| // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "chaps/session_impl.h" |
| |
| #include <memory> |
| #include <string> |
| #include <vector> |
| |
| #include <base/bind.h> |
| #include <base/check.h> |
| #include <base/check_op.h> |
| #include <base/logging.h> |
| #include <base/stl_util.h> |
| #include <crypto/libcrypto-compat.h> |
| #include <crypto/scoped_openssl_types.h> |
| #include <gmock/gmock.h> |
| #include <gtest/gtest.h> |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| |
| #include "chaps/chaps_factory_impl.h" |
| #include "chaps/chaps_factory_mock.h" |
| #include "chaps/chaps_utility.h" |
| #include "chaps/handle_generator_mock.h" |
| #include "chaps/object_impl.h" |
| #include "chaps/object_mock.h" |
| #include "chaps/object_pool_mock.h" |
| #include "chaps/tpm_utility_mock.h" |
| |
| using std::string; |
| using std::vector; |
| using ::testing::_; |
| using ::testing::AnyNumber; |
| using ::testing::Invoke; |
| using ::testing::InvokeWithoutArgs; |
| using ::testing::Return; |
| using ::testing::SetArgPointee; |
| using ::testing::StrictMock; |
| using Result = chaps::ObjectPool::Result; |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| void ConfigureObjectPool(chaps::ObjectPoolMock* op, int handle_base) { |
| op->SetupFake(handle_base); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*op, Insert(_)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*op, Find(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*op, FindByHandle(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*op, Delete(_)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*op, Flush(_)).WillRepeatedly(Return(Result::Success)); |
| } |
| |
| chaps::ObjectPool* CreateObjectPoolMock() { |
| chaps::ObjectPoolMock* op = new chaps::ObjectPoolMock(); |
| ConfigureObjectPool(op, 100); |
| return op; |
| } |
| |
| chaps::Object* CreateObjectMock() { |
| chaps::ObjectMock* o = new chaps::ObjectMock(); |
| o->SetupFake(); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, GetObjectClass()).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, SetAttributes(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, FinalizeNewObject()).WillRepeatedly(Return(CKR_OK)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, Copy(_)).WillRepeatedly(Return(CKR_OK)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, IsTokenObject()).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, IsAttributePresent(_)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, GetAttributeString(_)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, GetAttributeInt(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, GetAttributeBool(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, SetAttributeString(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, SetAttributeInt(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, SetAttributeBool(_, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, set_handle(_)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, set_store_id(_)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, handle()).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, store_id()).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*o, RemoveAttribute(_)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| return o; |
| } |
| |
| bool FakeRandom(int num_bytes, string* random) { |
| *random = string(num_bytes, 0); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void ConfigureTPMUtility(chaps::TPMUtilityMock* tpm) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(*tpm, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(*tpm, GenerateRandom(_, _)).WillRepeatedly(Invoke(FakeRandom)); |
| } |
| |
| string bn2bin(const BIGNUM* bn) { |
| string bin; |
| bin.resize(BN_num_bytes(bn)); |
| bin.resize(BN_bn2bin(bn, chaps::ConvertStringToByteBuffer(bin.data()))); |
| return bin; |
| } |
| |
| std::string GetRSAPSSParam(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg, |
| CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf, |
| CK_ULONG sLen) { |
| CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS params; |
| params.hashAlg = hashAlg; |
| params.mgf = mgf; |
| params.sLen = sLen; |
| std::string param_bytes(reinterpret_cast<char*>(¶ms), sizeof(params)); |
| return param_bytes; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| namespace chaps { |
| |
| // Test fixture for an initialized SessionImpl instance. |
| class TestSession : public ::testing::Test { |
| public: |
| TestSession() { |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory_, CreateObject()) |
| .WillRepeatedly(InvokeWithoutArgs(CreateObjectMock)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory_, CreateObjectPool(_, _, _, _)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(InvokeWithoutArgs(CreateObjectPoolMock)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(handle_generator_, CreateHandle()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1)); |
| ConfigureObjectPool(&token_pool_, 0); |
| ConfigureTPMUtility(&tpm_); |
| } |
| void SetUp() { |
| session_.reset(new SessionImpl(1, &token_pool_, &tpm_, &factory_, |
| &handle_generator_, false)); |
| } |
| void GenerateSecretKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, |
| CK_ULONG size, |
| const Object** obj) { |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE encdec_template[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE signverify_template[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr = encdec_template; |
| if (mechanism == CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN) |
| attr = signverify_template; |
| int handle = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->GenerateKey(mechanism, "", attr, 4, &handle)); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, obj)); |
| } |
| void GenerateRSAKeyPair(bool signing, |
| CK_ULONG size, |
| const Object** pub, |
| const Object** priv) { |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_BYTE pubexp[] = {1, 0, 1}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, signing ? &no : &yes, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, signing ? &yes : &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubexp, 3}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, signing ? &no : &yes, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, signing ? &yes : &no, sizeof(no)}}; |
| int pubh = 0, privh = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pubh, &privh)); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(pubh, pub)); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(privh, priv)); |
| } |
| |
| string GetDERforNID(int openssl_nid) { |
| // OBJ_nid2obj returns a pointer to an internal table and does not allocate |
| // memory. No need to free. |
| ASN1_OBJECT* obj = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); |
| int expected_size = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(obj, nullptr); |
| string output(expected_size, '\0'); |
| unsigned char* buf = ConvertStringToByteBuffer(output.data()); |
| int output_size = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(obj, &buf); |
| CHECK_EQ(output_size, expected_size); |
| return output; |
| } |
| |
| void GenerateECCKeyPair(bool use_token_object_for_pub, |
| bool use_token_object_for_priv, |
| const Object** pub, |
| const Object** priv) { |
| // Create DER encoded OID of P-256 for CKA_EC_PARAMS (prime256v1 or |
| // secp256r1) |
| string ec_params = GetDERforNID(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); |
| |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = { |
| {CKA_TOKEN, use_token_object_for_pub ? &yes : &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ConvertStringToByteBuffer(ec_params.data()), |
| ec_params.size()}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = { |
| {CKA_TOKEN, use_token_object_for_priv ? &yes : &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}}; |
| int pubh = 0, privh = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pubh, &privh)); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(pubh, pub)); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(privh, priv)); |
| } |
| |
| int CreateObject() { |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS c = CKO_DATA; |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{CKA_CLASS, &c, sizeof(c)}, |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}}; |
| int h; |
| session_->CreateObject(attr, 2, &h); |
| return h; |
| } |
| |
| void TestSignVerify(const Object* pub, |
| const Object* priv, |
| size_t input_size, |
| CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, |
| const string& mechanism_parameter) { |
| string in(input_size, 'A'); |
| int len = 0; |
| string sig; |
| |
| // Sign / verify with OperationSinglePart(). |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, mech, mechanism_parameter, priv)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kSign, in, &len, &sig)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationSinglePart(kSign, in, &len, &sig)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kVerify, mech, mechanism_parameter, pub)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kVerify, in, NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->VerifyFinal(sig)); |
| |
| // Same stuff with OperationUpdate(). |
| in = string(input_size, 'B'); |
| string sig2; |
| len = 0; |
| size_t first_divide = input_size / 2; |
| size_t second_divide = input_size / 5 * 2; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, mech, mechanism_parameter, priv)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate( |
| kSign, in.substr(0, first_divide), NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate( |
| kSign, in.substr(first_divide, input_size - first_divide), |
| NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationFinal(kSign, &len, &sig2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationFinal(kSign, &len, &sig2)); |
| |
| // Test verification with OperationUpdate(). |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kVerify, mech, mechanism_parameter, pub)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate( |
| kVerify, in.substr(0, second_divide), NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate( |
| kVerify, in.substr(second_divide, input_size - second_divide), |
| NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->VerifyFinal(sig2)); |
| } |
| |
| protected: |
| ObjectPoolMock token_pool_; |
| ChapsFactoryMock factory_; |
| StrictMock<TPMUtilityMock> tpm_; |
| HandleGeneratorMock handle_generator_; |
| std::unique_ptr<SessionImpl> session_; |
| }; |
| |
| // Session Test that uses real Object implementation (ObjectImpl) |
| class TestSessionWithRealObject : public TestSession { |
| public: |
| TestSessionWithRealObject() { |
| chaps::ChapsFactory* factory = &factory_; |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory_, CreateObject()) |
| .WillRepeatedly(InvokeWithoutArgs( |
| [factory] { return new chaps::ObjectImpl(factory); })); |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory_, CreateObjectPool(_, _, _, _)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(InvokeWithoutArgs(CreateObjectPoolMock)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory_, CreateObjectPolicy(_)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ChapsFactoryImpl::GetObjectPolicyForType)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(handle_generator_, CreateHandle()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1)); |
| ConfigureObjectPool(&token_pool_, 0); |
| ConfigureTPMUtility(&tpm_); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| typedef TestSession TestSession_DeathTest; |
| |
| // Test that SessionImpl asserts as expected when not properly initialized. |
| TEST(DeathTest, InvalidInit) { |
| ObjectPoolMock pool; |
| ChapsFactoryMock factory; |
| TPMUtilityMock tpm; |
| HandleGeneratorMock handle_generator; |
| SessionImpl* session; |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory, CreateObjectPool(_, _, _, _)).Times(AnyNumber()); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session = new SessionImpl(1, NULL, &tpm, &factory, |
| &handle_generator, false), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session = new SessionImpl(1, &pool, NULL, &factory, |
| &handle_generator, false), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED( |
| session = new SessionImpl(1, &pool, &tpm, NULL, &handle_generator, false), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED( |
| session = new SessionImpl(1, &pool, &tpm, &factory, NULL, false), |
| "Check failed"); |
| (void)session; |
| } |
| |
| // Test that SessionImpl asserts as expected when passed invalid arguments. |
| TEST_F(TestSession_DeathTest, InvalidArgs) { |
| OperationType invalid_op = kNumOperationTypes; |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->IsOperationActive(invalid_op), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->CreateObject(NULL, 0, NULL), |
| "Check failed"); |
| int i; |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->CreateObject(NULL, 1, &i), |
| "Check failed"); |
| i = CreateObject(); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->CopyObject(NULL, 0, i, NULL), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->CopyObject(NULL, 1, i, &i), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->FindObjects(invalid_op, NULL), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->GetObject(1, NULL), "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->OperationInit(invalid_op, 0, "", NULL), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED( |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_AES_CBC, "", NULL), "Check failed"); |
| string s; |
| const Object* o; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, 32, &o); |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_AES_ECB, "", o)); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->OperationUpdate(invalid_op, "", &i, &s), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->OperationUpdate(kEncrypt, "", NULL, &s), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->OperationUpdate(kEncrypt, "", &i, NULL), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->OperationFinal(invalid_op, &i, &s), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->OperationFinal(kEncrypt, NULL, &s), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->OperationFinal(kEncrypt, &i, NULL), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED( |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(invalid_op, "", &i, &s), "Check failed"); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that SessionImpl asserts when out-of-memory during initialization. |
| TEST(DeathTest, OutOfMemoryInit) { |
| ObjectPoolMock pool; |
| TPMUtilityMock tpm; |
| ChapsFactoryMock factory; |
| HandleGeneratorMock handle_generator; |
| ObjectPool* null_pool = NULL; |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory, CreateObjectPool(_, _, _, _)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Return(null_pool)); |
| Session* session; |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session = new SessionImpl(1, &pool, &tpm, &factory, |
| &handle_generator, false), |
| "Check failed"); |
| (void)session; |
| } |
| |
| // Test that SessionImpl asserts when out-of-memory during object creation. |
| TEST_F(TestSession_DeathTest, OutOfMemoryObject) { |
| Object* null_object = NULL; |
| EXPECT_CALL(factory_, CreateObject()).WillRepeatedly(Return(null_object)); |
| int tmp; |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->CreateObject(NULL, 0, &tmp), |
| "Check failed"); |
| EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(session_->FindObjectsInit(NULL, 0), "Check failed"); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that default session properties are correctly reported. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, DefaultSetup) { |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, session_->GetSlot()); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(session_->IsReadOnly()); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(session_->IsOperationActive(kEncrypt)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test object management: create / copy / find / destroy. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, Objects) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Insert(_)).Times(2); |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Find(_, _)).Times(1); |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Delete(_)).Times(1); |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS oc = CKO_SECRET_KEY; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{CKA_CLASS, &oc, sizeof(oc)}}; |
| int handle = 0; |
| int invalid_handle = -1; |
| // Create a new object. |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->CreateObject(attr, base::size(attr), &handle)); |
| EXPECT_GT(handle, 0); |
| const Object* o; |
| // Get the new object from the new handle. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, &o)); |
| int handle2 = 0; |
| // Copy an object (try invalid and valid handles). |
| EXPECT_EQ( |
| CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, |
| session_->CopyObject(attr, base::size(attr), invalid_handle, &handle2)); |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->CopyObject(attr, base::size(attr), handle, &handle2)); |
| // Ensure handles are unique. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(handle != handle2); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle2, &o)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(session_->GetObject(invalid_handle, &o)); |
| vector<int> v; |
| // Find objects with calls out-of-order. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, session_->FindObjects(1, &v)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, session_->FindObjectsFinal()); |
| // Find the objects we've created (there should be 2). |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->FindObjectsInit(attr, base::size(attr))); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, |
| session_->FindObjectsInit(attr, base::size(attr))); |
| // Test multi-step finds by only allowing 1 result at a time. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->FindObjects(1, &v)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, v.size()); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->FindObjects(1, &v)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(2, v.size()); |
| // We have them all but we'll query again to make sure it behaves properly. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->FindObjects(1, &v)); |
| ASSERT_EQ(2, v.size()); |
| // Check that the handles found are the same ones we know about. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(v[0] == handle || v[1] == handle); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(v[0] == handle2 || v[1] == handle2); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->FindObjectsFinal()); |
| // Destroy an object (try invalid and valid handles). |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, session_->DestroyObject(invalid_handle)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->DestroyObject(handle)); |
| // Once destroyed, we should not be able to use the handle. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(session_->GetObject(handle, &o)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test multi-part and single-part cipher operations. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, Cipher) { |
| const Object* key_object = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, 32, &key_object); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, |
| string(16, 'A'), key_object)); |
| string in(22, 'B'); |
| string out, tmp; |
| int maxlen = 0; |
| // Check buffer-too-small semantics (and for each call following). |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kEncrypt, in, &maxlen, &tmp)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kEncrypt, in, &maxlen, &tmp)); |
| out += tmp; |
| // The first block is ready, check that we've received it. |
| EXPECT_EQ(16, out.length()); |
| maxlen = 0; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationFinal(kEncrypt, &maxlen, &tmp)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationFinal(kEncrypt, &maxlen, &tmp)); |
| out += tmp; |
| // Check that we've received the final block. |
| EXPECT_EQ(32, out.length()); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDecrypt, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, |
| string(16, 'A'), key_object)); |
| string in2; |
| maxlen = 0; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kDecrypt, out, &maxlen, &in2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kDecrypt, out, &maxlen, &in2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(22, in2.length()); |
| // Check that what has been decrypted matches our original plain-text. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(in == in2); |
| } |
| |
| // Test multi-part and single-part digest operations. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, Digest) { |
| string in(30, 'A'); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_SHA_1, "", NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kDigest, in.substr(0, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kDigest, in.substr(10, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kDigest, in.substr(20, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| int len = 0; |
| string out; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationFinal(kDigest, &len, &out)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(20, len); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationFinal(kDigest, &len, &out)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_SHA_1, "", NULL)); |
| string out2; |
| len = 0; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kDigest, in, &len, &out2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationSinglePart(kDigest, in, &len, &out2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(20, len); |
| // Check that both operations computed the same digest. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(out == out2); |
| } |
| |
| // Test HMAC sign and verify operations. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, HMAC) { |
| const Object* key_object = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, 32, &key_object); |
| string in(30, 'A'); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, "", key_object)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kSign, in.substr(0, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kSign, in.substr(10, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kSign, in.substr(20, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| int len = 0; |
| string out; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, session_->OperationFinal(kSign, &len, &out)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationFinal(kSign, &len, &out)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kVerify, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, "", key_object)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kVerify, in, NULL, NULL)); |
| // A successful verify implies both operations computed the same MAC. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->VerifyFinal(out)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test empty multi-part operation. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, FinalWithNoUpdate) { |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_SHA_1, "", NULL)); |
| int len = 20; |
| string out; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationFinal(kDigest, &len, &out)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(20, len); |
| } |
| |
| // Test multi-part and single-part operations inhibit each other. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, UpdateOperationPreventsSinglePart) { |
| string in(30, 'A'); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_SHA_1, "", NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kDigest, in.substr(0, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| int len = 0; |
| string out; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, session_->OperationSinglePart( |
| kDigest, in.substr(10, 20), &len, &out)); |
| |
| // The error also terminates the operation. |
| len = 0; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, |
| session_->OperationFinal(kDigest, &len, &out)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, SinglePartOperationPreventsUpdate) { |
| string in(30, 'A'); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_SHA_1, "", NULL)); |
| string out; |
| int len = 0; |
| // Perform a single part operation but leave the output to be collected. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kDigest, in, &len, &out)); |
| |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, |
| session_->OperationUpdate(kDigest, in.substr(10, 10), NULL, NULL)); |
| |
| // The error also terminates the operation. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kDigest, in, &len, &out)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, SinglePartOperationPreventsFinal) { |
| string in(30, 'A'); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_SHA_1, "", NULL)); |
| string out; |
| int len = 0; |
| // Perform a single part operation but leave the output to be collected. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kDigest, in, &len, &out)); |
| |
| len = 0; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, |
| session_->OperationFinal(kDigest, &len, &out)); |
| |
| // The error also terminates the operation. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kDigest, in, &len, &out)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test RSA PKCS #1 encryption. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, RSAEncrypt) { |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(false, 1024, &pub, &priv); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_RSA_PKCS, "", pub)); |
| string in(100, 'A'); |
| int len = 0; |
| string out; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationSinglePart(kEncrypt, in, &len, &out)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationSinglePart(kEncrypt, in, &len, &out)); |
| |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kDecrypt, CKM_RSA_PKCS, "", priv)); |
| len = 0; |
| string in2 = out; |
| string out2; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kDecrypt, in2, &len, &out2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| session_->OperationFinal(kDecrypt, &len, &out2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationFinal(kDecrypt, &len, &out2)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(in.length(), out2.length()); |
| // Check that what has been decrypted matches our original plain-text. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(in == out2); |
| } |
| |
| // Test RSA PKCS #1 sign / verify. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, RsaSign) { |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(true, 1024, &pub, &priv); |
| |
| // Test the generic RSA mechanism. |
| TestSignVerify(pub, priv, 100, CKM_RSA_PKCS, ""); |
| |
| // Test RSA mechanism with built-in hash. |
| TestSignVerify(pub, priv, 100, CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, ""); |
| } |
| |
| // Test RSA PSS sign / verify. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, RsaPSSSign) { |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(true, 1024, &pub, &priv); |
| |
| // Test the generic RSA PSS mechanism. |
| TestSignVerify(pub, priv, 20, CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, |
| GetRSAPSSParam(CKM_SHA_1, CKG_MGF1_SHA1, 20)); |
| |
| // Test the version with built-in hash. |
| TestSignVerify(pub, priv, 100, CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, |
| GetRSAPSSParam(CKM_SHA_1, CKG_MGF1_SHA1, 20)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test ECC ECDSA sign / verify. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, EcdsaSign) { |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateECCKeyPair(false, false, &pub, &priv); |
| |
| // Test the generic ECDSA. |
| TestSignVerify(pub, priv, 100, CKM_ECDSA, ""); |
| |
| // Test ECDSA with built-in hash. |
| TestSignVerify(pub, priv, 100, CKM_ECDSA_SHA1, ""); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that requests for unsupported mechanisms are handled correctly. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, MechanismInvalid) { |
| const Object* key = NULL; |
| // Use a valid key so that key errors don't mask mechanism errors. |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, 16, &key); |
| // We don't support IDEA. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_IDEA_CBC, "", key)); |
| // We don't support SHA-224. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, "", key)); |
| // We don't support MD2. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_MD2, "", NULL)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that operation / mechanism mismatches are handled correctly. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, MechanismMismatch) { |
| const Object* hmac = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, 16, &hmac); |
| const Object* aes = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, 16, &aes); |
| // Encrypt with a sign/verify mechanism. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, "", hmac)); |
| // Sign with an encryption mechanism. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, "", aes)); |
| // Sign with a digest-only mechanism. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_SHA_1, "", hmac)); |
| // Digest with a sign+digest mechanism. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kDigest, CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS, "", NULL)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that mechanism / key type mismatches are handled correctly. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, KeyTypeMismatch) { |
| const Object* aes = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, 16, &aes); |
| const Object* rsapub = NULL; |
| const Object* rsapriv = NULL; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(true, 512, &rsapub, &rsapriv); |
| // DES3 with an AES key. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_DES3_CBC, "", aes)); |
| // AES with an RSA key. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_AES_CBC, "", rsapriv)); |
| // HMAC with an RSA key. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, "", rsapriv)); |
| // RSA with an AES key. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS, "", aes)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that key function permissions are correctly enforced. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, KeyFunctionPermission) { |
| const Object* encpub = NULL; |
| const Object* encpriv = NULL; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(false, 512, &encpub, &encpriv); |
| const Object* sigpub = NULL; |
| const Object* sigpriv = NULL; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(true, 512, &sigpub, &sigpriv); |
| // Try decrypting with a sign-only key. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, |
| session_->OperationInit(kDecrypt, CKM_RSA_PKCS, "", sigpriv)); |
| // Try signing with a decrypt-only key. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_RSA_PKCS, "", encpriv)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that invalid mechanism parameters for ciphers are handled correctly. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, BadIV) { |
| const Object* aes = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, 16, &aes); |
| const Object* des = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_DES_KEY_GEN, 16, &des); |
| const Object* des3 = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN, 16, &des3); |
| // AES expects 16 bytes and DES/DES3 expects 8 bytes. |
| string bad_iv(7, 0); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_AES_CBC, bad_iv, aes)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_DES_CBC, bad_iv, des)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_DES3_CBC, bad_iv, des3)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that invalid key size ranges are handled correctly. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, BadKeySize) { |
| const Object* key = NULL; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, 16, &key); |
| // AES keys can be 16, 24, or 32 bytes in length. |
| const_cast<Object*>(key)->SetAttributeString(CKA_VALUE, string(33, 0)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, |
| session_->OperationInit(kEncrypt, CKM_AES_ECB, "", key)); |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(true, 512, &pub, &priv); |
| // RSA keys can have a modulus size no smaller than 512. |
| const_cast<Object*>(priv)->SetAttributeString(CKA_MODULUS, string(32, 0)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, |
| session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_RSA_PKCS, "", priv)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that invalid attributes for key pair generation are handled correctly. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, BadRSAGenerate) { |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| int size = 1024; |
| CK_BYTE pubexp[] = {1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubexp, 12}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = { |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| }; |
| int pub, priv; |
| // CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT too large. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pub, &priv)); |
| pub_attr[1].ulValueLen = 3; |
| size = 20000; |
| // CKA_MODULUS_BITS too large. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pub, &priv)); |
| // CKA_MODULUS_BITS missing. |
| EXPECT_EQ( |
| CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, 2, |
| priv_attr, base::size(priv_attr), &pub, &priv)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that invalid attributes for key generation are handled correctly. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, BadAESGenerate) { |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| int size = 33; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| int handle = 0; |
| // CKA_VALUE_LEN missing. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, |
| session_->GenerateKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, "", attr, 3, &handle)); |
| // CKA_VALUE_LEN out of range. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, |
| session_->GenerateKey(CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, "", attr, 4, &handle)); |
| } |
| |
| // Test that signature verification fails as expected for invalid signatures. |
| TEST_F(TestSession, BadSignature) { |
| string input(100, 'A'); |
| string signature(20, 0); |
| const Object* hmac; |
| GenerateSecretKey(CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, 32, &hmac); |
| const Object *rsapub, *rsapriv; |
| GenerateRSAKeyPair(true, 1024, &rsapub, &rsapriv); |
| // HMAC with bad signature length. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kVerify, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, "", hmac)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kVerify, input, NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, session_->VerifyFinal(signature)); |
| // HMAC with bad signature. |
| signature.resize(32); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->OperationInit(kVerify, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, "", hmac)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kVerify, input, NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, session_->VerifyFinal(signature)); |
| // RSA with bad signature length. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kVerify, CKM_RSA_PKCS, "", rsapub)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kVerify, input, NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, session_->VerifyFinal(signature)); |
| // RSA with bad signature. |
| signature.resize(128, 1); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kVerify, CKM_RSA_PKCS, "", rsapub)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationUpdate(kVerify, input, NULL, NULL)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, session_->VerifyFinal(signature)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, Flush) { |
| ObjectMock token_object; |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_object, IsTokenObject()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| ObjectMock session_object; |
| EXPECT_CALL(session_object, IsTokenObject()).WillRepeatedly(Return(false)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Flush(_)) |
| .WillOnce(Return(Result::Failure)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Return(Result::Success)); |
| EXPECT_NE(session_->FlushModifiableObject(&token_object), CKR_OK); |
| EXPECT_EQ(session_->FlushModifiableObject(&token_object), CKR_OK); |
| EXPECT_EQ(session_->FlushModifiableObject(&session_object), CKR_OK); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateRSAWithTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MinRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1024)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MaxRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(2048)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GenerateRSAKey(_, _, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GetRSAPublicKey(_, _, _)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_BYTE pubexp[] = {1, 0, 1}; |
| int size = 2048; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubexp, 3}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}}; |
| int pubh = 0, privh = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pubh, &privh)); |
| // There are a few sensitive attributes that MUST not exist. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(privh, &object)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_1)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_2)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_1)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_2)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_COEFFICIENT)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob exists. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, true)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateRSAWithTPMInconsistentToken) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MinRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1024)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MaxRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(2048)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GenerateRSAKey(_, _, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GetRSAPublicKey(_, _, _)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_BYTE pubexp[] = {1, 0, 1}; |
| int size = 2048; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubexp, 3}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}}; |
| // Attempt to generate a private key on the token, but public key not on the |
| // token. |
| int pubh = 0, privh = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pubh, &privh)); |
| const Object* public_object = NULL; |
| const Object* private_object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(pubh, &public_object)); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(privh, &private_object)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(public_object->IsTokenObject()); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(private_object->IsTokenObject()); |
| |
| // Destroy the objects. |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->DestroyObject(pubh)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->DestroyObject(privh)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateRSAWithNoTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MinRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1024)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MaxRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(2048)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(false)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GenerateRSAKey(_, _, _, _, _, _)).Times(0); |
| |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_BYTE pubexp[] = {1, 0, 1}; |
| int size = 1024; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubexp, 3}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}}; |
| int pubh = 0, privh = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pubh, &privh)); |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should exist. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(privh, &object)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_COEFFICIENT)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob doesn't exists. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateRSAWithForceSoftware) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MinRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1024)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MaxRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(2048)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GenerateRSAKey(_, _, _, _, _, _)).Times(0); |
| |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_BYTE pubexp[] = {1, 0, 1}; |
| int size = 1024; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubexp, 3}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {kForceSoftwareAttribute, &yes, sizeof(yes)}}; |
| int pubh = 0, privh = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| base::size(pub_attr), priv_attr, |
| base::size(priv_attr), &pubh, &privh)); |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should exist. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(privh, &object)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_COEFFICIENT)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob doesn't exists. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateECCWithTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsECCurveSupported(_)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GenerateECCKey(_, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GetECCPublicKey(_, _)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateECCKeyPair(true, true, &pub, &priv); |
| |
| // TPM backed key object doesn't have CKA_VALUE which stored ECC private key. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(priv->IsAttributePresent(CKA_VALUE)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob exists. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(priv->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, true)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateECCWithTPMInconsistentToken) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsECCurveSupported(_)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GenerateECCKey(_, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GetECCPublicKey(_, _)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateECCKeyPair(false, true, &pub, &priv); |
| |
| EXPECT_FALSE(pub->IsTokenObject()); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsTokenObject()); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateECCWithNoTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(false)); |
| |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateECCKeyPair(true, true, &pub, &priv); |
| |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should exist. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsAttributePresent(CKA_VALUE)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob doesn't exists. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, GenerateECCWithForceSoftware) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsECCurveSupported(_)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| |
| // Create DER encoded OID of P-256 for CKA_EC_PARAMS (prime256v1 or |
| // secp256r1) |
| string ec_params = GetDERforNID(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); |
| |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = { |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ConvertStringToByteBuffer(ec_params.data()), |
| ec_params.size()}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {kForceSoftwareAttribute, &yes, sizeof(yes)}}; |
| int pubh = 0, privh = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->GenerateKeyPair( |
| CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, base::size(pub_attr), |
| priv_attr, base::size(priv_attr), &pubh, &privh)); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(privh, &priv)); |
| |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should exist. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsAttributePresent(CKA_VALUE)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(priv->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob doesn't exists. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(priv->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, EcdsaSignWithTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsECCurveSupported(_)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GenerateECCKey(_, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, GetECCPublicKey(_, _)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, LoadKey(_, _, _, _)).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, Sign(_, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| |
| const Object* pub = NULL; |
| const Object* priv = NULL; |
| GenerateECCKeyPair(true, true, &pub, &priv); |
| |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationInit(kSign, CKM_ECDSA_SHA1, "", priv)); |
| string in(100, 'A'); |
| int len = 0; |
| string sig; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->OperationSinglePart(kSign, in, &len, &sig)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, ImportRSAWithTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MinRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1024)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MaxRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(2048)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, WrapRSAKey(_, _, _, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| |
| crypto::ScopedBIGNUM exponent(BN_new()); |
| CHECK(exponent); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(BN_set_word(exponent.get(), 0x10001)); |
| crypto::ScopedRSA rsa(RSA_new()); |
| CHECK(rsa); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa.get(), 2048, exponent.get(), nullptr)); |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS priv_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; |
| CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_RSA; |
| CK_BBOOL false_value = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL true_value = CK_TRUE; |
| string id = "test_id"; |
| string label = "test_label"; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_n; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_e; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_d; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_p; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_q; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_dmp1; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_dmq1; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_iqmp; |
| RSA_get0_key(rsa.get(), &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); |
| RSA_get0_factors(rsa.get(), &rsa_p, &rsa_q); |
| RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa.get(), &rsa_dmp1, &rsa_dmq1, &rsa_iqmp); |
| string n = bn2bin(rsa_n); |
| string e = bn2bin(rsa_e); |
| string d = bn2bin(rsa_d); |
| string p = bn2bin(rsa_p); |
| string q = bn2bin(rsa_q); |
| string dmp1 = bn2bin(rsa_dmp1); |
| string dmq1 = bn2bin(rsa_dmq1); |
| string iqmp = bn2bin(rsa_iqmp); |
| |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE private_attributes[] = { |
| {CKA_CLASS, &priv_class, sizeof(priv_class)}, |
| {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_UNWRAP, &false_value, sizeof(false_value)}, |
| {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_ID, base::data(id), id.length()}, |
| {CKA_LABEL, base::data(label), label.length()}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS, base::data(n), n.length()}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, base::data(e), e.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, base::data(d), d.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIME_1, base::data(p), p.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIME_2, base::data(q), q.length()}, |
| {CKA_EXPONENT_1, base::data(dmp1), dmp1.length()}, |
| {CKA_EXPONENT_2, base::data(dmq1), dmq1.length()}, |
| {CKA_COEFFICIENT, base::data(iqmp), iqmp.length()}, |
| }; |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->CreateObject(private_attributes, |
| base::size(private_attributes), &handle)); |
| // There are a few sensitive attributes that MUST be removed. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, &object)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_1)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_2)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_1)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_2)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_COEFFICIENT)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob exists. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, true)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, ImportRSAWithNoTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(false)); |
| |
| crypto::ScopedBIGNUM exponent(BN_new()); |
| CHECK(exponent); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(BN_set_word(exponent.get(), 0x10001)); |
| crypto::ScopedRSA rsa(RSA_new()); |
| CHECK(rsa); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa.get(), 2048, exponent.get(), nullptr)); |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS priv_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; |
| CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_RSA; |
| CK_BBOOL false_value = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL true_value = CK_TRUE; |
| string id = "test_id"; |
| string label = "test_label"; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_n; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_e; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_d; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_p; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_q; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_dmp1; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_dmq1; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_iqmp; |
| RSA_get0_key(rsa.get(), &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); |
| RSA_get0_factors(rsa.get(), &rsa_p, &rsa_q); |
| RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa.get(), &rsa_dmp1, &rsa_dmq1, &rsa_iqmp); |
| string n = bn2bin(rsa_n); |
| string e = bn2bin(rsa_e); |
| string d = bn2bin(rsa_d); |
| string p = bn2bin(rsa_p); |
| string q = bn2bin(rsa_q); |
| string dmp1 = bn2bin(rsa_dmp1); |
| string dmq1 = bn2bin(rsa_dmq1); |
| string iqmp = bn2bin(rsa_iqmp); |
| |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE private_attributes[] = { |
| {CKA_CLASS, &priv_class, sizeof(priv_class)}, |
| {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_UNWRAP, &false_value, sizeof(false_value)}, |
| {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_ID, base::data(id), id.length()}, |
| {CKA_LABEL, base::data(label), label.length()}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS, base::data(n), n.length()}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, base::data(e), e.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, base::data(d), d.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIME_1, base::data(p), p.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIME_2, base::data(q), q.length()}, |
| {CKA_EXPONENT_1, base::data(dmp1), dmp1.length()}, |
| {CKA_EXPONENT_2, base::data(dmq1), dmq1.length()}, |
| {CKA_COEFFICIENT, base::data(iqmp), iqmp.length()}, |
| }; |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->CreateObject(private_attributes, |
| base::size(private_attributes), &handle)); |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should still exist. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, &object)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_COEFFICIENT)); |
| |
| // Software key should not have TPM attributes. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, ImportRSAWithForceSoftware) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MinRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(1024)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, MaxRSAKeyBits()).WillRepeatedly(Return(2048)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, WrapRSAKey(_, _, _, _, _, _, _)).Times(0); |
| |
| crypto::ScopedBIGNUM exponent(BN_new()); |
| CHECK(exponent); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(BN_set_word(exponent.get(), 0x10001)); |
| crypto::ScopedRSA rsa(RSA_new()); |
| CHECK(rsa); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa.get(), 2048, exponent.get(), nullptr)); |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS priv_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; |
| CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_RSA; |
| CK_BBOOL false_value = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL true_value = CK_TRUE; |
| string id = "test_id"; |
| string label = "test_label"; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_n; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_e; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_d; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_p; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_q; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_dmp1; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_dmq1; |
| const BIGNUM* rsa_iqmp; |
| RSA_get0_key(rsa.get(), &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); |
| RSA_get0_factors(rsa.get(), &rsa_p, &rsa_q); |
| RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa.get(), &rsa_dmp1, &rsa_dmq1, &rsa_iqmp); |
| string n = bn2bin(rsa_n); |
| string e = bn2bin(rsa_e); |
| string d = bn2bin(rsa_d); |
| string p = bn2bin(rsa_p); |
| string q = bn2bin(rsa_q); |
| string dmp1 = bn2bin(rsa_dmp1); |
| string dmq1 = bn2bin(rsa_dmq1); |
| string iqmp = bn2bin(rsa_iqmp); |
| |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE private_attributes[] = { |
| {CKA_CLASS, &priv_class, sizeof(priv_class)}, |
| {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_UNWRAP, &false_value, sizeof(false_value)}, |
| {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_ID, base::data(id), id.length()}, |
| {CKA_LABEL, base::data(label), label.length()}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS, base::data(n), n.length()}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, base::data(e), e.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, base::data(d), d.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIME_1, base::data(p), p.length()}, |
| {CKA_PRIME_2, base::data(q), q.length()}, |
| {CKA_EXPONENT_1, base::data(dmp1), dmp1.length()}, |
| {CKA_EXPONENT_2, base::data(dmq1), dmq1.length()}, |
| {CKA_COEFFICIENT, base::data(iqmp), iqmp.length()}, |
| {kForceSoftwareAttribute, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| }; |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->CreateObject(private_attributes, |
| base::size(private_attributes), &handle)); |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should still exist. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, &object)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_PRIME_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_1)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_EXPONENT_2)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_COEFFICIENT)); |
| |
| // Software key should not have TPM attributes. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, ImportECCWithTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsECCurveSupported(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, WrapECCKey(_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _)).WillOnce(Return(true)); |
| |
| crypto::ScopedEC_KEY key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)); |
| ASSERT_NE(key, nullptr); |
| // Focus GetECParametersAsString() dump OID to CKA_EC_PARAMS |
| EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(key.get(), OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(key.get())); |
| |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS priv_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; |
| CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_EC; |
| CK_BBOOL false_value = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL true_value = CK_TRUE; |
| string id = "test_id"; |
| string label = "test_label"; |
| string ec_params = GetECParametersAsString(key.get()); |
| string private_value = bn2bin(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key.get())); |
| |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE private_attributes[] = { |
| {CKA_CLASS, &priv_class, sizeof(priv_class)}, |
| {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_UNWRAP, &false_value, sizeof(false_value)}, |
| {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_ID, base::data(id), id.length()}, |
| {CKA_LABEL, base::data(label), label.length()}, |
| {CKA_EC_PARAMS, base::data(ec_params), ec_params.length()}, |
| {CKA_VALUE, base::data(private_value), private_value.length()}, |
| }; |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->CreateObject(private_attributes, |
| base::size(private_attributes), &handle)); |
| |
| // There are a few sensitive attributes that MUST be removed. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, &object)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_VALUE)); |
| |
| // Check attributes that store TPM wrapped blob exists. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, true)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, ImportECCWithNoTPM) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(false)); |
| |
| crypto::ScopedEC_KEY key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)); |
| ASSERT_NE(key, nullptr); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(key.get())); |
| |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS priv_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; |
| CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_EC; |
| CK_BBOOL false_value = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL true_value = CK_TRUE; |
| string id = "test_id"; |
| string label = "test_label"; |
| string ec_params = GetECParametersAsString(key.get()); |
| string private_value = bn2bin(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key.get())); |
| |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE private_attributes[] = { |
| {CKA_CLASS, &priv_class, sizeof(priv_class)}, |
| {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_UNWRAP, &false_value, sizeof(false_value)}, |
| {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_ID, base::data(id), id.length()}, |
| {CKA_LABEL, base::data(label), label.length()}, |
| {CKA_EC_PARAMS, base::data(ec_params), ec_params.length()}, |
| {CKA_VALUE, base::data(private_value), private_value.length()}, |
| }; |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->CreateObject(private_attributes, |
| base::size(private_attributes), &handle)); |
| |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should still exist. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, &object)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_VALUE)); |
| |
| // Software key should not have TPM attributes. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSessionWithRealObject, ImportECCWithForceSoftware) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, IsTPMAvailable()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_CALL(tpm_, WrapECCKey(_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _)).Times(0); |
| |
| crypto::ScopedEC_KEY key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)); |
| ASSERT_NE(key, nullptr); |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(key.get())); |
| |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS priv_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; |
| CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_EC; |
| CK_BBOOL false_value = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL true_value = CK_TRUE; |
| string id = "test_id"; |
| string label = "test_label"; |
| string ec_params = GetECParametersAsString(key.get()); |
| string private_value = bn2bin(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key.get())); |
| |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE private_attributes[] = { |
| {CKA_CLASS, &priv_class, sizeof(priv_class)}, |
| {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_UNWRAP, &false_value, sizeof(false_value)}, |
| {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_TOKEN, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_PRIVATE, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| {CKA_ID, base::data(id), id.length()}, |
| {CKA_LABEL, base::data(label), label.length()}, |
| {CKA_EC_PARAMS, base::data(ec_params), ec_params.length()}, |
| {CKA_VALUE, base::data(private_value), private_value.length()}, |
| {kForceSoftwareAttribute, &true_value, sizeof(true_value)}, |
| }; |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, |
| session_->CreateObject(private_attributes, |
| base::size(private_attributes), &handle)); |
| |
| // For a software key, the sensitive attributes should still exist. |
| const Object* object = NULL; |
| ASSERT_TRUE(session_->GetObject(handle, &object)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(CKA_VALUE)); |
| |
| // Software key should not have TPM attributes. |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kAuthDataAttribute)); |
| EXPECT_FALSE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyBlobAttribute)); |
| |
| // Check that kKeyInSoftware attribute is correctly set. |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->IsAttributePresent(kKeyInSoftware)); |
| EXPECT_TRUE(object->GetAttributeBool(kKeyInSoftware, false)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, CreateObjectsNoPrivate) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Insert(_)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Return(ObjectPool::Result::WaitForPrivateObjects)); |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| int size = 2048; |
| CK_BBOOL no = CK_FALSE; |
| CK_BBOOL yes = CK_TRUE; |
| |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS oc = CKO_SECRET_KEY; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{CKA_CLASS, &oc, sizeof(oc)}}; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_WOULD_BLOCK_FOR_PRIVATE_OBJECTS, |
| session_->CreateObject(attr, base::size(attr), &handle)); |
| |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_WOULD_BLOCK_FOR_PRIVATE_OBJECTS, |
| session_->GenerateKey(CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, "", key_attr, 4, |
| &handle)); |
| |
| CK_BYTE pubexp[] = {1, 0, 1}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_ENCRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_VERIFY, &yes, sizeof(yes)}, |
| {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubexp, 3}, |
| {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &size, sizeof(size)}}; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_attr[] = {{CKA_TOKEN, &no, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)}, |
| {CKA_DECRYPT, &no, sizeof(no)}, |
| {CKA_SIGN, &yes, sizeof(yes)}}; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_WOULD_BLOCK_FOR_PRIVATE_OBJECTS, |
| session_->GenerateKeyPair(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, "", pub_attr, |
| 5, priv_attr, 3, &handle, &handle)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, FindObjectsNoPrivate) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Find(_, _)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Return(ObjectPool::Result::WaitForPrivateObjects)); |
| |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS oc = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{CKA_CLASS, &oc, sizeof(oc)}}; |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_WOULD_BLOCK_FOR_PRIVATE_OBJECTS, |
| session_->FindObjectsInit(attr, base::size(attr))); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, DestroyObjectsNoPrivate) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Delete(_)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Return(ObjectPool::Result::WaitForPrivateObjects)); |
| |
| int handle = 0; |
| |
| CK_OBJECT_CLASS oc = CKO_SECRET_KEY; |
| CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{CKA_CLASS, &oc, sizeof(oc)}}; |
| ASSERT_EQ(CKR_OK, session_->CreateObject(attr, base::size(attr), &handle)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_WOULD_BLOCK_FOR_PRIVATE_OBJECTS, |
| session_->DestroyObject(handle)); |
| } |
| |
| TEST_F(TestSession, FlushObjectsNoPrivate) { |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_pool_, Flush(_)) |
| .WillRepeatedly(Return(ObjectPool::Result::WaitForPrivateObjects)); |
| |
| ObjectMock token_object; |
| EXPECT_CALL(token_object, IsTokenObject()).WillRepeatedly(Return(true)); |
| EXPECT_EQ(CKR_WOULD_BLOCK_FOR_PRIVATE_OBJECTS, |
| session_->FlushModifiableObject(&token_object)); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace chaps |
| |
| int main(int argc, char** argv) { |
| ::testing::InitGoogleMock(&argc, argv); |
| OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); |
| ERR_load_crypto_strings(); |
| return RUN_ALL_TESTS(); |
| } |
