futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
[ Upstream commit 6b54082c3ed4dc9821cdf0edb17302355cc5bb45 ]
sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.
During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.
A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().
For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.
This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.
Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.
BUG=b/467363716
TEST=presubmit
RELEASE_NOTE=Fixed CVE-2025-40341 in the Linux kernel.
cos-patch: security-moderate
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Change-Id: I6b99ebcbc800522baa5e70930bbb47ca73a67b7b
Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/1477863998-3298-5-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net/
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/119
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kernel CVE Triage Automation <cloud-image-kernel-cve-triage-automation@prod.google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://cos-review.googlesource.com/c/third_party/kernel/+/121561
Reviewed-by: Angel Adetula <angeladetula@google.com>
Tested-by: Cusky Presubmit Bot <presubmit@cos-infra-prod.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Velasquez <rdvelasquez@google.com>
1 file changed
