add new keyset due to failed encryption.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetEncryptFail) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithoutKeyData();

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  // Mock vk to inject encryption failure
  auto mock_vk = new NiceMock<MockVaultKeyset>();
  mock_vk->mutable_serialized()->set_wrapped_reset_seed("reset_seed");
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vault_keyset_factory_, New(_, _)).WillOnce(Return(mock_vk));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Load(_)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Decrypt(_, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Encrypt(new_passkey, _)).WillOnce(Return(false));

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  ASSERT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE,
            homedirs_mock_vk_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey,
                                         nullptr, false, &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // If we failed to save the added keyset due to encryption failure, the old
  // keyset should still exist and be readable with the old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to add new keyset due to failed disk write.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, AddKeysetSaveFail) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithoutKeyData();

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  // Mock vk to inject save failure.
  auto mock_vk = new NiceMock<MockVaultKeyset>();
  mock_vk->mutable_serialized()->set_wrapped_reset_seed("reset_seed");
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vault_keyset_factory_, New(_, _)).WillOnce(Return(mock_vk));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Load(_)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Decrypt(_, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Encrypt(new_passkey, _)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Save(_)).WillOnce(Return(false));

  // TEST

  int index = -1;
  ASSERT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE,
            homedirs_mock_vk_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey,
                                         nullptr, false, &index));
  EXPECT_EQ(index, -1);

  // VERIFY
  // If we failed to save the added keyset due to disk failure, the old
  // keyset should still exist and be readable with the old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Successfully updates the keyset.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetSuccess) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                                    /*signature=*/std::string()));

  // VERIFY
  // The keyset update doesn't require signature, thus successfully can be
  // updated without providing one. The keyset now available with the new
  // credentials only.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(users_[0].credentials);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(new_credentials, kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Fail to update keyset due to failed encryption.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetEncryptFail) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithoutKeyData();

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // Mock vk to inject encryption failure
  auto mock_vk = new NiceMock<MockVaultKeyset>();
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vault_keyset_factory_, New(_, _)).WillOnce(Return(mock_vk));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Load(_)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Decrypt(_, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Encrypt(new_passkey, _)).WillOnce(Return(false));

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE,
            homedirs_mock_vk_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                                            /*signature=*/std::string()));

  // VERIFY
  // Failed encrypting updated keyset. Old keyset shall still be
  // readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not  exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to update keyset due to failed disk write
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetSaveFail) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithoutKeyData();

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // Mock vk to inject encryption failure
  auto mock_vk = new NiceMock<MockVaultKeyset>();
  base::FilePath source_path("doesn't matter");
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vault_keyset_factory_, New(_, _)).WillOnce(Return(mock_vk));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Load(_)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Decrypt(_, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Encrypt(new_passkey, _)).WillOnce(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, source_file()).WillOnce(ReturnRef(source_path));
  EXPECT_CALL(*mock_vk, Save(_)).WillOnce(Return(false));

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_BACKING_STORE_FAILURE,
            homedirs_mock_vk_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                                            /*signature=*/std::string()));

  // VERIFY
  // Failed saving updated keyset. Old keyset shall still be
  // readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not  exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to update keyset due to lacking privilieges.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetInvalidPrivileges) {
  // SETUP

  KeyData vk_key_data;
  vk_key_data.mutable_privileges()->set_update(false);
  vk_key_data.mutable_privileges()->set_authorized_update(false);

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(vk_key_data);

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED,
            homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                                    /*signature=*/std::string()));

  // VERIFY
  // Invalid permissions cause an update error. Old keyset shall still be
  // readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not  exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fail to update keyset due to non existent label.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetNonExistentLabel) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(SignedKeyData(std::string(), "abc123", 0));

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  Credentials not_existing_label_credentials = users_[0].credentials;
  key_data = users_[0].credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label("i do not exist");
  not_existing_label_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
            homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(not_existing_label_credentials, &new_key,
                                    /*signature=*/std::string()));

  // VERIFY
  // Invalid label cause an update error. Old keyset shall still be
  // readable with old credentials, and the new one shall not  exist.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fails to update keyset due to missing signature.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetAuthorizedNoSignature) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(SignedKeyData(std::string(), "abc123", 0));

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID,
            homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                                    /*signature=*/std::string()));

  // VERIFY
  // The keyset update requires the signature and fails when non provided. The
  // keyset is accessible with the old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Successfully updates keyset by providing correct signature.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetAuthorizedSuccess) {
  // SETUP

  std::string signing_key("abc123");
  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(SignedKeyData(std::string(), signing_key, 0));

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);
  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                                    SignatureForUpdate(new_key, signing_key)));

  // VERIFY
  // The keyset update requires signature, and succeed with the correct one
  // provided. The keyset now available with the new credentials only.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(users_[0].credentials);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndexAndRevision(new_credentials,
                                                 kInitialKeysetIndex, 1);
}

// Ensure signing matches the test vectors in Chrome.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetAuthorizedCompatVector) {
  // SETUP

  // The salted password passed in from Chrome.
  constexpr char kPassword[] = "OSL3HZZSfK+mDQTYUh3lXhgAzJNWhYz52ax0Bleny7Q=";
  // A no-op encryption key.
  constexpr char kB64CipherKey[] =
      "QUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUE=";
  // The signing key pre-installed.
  constexpr char kB64SigningKey[] =
      "p5TR/34XX0R7IMuffH14BiL1vcdSD8EajPzdIg09z9M=";
  // The HMAC-256 signature over kPassword using kSigningKey.
  constexpr char kB64Signature[] =
      "KOPQmmJcMr9iMkr36N1cX+G9gDdBBu7zutAxNayPMN4=";

  std::string cipher_key;
  ASSERT_TRUE(brillo::data_encoding::Base64Decode(kB64CipherKey, &cipher_key));
  std::string signing_key;
  ASSERT_TRUE(
      brillo::data_encoding::Base64Decode(kB64SigningKey, &signing_key));

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(SignedKeyData(cipher_key, signing_key, 0));

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey(kPassword);
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  std::string signature;
  ASSERT_TRUE(brillo::data_encoding::Base64Decode(kB64Signature, &signature));

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(
      CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
      homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key, signature));

  // VERIFY
  // The keyset update requires signature, and succeed with the correct one
  // provided. The keyset now available with the new credentials only.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(users_[0].credentials);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndexAndRevision(new_credentials,
                                                 kInitialKeysetIndex, 1);
}

// Fails to update keyset due to stale revision.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetAuthorizedNoLessOrEqualRevision) {
  // SETUP

  std::string signing_key("abc123");
  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(SignedKeyData(std::string(), signing_key, 1));

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);

  for (auto i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {
    Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, i);

    // TEST

    EXPECT_EQ(
        CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID,
        homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                                SignatureForUpdate(new_key, signing_key)));
  }

  // VERIFY
  // The keyset update requires version to be higher than the current one, and
  // fails if that is not the case. The keyset now available with the old
  // credentials only.

  // Update doesn't change label for restricted keysets.
  KeyData key_data = new_credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);
  new_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndexAndRevision(users_[0].credentials,
                                                 kInitialKeysetIndex, 1);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fails to update keyset due to wrong signature.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetAuthorizedBadSignature) {
  // SETUP

  std::string signing_key("abc123");
  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(SignedKeyData(std::string(), signing_key, 0));

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials = CredsForUpdate(new_passkey);
  Key new_key = KeyForUpdate(new_credentials, 1);

  Key wrong_key = new_key;
  wrong_key.set_secret("wrong");

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(
      CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID,
      homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &new_key,
                              SignatureForUpdate(wrong_key, signing_key)));

  // VERIFY
  // The keyset update requires the signature and fails when bad provided. The
  // keyset is accessible with the old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndexAndRevision(users_[0].credentials,
                                                 kInitialKeysetIndex, 0);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
}

// Fails to update keyset due to wrong credentials.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, UpdateKeysetBadSecret) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob wrong_passkey("wrong");
  Credentials wrong_credentials(users_[0].name, wrong_passkey);
  Key new_key;

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED,
            homedirs_->UpdateKeyset(wrong_credentials, &new_key,
                                    /*signature=*/std::string()));

  // VERIFY
  // The keyset update fails when wrong credentials are provided. The keyset
  // now available with the old credentials only.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Successfully removes keyset.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, RemoveKeysetSuccess) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new path");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, nullptr,
                                 false, &index));

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->RemoveKeyset(users_[0].credentials,
                                    users_[0].credentials.key_data()));

  // VERIFY
  // We had one initial keyset and one added one. After deleting the initial
  // one, only the new one shoulde be available.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({index});

  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(users_[0].credentials);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(new_credentials, index);
}

// Fails to remove due to missing the desired key.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, RemoveKeysetNotFound) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  KeyData key_data = users_[0].credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label("i do not exist");

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
            homedirs_->RemoveKeyset(users_[0].credentials, key_data));

  // VERIFY
  // Trying to delete keyset with non-existing label. Nothing changes, initial
  // keyset still available with old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Fails to remove due to not existing label.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, RemoveKeysetNonExistentLabel) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  Credentials not_existing_label_credentials = users_[0].credentials;
  KeyData key_data = users_[0].credentials.key_data();
  key_data.set_label("i do not exist");
  not_existing_label_credentials.set_key_data(key_data);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_NOT_FOUND,
            homedirs_->RemoveKeyset(not_existing_label_credentials,
                                    users_[0].credentials.key_data()));

  // VERIFY
  // Wrong label on authorization credentials. Nothing changes, initial
  // keyset still available with old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Fails to remove due to invalid credentials.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, RemoveKeysetInvalidCreds) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob wrong_passkey("wrong");
  Credentials wrong_credentials(users_[0].name, wrong_passkey);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_FAILED,
            homedirs_->RemoveKeyset(wrong_credentials,
                                    users_[0].credentials.key_data()));

  // VERIFY
  // Wrong credentials. Nothing changes, initial keyset still available
  // with old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Fails to remove due to lacking privilieges.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, RemoveKeysetInvalidPrivileges) {
  // SETUP

  KeyData vk_key_data;
  vk_key_data.mutable_privileges()->set_remove(false);
  vk_key_data.set_label(kPasswordLabel);

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(vk_key_data);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_AUTHORIZATION_KEY_DENIED,
            homedirs_->RemoveKeyset(users_[0].credentials,
                                    users_[0].credentials.key_data()));

  // VERIFY
  // Wrong permission on the keyset. Nothing changes, initial keyset still
  // available with old credentials.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// List labels.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, GetVaultKeysetLabels) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new path");
  KeyData key_data;
  key_data.set_label(kAltPasswordLabel);

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, &key_data,
                                 false, &index));

  // TEST

  std::vector<std::string> labels;
  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->GetVaultKeysetLabels(users_[0].obfuscated, &labels));

  // VERIFY
  // Labels of the initial and newly added keysets are returned.

  ASSERT_EQ(2, labels.size());
  EXPECT_THAT(labels, UnorderedElementsAre(kPasswordLabel, kAltPasswordLabel));
}

// List labels for legacy keyset.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, GetVaultKeysetLabelsOneLegacyLabeled) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithoutKeyData();
  std::vector<std::string> labels;

  // TEST

  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->GetVaultKeysetLabels(users_[0].obfuscated, &labels));

  // VERIFY
  // Initial keyset has no key data thus shall provide "legacy" label.

  ASSERT_EQ(1, labels.size());
  EXPECT_EQ(base::StringPrintf("%s%d", kKeyLegacyPrefix, kInitialKeysetIndex),
            labels[0]);
}

// Successfully force removes keyset.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ForceRemoveKeysetSuccess) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);
  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey2("new pass2");
  Credentials new_credentials2(users_[0].name, new_passkey2);

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, nullptr,
                                 false, &index));
  int index2 = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey2, nullptr,
                                 false, &index2));

  // TEST

  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->ForceRemoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, index));
  // Remove a non-existing keyset is a success.
  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->ForceRemoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, index));

  // VERIFY
  // We added two new keysets and force removed on of them. Only initial and the
  // second added shall remain.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex, index2});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetNotPresentWithCreds(new_credentials);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(new_credentials2, index2);
}

// Fails to remove keyset due to invalid index.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ForceRemoveKeysetInvalidIndex) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  // TEST

  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->ForceRemoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, -1));
  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->ForceRemoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kKeyFileMax));

  // VERIFY
  // Trying to delete keyset with out-of-bound index id. Nothing changes,
  // initial keyset still available with old creds.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Fails to remove keyset due to injected error.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ForceRemoveKeysetFailedDelete) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());
  EXPECT_CALL(
      platform_,
      DeleteFile(Property(&base::FilePath::value, EndsWith("master.0")), false))
      .WillOnce(Return(false));

  // TEST

  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->ForceRemoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, 0));

  // VERIFY
  // Deletion fails, Nothing changes, initial keyset still available with old
  // creds.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
}

// Successfully moves keyset.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, MoveKeysetSuccess) {
  // SETUP

  constexpr int kFirstMoveIndex = 17;
  constexpr int kSecondMoveIndex = 22;

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  // TEST

  // Move twice to test move from the initial position and from a non-initial
  // position.
  ASSERT_TRUE(homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kInitialKeysetIndex,
                                    kFirstMoveIndex));
  ASSERT_TRUE(homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kFirstMoveIndex,
                                    kSecondMoveIndex));

  // VERIFY
  // Move initial keyset twice, expect it to be accessible with old creds on the
  // new index slot.

  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kSecondMoveIndex});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials, kSecondMoveIndex);
}

// Fails to move keyset.
TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, MoveKeysetFail) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  brillo::SecureBlob new_passkey("new pass");
  Credentials new_credentials(users_[0].name, new_passkey);

  int index = -1;
  EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTOHOME_ERROR_NOT_SET,
            homedirs_->AddKeyset(users_[0].credentials, new_passkey, nullptr,
                                 false, &index));

  const std::string kInitialFile =
      base::StringPrintf("master.%d", kInitialKeysetIndex);
  const std::string kIndexPlus2File =
      base::StringPrintf("master.%d", index + 2);
  const std::string kIndexPlus3File =
      base::StringPrintf("master.%d", index + 3);

  // Inject open failure for the slot 2.
  ON_CALL(platform_,
          OpenFile(Property(&base::FilePath::value, EndsWith(kIndexPlus2File)),
                   StrEq("wx")))
      .WillByDefault(Return(nullptr));

  // Inject rename failure for the slot 3.
  ON_CALL(platform_,
          Rename(Property(&base::FilePath::value, EndsWith(kInitialFile)),
                 Property(&base::FilePath::value, EndsWith(kIndexPlus3File))))
      .WillByDefault(Return(false));

  // TEST

  // Out of bound indexes
  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, -1, index));
  ASSERT_FALSE(
      homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kInitialKeysetIndex, -1));
  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kKeyFileMax, index));
  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kInitialKeysetIndex,
                                     kKeyFileMax));

  // Not existing source
  ASSERT_FALSE(
      homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, index + 4, index + 5));

  // Destination exists
  ASSERT_FALSE(
      homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kInitialKeysetIndex, index));

  // Destination file error-injected.
  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kInitialKeysetIndex,
                                     index + 2));
  ASSERT_FALSE(homedirs_->MoveKeyset(users_[0].obfuscated, kInitialKeysetIndex,
                                     index + 3));

  // VERIFY

  // TODO(chromium:1141301, dlunev): the fact we have keyset index+3 is a bug -
  // MoveKeyset will not cleanup created file if Rename fails. Not addressing it
  // now durign test refactor, but will in the coming CLs.
  VerifyKeysetIndicies({kInitialKeysetIndex, index, index + 3});

  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(users_[0].credentials,
                                      kInitialKeysetIndex);
  VerifyKeysetPresentWithCredsAtIndex(new_credentials, index);
}

TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ReSaveKeysetNoReSave) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk0 =
      homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(users_[0].credentials, /* error */ nullptr);
  ASSERT_NE(vk0.get(), nullptr);

  // TEST

  MountError code;
  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk_load =
      homedirs_->LoadUnwrappedKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &code);
  EXPECT_EQ(MOUNT_ERROR_NONE, code);

  // VERIFY

  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk0_new(
      homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(users_[0].credentials, /* error */ nullptr));
  ASSERT_NE(vk0_new.get(), nullptr);

  brillo::SecureBlob lhs, rhs;
  GetKeysetBlob(vk0->serialized(), &lhs);
  GetKeysetBlob(vk0_new->serialized(), &rhs);
  ASSERT_EQ(lhs.size(), rhs.size());
  ASSERT_EQ(0, brillo::SecureMemcmp(lhs.data(), rhs.data(), lhs.size()));
}

TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ReSaveKeysetChapsRepopulation) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk0 =
      homedirs_->LoadVaultKeysetForUser(users_[0].obfuscated, 0);
  ASSERT_NE(vk0.get(), nullptr);
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->clear_wrapped_chaps_key();
  EXPECT_FALSE(vk0->serialized().has_wrapped_chaps_key());
  ASSERT_TRUE(vk0->Save(vk0->source_file()));

  // TEST

  MountError code;
  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk_load =
      homedirs_->LoadUnwrappedKeyset(users_[0].credentials, &code);
  EXPECT_EQ(MOUNT_ERROR_NONE, code);
  EXPECT_TRUE(vk_load->serialized().has_wrapped_chaps_key());

  // VERIFY

  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk0_new =
      homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(users_[0].credentials, /* error */ nullptr);
  ASSERT_NE(vk0_new.get(), nullptr);
  EXPECT_TRUE(vk0_new->serialized().has_wrapped_chaps_key());

  ASSERT_EQ(vk0_new->chaps_key().size(), vk_load->chaps_key().size());
  ASSERT_EQ(0, brillo::SecureMemcmp(vk0_new->chaps_key().data(),
                                    vk_load->chaps_key().data(),
                                    vk0_new->chaps_key().size()));
}

TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ReSaveOnLoadNoReSave) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk0 =
      homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(users_[0].credentials, /* error */ nullptr);
  ASSERT_NE(vk0.get(), nullptr);

  // TEST

  EXPECT_FALSE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));
}

// The following tests use MOCKs for TpmState and hand-crafted vault keyset
// state. Ideally we shall have a fake tpm, but that is not feasible ATM.

TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ReSaveOnLoadTestRegularCreds) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk0 =
      homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(users_[0].credentials, /* error */ nullptr);
  ASSERT_NE(vk0.get(), nullptr);

  NiceMock<MockTpmInit> mock_tpm_init;
  EXPECT_CALL(mock_tpm_init, HasCryptohomeKey()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(mock_tpm_init, SetupTpm(true)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));

  EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsEnabled()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsOwned()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));

  crypto_.set_use_tpm(true);
  crypto_.Init(&mock_tpm_init);

  // TEST

  // Scrypt wrapped shall be resaved when tpm present.
  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));

  // Tpm wrapped not pcr bound, but no public hash - resave.
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_flags(SerializedVaultKeyset::TPM_WRAPPED |
                                       SerializedVaultKeyset::SCRYPT_DERIVED);
  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));

  // Tpm wrapped pcr bound, but no public hash - resave.
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_flags(SerializedVaultKeyset::TPM_WRAPPED |
                                       SerializedVaultKeyset::SCRYPT_DERIVED |
                                       SerializedVaultKeyset::PCR_BOUND);
  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));

  // Tpm wrapped not pcr bound, public hash - resave.
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_tpm_public_key_hash("public hash");
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_flags(SerializedVaultKeyset::TPM_WRAPPED |
                                       SerializedVaultKeyset::SCRYPT_DERIVED);
  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));

  // Tpm wrapped pcr bound, public hash - no resave.
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_tpm_public_key_hash("public hash");
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_flags(SerializedVaultKeyset::TPM_WRAPPED |
                                       SerializedVaultKeyset::SCRYPT_DERIVED |
                                       SerializedVaultKeyset::PCR_BOUND);
  EXPECT_FALSE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));
}

TEST_F(KeysetManagementTest, ReSaveOnLoadTestLeCreds) {
  // SETUP

  KeysetSetUpWithKeyData(DefaultKeyData());

  std::unique_ptr<VaultKeyset> vk0 =
      homedirs_->GetValidKeyset(users_[0].credentials, /* error */ nullptr);
  ASSERT_NE(vk0.get(), nullptr);

  NiceMock<MockTpmInit> mock_tpm_init;
  EXPECT_CALL(mock_tpm_init, HasCryptohomeKey()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(mock_tpm_init, SetupTpm(true)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));

  EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsEnabled()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
  EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsOwned()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true));

  auto le_cred_manager = new cryptohome::MockLECredentialManager();
  crypto_.set_le_manager_for_testing(
      std::unique_ptr<cryptohome::LECredentialManager>(le_cred_manager));

  crypto_.set_use_tpm(true);
  crypto_.Init(&mock_tpm_init);

  // TEST

  // le credentials which doesn't need pcr binding - no re-save
  EXPECT_CALL(*le_cred_manager, NeedsPcrBinding(_))
      .WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_flags(SerializedVaultKeyset::LE_CREDENTIAL);
  EXPECT_FALSE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));

  // le credentials which needs pcr binding - no resave.
  EXPECT_CALL(*le_cred_manager, NeedsPcrBinding(_))
      .WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
  vk0->mutable_serialized()->set_flags(SerializedVaultKeyset::LE_CREDENTIAL);
  EXPECT_TRUE(homedirs_->ShouldReSaveKeyset(vk0.get()));
}

}  // namespace cryptohome